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Abstract
The finance literature reports mixed results about the dividend announcements and stock market 
reaction to those announcements. This study posits that the heterogeneous reaction of stock market to 
dividend announcements might be a result of several firm-specific financial and non-financial factors. 
In this vein, this study has tried to analyze the role of family-ownership, firm-size, leverage, and 
dividend yield in defining the dividend announcement effects. Using a sample of 206 dividend 
announcements of 136 firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period of 2008 to 2012, 
the results of both the univariate tests and the regression analysis show that the reaction of stock 
market to dividend announcements varies significantly across different groups of firms. Specifically, 
our results show that family ownership, firm-size, dividend yield and leverage significantly mediate  
the reaction of stock market around dividend announcement days. 
Keywords: Heterogeneous Reaction, Abnormal Returns, Family Ownership, Pakistan Stock 
Exchange.
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Introduction
 The corporate dividend policy have been a widely-debated subject in the domain of corpo-
rate finance and a large number of studies has explored different angles of dividend policy. One such 
angle is the stock market reaction to dividend announcements. Miller and Modigliani (1961), argues 
that dividend policy does not impact the firm value in perfect capital markets. However, Jensen’s 
(1986) Free Cash Flow (FCF) theory and Cash Flow Signaling Theory presented by Ross (1977), John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985) have rejected the argument of 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) by supporting notion that firm value is affected by dividend policy. Both 
these theories suggest positive correlation between dividend announcements and the reaction of the 
market to the dividend announcements. However, the empirical studies report mixed results regarding 
dividend announcement effects. 
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 Some studies including Aharony and Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976), Asquith and Mullins 
(1983), Gurgul et al. (2003), Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), Dasilas and Leventis (2011) have supported 
both these hypothesis by reporting positive abnormal returns around dividend announcement days. On 
the other hand, there are some other studies which have rejected the idea of positive correlation 
between the announcements of dividend and the sub-sequent stock market price reaction (Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 2002; Chen, Firth and Gao, 2002; Vieira, 2005; and 
Hossain, Siddiquee and Rahman, 2006). These studies have found no significant evidence of associa-
tion between dividend announcements and reaction of stock market to these announcements. Further, 
some studies even have reported evidences of negative correlation between the announcements of 
dividend and the sub-sequent stock market share price reaction (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, 
Keown and Pinkerton, 1984; and Healy, Hathorn and Kirch, 1997).
 These mixed results of the past studies might be an outcome of different factors that mediates 
the dividend announcement effects. A number of factors are identified by literature that affects the 
dividend announcement effects. Baker, Powell and Veit (2002) and Baker and Powell (1999) have 
highlighted that firm specific factors may impact the association between the dividend announce-
ments and the sub-sequent reaction of stock market. Further, La Porta et al. (2000), and Ball et al. 
(2000) have argued that the ownership structure also plays a vital role in explaining the dividends 
information content and in turn the reaction of market to dividend announcements. 
 A number of studies, including Eddy and Seifert (1988), Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) Haw 
and Kim (1991), Healy et al. (1997), Said (2012), Vieira (2011), around the globe have tried to empiri-
cal test the association between different factors and dividend announcement effects. However, in 
Pakistan, no study until the date has tried to empirically figure out the variables that affect the 
dividend announcement effects of Pakistani firms. In this context, this study has made an attempt to 
determine the variables that explains the information content of dividends of Pakistani firms. Particu-
larly, this study has focused on the firm-specific factors and more specifically the firm size, ownership 
composition of a firm (whether a firm is family and non-family), leverage ratio and dividend yield.
Literature Review 
 This section presents the literature review of the past studies. First, the literature review of 
those studies has been discussed which focuses on association between the dividend announcements 
and the share price reaction. Later the focus is shifted to factors that moderate the above-mentioned 
relationship. 
 
Stock Market Reaction to Dividend Announcements
 A large number of researchers have analyzed the dividend policy and its impact on the value 
of thefirm since the seminal work of Miller and Modigliani (1961). They have used different theories 
to describe the link between the firm value and the dividend policy. Two prominent theories out of 
these are free cash flow (FCF) theory of Jensen (1986) and cash flow signaling (CFS) theory. CFS 
theory which is also called asymmetric information theory has been developed by a number of 
researchers including Ross (1977), Miller and Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and 
Williams (1985). This theory proposes that the firm’s managers, as compared to shareholders (inves-
tors), have more private information about the firm’s future prospects and they signal this private 
information to the market via dividend changes. Hence, when increase in dividends is announced by 
a firm, the stock market assumes that the future prospects of that particular firm are good and hence 
reacts positively. On the other hand, when a firm cuts dividend, the stock market assumes that the 
future prospects of that particular firm are not good and hence reacts negatively, which results in lower 
share prices of the firm. Therefore, in the context of CFS, it is expected that the stock market will react 
positively whenever dividends are announced by a firm. 
 The second theory i.e. FCF theory was developed by Jensen (1986) and is based on the 
agency relationship between managers and shareholders. This theory suggests that dividend plays a 
disciplinary role for the firm’s management. Distribution of free cash flows in the form of dividends 
decreases the conflict between managers and shareholders by making it less likely for managers to 
invest free cash flows in projects that have negative net present value. According to this argument, 
dividend announcements should result in increase in the stock prices. Therefore, like CFS theory, this 
theory also predicts positive correlation between dividend announcements and prices of stock.
 The empirical support for both the theories is mixed. Several studies including Aharony and 
Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976),  Gurgul et al. (2003), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Dasilas and 
Leventis (2011), and Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), have supported both these theories by reporting 
significant abnormal returns around announcement days. On other hand, other studies have reported 
evidence that does not support these theories (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 
2002; Vieira, 2005; Hossain et al., 2006; and Chen, et al., 2002). These studies have found no signifi-
cant abnormal returns around announcement dates. Further, some studies even have reported evidenc-
es of negative correlation between the dividend announcements and the subsequent reaction of stock 
market (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, et al., 1984; and Healy et al., 1997).
Moderating Role of Firm-Specific Factors
 Literature suggests that the mixed evidence as discussed above might be an outcome of 
different factors that moderates the stock market response to the dividend announcements. These 
factors include firm size, family ownership, leverage and dividend yield. We discuss these factors in 
details in the following paragraphs.
Family ownership
 Capulong et al. (2000) has stated that ownership composition and ownership concentration 
are the two key important dimensions of corporate ownership structures. Concentration of ownership 
deals with the distribution of power between the shareholders and the managers while on the other 
hand, composition of ownership deals with the identity of shareholders of a company and specifically 
the large shareholders. A large shareholder (also called block-holder) can be government, holding 
company, individual, bank, institutional investor or family. Thus, broadly speaking there are two 
categories of ownership composition: the family block-holder and non-family block-holder. Accord-
ing to Holderness and Sheehan (1988), and Gugler (2001), family block holder has different motiva-
tions and incentives to monitor the managers. Gorton and Kahl (1999) have argued that as compared 
to non-family block-holder, the family block-holders have greater incentive of monitoring the manag-
ers. Due to the better monitoring, the family block-holders affect the reaction of stock market to 
dividends announcements.  
 There are two leading theories that explain the relationship of family ownership with 
dividend announcements effects. These include the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory 
and Leland and Pyle’s (1977) general signaling theory. Under the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
agency cost model, it is argued that due to the better monitoring efforts of family owners, sharehold-
ers-managers interests are better aligned which reduces the agency conflicts and the agency costs. 
Therefore, if reducing agency conflicts is the motivation behind the announcement of dividend chang-
es, then the firms with family block-holder will experience weaker dividend announcement effects as 
compared to the firms with non-family block-holder. Under general Leland and Pyle’s (1977) theory 
of general signaling, it is argued that due to the better monitoring of managers by the family 
block-holders, the credibility of the manager’s decisions and the signals that they convey to the 
market increases. Therefore, due to higher credibility, the firms with family block-holders will experi-
ence stronger dividend announcement effects as compared to firms with non-family block-holder.
 Unlike the ownership concentration, only few researchers have empirically analyzed the 
dividend announcement effects in the context of family and non-family ownership. Therefore, this 
area is relatively unexplored and not enough evidences are available on this area. Recently, research-
ers have started exploring the relation between family ownership on dividend announcement effects. 
Setia-Atmaja, et al. (2004) are the first researchers who have analyzed the role of family ownership in 
mediating the dividend announcement effects in Australian environment. They reported positive 
relationship between family firms and dividend announcement effects. Contrary to Setia-Atmaja, et 
al. (2004), Vieira (2012) has reported no evidence from Portuguese Environment. 
 As discussed above, the agency cost theory predicts negative relationship while general 
signaling model predicts positive correlation between family ownership and dividend news effects. 
Hence, this study has formulated the following two competing hypothesis regarding relationship 
between family ownership and dividend announcement effects. 
H1a: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are negatively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are less than abnormal returns associ-
ated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
H1b: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are positively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are greater than abnormal returns 
associated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
Firm size
 The literature has identified the firm size as another potential variable that moderate the 
dividend announcement effects. The role of the size of the firm in determining the dividend announce-
ment effects can be described in the context of signaling or asymmetric information theory of John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). Under this theory, it is assert-
ed that as information asymmetry between equity holders and managers of firm is greater in case of 
the small size firms as compared to firms with large size; therefore, when small size firm tries to 
distribute more dividends, for the purpose of conveying signals to the outside investors about their 
future prospects, will experience greater dividend announcement effects. Therefore, in this context, 
negative relationship exists between the size of the firm and the dividend news effect.
 Empirical studies reports mixed results about the firm size relationship with the dividend 
announcement effects. Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Eddy and Seifert (1988) have reported negative 
association from the U.S. Amihud and Li (2006) and Yoon and Starks (1995). Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003) and Andres et al. (2011) have also supported signaling theory by reporting negative association 
from German environment. Vieira (2011), by utilizing the data of the UK, Portuguese and the French 
markets, have provided further evidence from the European market. She has reported interesting 
results. Her study found that dividend announcement effect is negatively correlated with the firm size 
only in the UK market while her study reported no evidence of significant association in the French 
and Portugal markets. Hussainey et al. (2011) and Zakaria et al. (2012) have also reported the same 
results from the U.K and the Malaysian Markets. 
 Based the on above literature and information asymmetric theory, this study has tested the 
following hypothesis:
H2: Reaction of stock market to the dividend news is negatively associated with the firm size. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of small-sized firms are greater than the abnormal 
returns associated with the dividend announcement of the large-sized firms.
Leverage
 Leverage is another firm specific variable that is identified by the literature as a potential 
determinant of the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Said (2012) and Vieira (2011) has 
defined leverage as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets. The role of leverage in determining 
the dividend announcement effects is explained both by Jensen’s (1986) version of FCF agency cost 
argument and signaling explanation of Ross (1977). Using Jensen’s (1986) argument, Borokhovich et 
al. (2005) have highlighted that the agency costs are lower in the firms that have higher debt ratios as 
managers in these firms are left with little cash flows under their discretions due to the payment of the 
debt and financial expenses. Therefore, dividends role in reducing agency costs is limited in these 
firms and hence a weaker dividend announcement effects will be experienced by the firm with higher 
leverage ratios. Under the second argument i.e. signaling theory of Ross (1977), it is argued that firms 
with good quality try to differentiate themselves from bad quality firms by using high leverage ratio. 
Therefore, investors interpret the dividend signals of the companies with higher leverage ratios as 
favorable as the investors anticipate that the managers of such good quality firm will be able to contin-
ue paying dividends in the future. 
 Empirical results regarding the association of the dividend news effects with leverage are 
mixed. Few studies have supported cash flow or agency theory by reporting negative association 
(Healy et al., 1997; and Alonso et al., 2005). Contrarily, Allen and Rachim (1996), Vieira (2011) and 
Zakaria et al. (2012) have supported signaling theory by reporting positive relation between the 
dividend announcement effects and leverage. 
 
 Literature suggests that the agency cost argument generally favors Pakistani environment 
more than the signaling theory regarding the role of leverage in determining different factors related 
to corporate finance and corporate performance (Nazir and Saita, 2013; Khan, Kaleem and Nazir, 
2012; and Satti, 2013). However, this study has tested two hypotheses based on the agency and the 
signaling theory in the light of empirical results reported from different countries. 
H3a: Negative association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are greater as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of the firms with high level of leverage.
H3b: Positive association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to the 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are lesser as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of firms with high level of leverage.
Dividend yield
 Dividend yield is one of the main factors that affect abnormal returns around dividend 
announcement days (Yoon and Starks, 1995; and Lee and Yan; 2003). The impact of dividend yield 
on share price reaction to dividend news can be explained in the context of agency cost and signaling 
theories. Both of the theories predict positive association between dividend announcement effects and 
dividend yield (Ariff and Finn, 1986; Lee, 1995; and Belde et al., 2005). Under the agency cost frame-
work, it is argued that high dividend yield helps in reducing agency conflicts in the firm. Hence, 
keeping other variables constant, the higher the dividend yield associated with the dividend announce-
ment, the stronger will be the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Contrarily, under the signal-
ing theory, it is argued that high dividend yield depicts that future prospects of a firm are good, there-
fore, dividend announcements that are accompanied by high dividend yield are perceived as a more 
favorable signal as compared to a dividend announcement with low dividend yield. Hence, a dividend 
announcement with high dividend yield induces stronger stock market reaction. 
 The earning response coefficient is dependent upon the earning retention rate, among other 
variables. Butler and Han (1994) argues that the share price reaction to the announcements is a 
function of earning surprise and earning response coefficient. They use dividend yield as a proxy for 
earning retention rate because actual earnings’ retention rate can go to unreasonable range if a firm has 
zero earnings or negative earnings. Dividend yield has been calculated as the per share dividend divid-
ed by the price of share five days before the announcement of dividend. Based on the above literature, 
this study has tested the following hypothesis:
H4: Positive association exists between the dividend yield and the dividend announcement effects. 
Hence, abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcements of the firms that are accompa-
nied by higher dividend yield will be greater as compared to the dividend announcement of the firms 
that are accompanied by lower dividend yield.
Growth opportunities
 Different studies have used growth opportunity as a control variable while examining 
relationship between different factors and stock market reaction to the dividend news (Vieira, 2005; 
Zakaria et al., 2012; Vieira, 2011; Neil and Robert, 2009; Vieira, 2012 and Andres et al., 2011). Past 
studies including Vieira (2011) and Andres et al. (2011) have used Tobin’s Q as a measure of inves-
tors’ expectation about the growth prospect of a firm and market to book value of equity (MV/BV) 
ratio as a proxy of Tobin’s Q. Thus, MV/BV has been used as a proxy of growth opportunity by this 
study also. According to Vieira (2011), high MV/BV shows that investors think that the firm has 
higher future growth prospects. Firms with lower MV/BV ratios are considered to have higher level 
of free cash flow and thus will be able to pay more dividends. Therefore, reaction of stock market is 
more strong to dividend news of firms that have lower MV/BV ratio, hence negative coefficient is 
expected for this variable. Among the past studies that have used MV/BV as control variable, Zakaria 
et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) have found no significant influence of this variable on the stock 
market reaction to the dividend news while Vieira (2011), Neil and Robert (2009) and Vieira (2005) 
have found negative relationship between  MV/BV and the dividend news effects. Apart from MV/BV 
ratio, this study also used price to earnings (P/E) ratio as proxy for investment opportunities by 
following Basu (1977) and Reinganum (1981). Both these studies reported negative association.
 
Methodology
Sample and Data Sources
 This section discusses the data sources, the data collection methods, the data analysis tools, 
and variables. For the purpose of the data collection, this study used simple random sampling 
technique. The sampling period ranges from year 2008 to 2012. During this sampling period, 136 
firms announced 206 annual dividends. Therefore, we analyze 206 annual dividend announcements of 
136 firms over the above-mentioned sampling period.
 The data of dividend announcements and the stock prices have been extracted from the KSE 
database. Data about the firm-specific variables and ownership structure were gathered from the 
annual reports of the firms.
Model Specification
 For testing the association of the above-mentioned variables with the dividend news effects, 
this study has utilized standard event study methodology. For generating abnormal returns market 
model has been utilized. Equation of the market model is specified as under:
Where,
Ritis return rate of security i at day t
Rmtis the rate of return of market at day t
αiis constant
βi isthe sensitivity of the expected asset return to the expected market return calculated as
 For the purpose of estimating the parameters of market model, 100 daily continuously 
compounded returns are used which ranged from approximately 145 days before the announcement 
date. KSE-100 Index is used as a market proxy. Ordinary least square method has been utilized for 
estimating the market model parameters. After estimating the parameters of market model, the follow-
ing equation has been used to calculate the expected returns:
Where,
E(Ri) is the expected return on stock iat day t
    is the estimated intercept of market model for stock i
    is the estimated beta of market model for stock i
For each dividend announcement, abnormal returns are calculated after estimating the market model 
parameters, by using the following equation:
Where,
ARit is the stock i abnormal return at day t
Rit is the actual stock i return at day t
 Abnormal returns, in case of each event (dividend announcement), are calculated for all 
event windows. After calculation of abnormal returns, average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumula-
tive abnormal returns (CAAR) are calculated for all event windows. After calculating AAR and 
CAAR, univariate and multivariate analysis has been performed. Before performing univariate and 
multivariate analyses to test the association between dividend news and aforementioned independent 
variables, the significance of the AAR and CAAR of the event windows mentioned before has been 
checked by using student t-test on overall sample.  
 For univariate analysis, independent samples t-test has been used while for multivariate 
analysis, regression analysis has been performed. In univariate analysis, independent sample t-test has 
been performed on AAR and CAAR of lower 50th and upper 50th percentile of each variable (exclud-
ing family ownership in case of which test has been conducted on AAR and CAAR of family and 
non-family groups). In multivariate analysis, regression has been run by using both AAR and CAAR 
as dependent variables. The following are the regression equations with a full set of explanatory 
variables:
ARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e ……(1)
CAARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e…(2)
Where,
AARt is average abnormal return of specific event window
CAARt is cumulative average abnormal return of specific event window
β1 is the co-efficient of family and indicates relationship between family ownership and AARt and 
CAARt
β2 is the co-efficient of LMV (firm size) and indicates relationship between firm size and AARt and 
CAARt
β3 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β4 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β5is the co-efficient of growth opportunity (MV/BV) and indicates relationship between MV/BV and 
AARt and CAARt
 Before performing these formal tests to determine the relationship between four aforemen-
tioned independent variables and stock market reaction to dividend news, a series of diagnostic tests 
were conducted to identify problems in the data. Details of these diagnostic tests and remedial actions 
are not reported for the sake of parsimony.
Results and Discussion
T-tests Results
 Table 1 below reports mean values of AAR and CAAR for the event windows ranging from 
five days prior to dividend announcement to five days after dividend announcements. All tables in this 
paper were constructed using asdoc program of Shah (2018).
 Table 1 shows that p-values of mean values of AAR and CAAR are statistically significant 
only in few event windows. For example, AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, CAARt0, AARt-2, 
AARt-5 and CAARt-2 are significant at five percent level while CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant 
only at the 10 percent level. Averages of all these significant AARs and CAARs are positive which 
shows that market reacts positively to the announcements of dividend. Moreover, significance of 
AARt-2, CAARt-2, and AART-1 indicates leakage of information about the dividend announcements 
prior to announcement of these dividends. 
 For further analysis, those event windows have been used analysis that have significant 
AARs and CAARs. Therefore, we use AARt-2, AARt-5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, and CAARt0 as depen-
dent variables in the regressions analysis to test their relationship with the previously mentioned four 
explanatory variables.
Table 1
Means and T-Tests of the Abnormal Returns in Different Event Windows
Univariate Analyses
 
This section presents and discusses results of the t-tests to find whether firm-specific variables 
moderate reaction of stock market to dividend news. The median values of each firm-specific variable 
is used to divide firms into two above 50th and below 50th percentiles, except for family ownership 
for which the groups have been made based on family vs. non-family status of firms. Then AAR and 
CAAR have been calculated for these groups of firms. Table 2 reports that mean differences of these 
abnormal returns under the heading of each firm-specific variable that have been used for making 
group of firms. For example, the column with heading ‘Size shows the mean abnormal returns of 
firms that are in the 50th top percentile of firm size minus mean abnormal returns of firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile of firm size.
 The results show that family firms have lower abnormal returns than non-family firms. The 
p-values show that the mean differences are significant only in case of AARt-5 at one percent level of 
significance and in case AARt-2 at five percent level of significance. Results also show that reaction 
of stock market to dividend news is stronger for smaller firms as compared to larger firms.  This is 
evident from the column with the heading ‘Size’, showing that mean differences of CAARt-2 and 
CAARt0 are negative and statistically significant. Results also depicts that firm’s leverage ratio 
significantly moderates the dividend news effects. For example, mean differences in abnormal returns 
are significantly higher for dividend announcements in firms with lower leverage ratios as compared 
to firms that have high leverage ratios. Finally, there is some evidence that firms with lower dividend 
yield experience more reaction to dividend announcements as compared to firms with higher 
dividend yield.
This section presents and discusses results of the t-test to find
Table 2
Mean Differences in Return
Regressions Results
 Regression analysis results are reported in Table 3. The coefficients of the dummy variables 
used to indicate family firms are negative in all the event windows, except CAARt-1 where it is 
positive. In line with the results reported in univariate analysis, coefficient of family dummy is signifi-
cant and negative in AARt-2 and AARt-5 while it is insignificant in case of the rest of the event 
windows. It shows that announcement effects of family firms are weaker as compared to announce-
ment effects of non-family firms. This finding supports the agency theory explanation that family 
ownership reduces conflict between principal and agent and hence dividends lose its importance as a 
tool to reduce agency costs.
 The results show that the firm size coefficient is negative and statistically significant in case 
of CAARt-2 and CAAR0 while coefficients of abnormal returns in other event windows are insignifi-
cant. Result of the regression analysis supports the findings of univariate analysis as reported in Table 
2. These findings show that abnormal returns due to dividend announcements are significantly lower 
for firms that are placed in the top 50th percentile of the firm size as compared to the firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile. These results are in line with information asymmetric theory of Miller and 
Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and Williams (1985) that predicts that small firms face 
more information asymmetry problems and hence dividends are an effective tool for them in reducing 
information asymmetry costs.
Table 3
Regression Results
 Leverage coefficient is negative and significant in case of AARt+5, CAARt-2 and CAARt-1. 
These results indicate that negative relationship exists between leverage and dividend news effects. 
Our results support the free cash flow argument of agency theory which suggests that agency costs are 
lower in firms that have high leverage ratio; hence dividend announcement effects are weaker in such 
firms. Positive and statistically significant dividend yield coefficient is reported in case of AARt+5 
and CAARt0 while it is insignificant in all other event windows. Generally, the results suggest that 
firms with higher dividend yield experience strong dividend announcement effects. 
 MV/BV and P/E ratio have been used as alternative proxies for firm’s investment opportuni-
ties. Results in Table 3 show that MV/BV has no significant influence on the dividend announcement 
effects. This finding is consistent with Zakaria et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) who found no 
significant influence of this variable on dividend announcement effects. However, the second proxy 
for investment opportunities, the P/E ratio, has statistically significant negative coefficient in case of 
AARt-5 and CAARt-1. These findings suggest that dividend announcement effects are weaker for 
firms with higher growth opportunities and stronger for firms that have less investment opportunities. 
Conclusion
 This study has empirically sought to determine the relation between the dividend announce-
ment effects and the firm-specific factors including family ownership, dividend yield, firm size and 
leverage ratio of firms.  Results of two-sample t-test indicate that only AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, 
CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant, therefore, cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal returns 
of these event windows were used as dependent variables in the regression analysis. Both multiple 
regression and univariate analyses have been employed to determine the moderating role of the 
firm-specific independent variables on the market reaction to the dividend news. The results of both 
univariate and regression analyses are consistent. Negative relation is reported between the abnormal 
returns and the family ownership. It affirms that the stock market gives lesser importance to the 
dividend announcement of family firms than the announcements of non-family firms. This might be 
because of lower level of agency problems in the family firms as suggested by the Jensen and Meck-
ling’s (1976) agency hypothesis. Further, this study discovered a negative association between the size 
of the firm and the dividend news effect. This negative relation is explained by the information asym-
metry theory of John and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). This 
finding is in line with the finding of other empirical studies such as Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Andres 
et al. (2011), Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Amihud and Li (2006). Next, a negative association is found 
between the abnormal returns and the leverage. This negative association is in line with Jensen’s (1986) 
agency theory. Further, a positive relation is found between the dividend yield and the dividend abnor-
mal returns. Among the control variables, this study found that investment opportunities measured by 
MV/BV have no effect on the share price reaction to the dividend announcement while P/E ratio has 
significant negative effect on abnormal returns. These findings show that the reaction of the stock 
market to the dividend announcement is heterogeneous. Firms with significant agency problems and 
information asymmetry problems experience positive abnormal stock returns when they announce 
dividends. 
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Abstract
The finance literature reports mixed results about the dividend announcements and stock market 
reaction to those announcements. This study posits that the heterogeneous reaction of stock market to 
dividend announcements might be a result of several firm-specific financial and non-financial factors. 
In this vein, this study has tried to analyze the role of family-ownership, firm-size, leverage, and 
dividend yield in defining the dividend announcement effects. Using a sample of 206 dividend 
announcements of 136 firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period of 2008 to 2012, 
the results of both the univariate tests and the regression analysis show that the reaction of stock 
market to dividend announcements varies significantly across different groups of firms. Specifically, 
our results show that family ownership, firm-size, dividend yield and leverage significantly mediate  
the reaction of stock market around dividend announcement days. 
Keywords: Heterogeneous Reaction, Abnormal Returns, Family Ownership, Pakistan Stock 
Exchange.
JEL Classification: G 230
Introduction
 The corporate dividend policy have been a widely-debated subject in the domain of corpo-
rate finance and a large number of studies has explored different angles of dividend policy. One such 
angle is the stock market reaction to dividend announcements. Miller and Modigliani (1961), argues 
that dividend policy does not impact the firm value in perfect capital markets. However, Jensen’s 
(1986) Free Cash Flow (FCF) theory and Cash Flow Signaling Theory presented by Ross (1977), John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985) have rejected the argument of 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) by supporting notion that firm value is affected by dividend policy. Both 
these theories suggest positive correlation between dividend announcements and the reaction of the 
market to the dividend announcements. However, the empirical studies report mixed results regarding 
dividend announcement effects. 
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 Some studies including Aharony and Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976), Asquith and Mullins 
(1983), Gurgul et al. (2003), Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), Dasilas and Leventis (2011) have supported 
both these hypothesis by reporting positive abnormal returns around dividend announcement days. On 
the other hand, there are some other studies which have rejected the idea of positive correlation 
between the announcements of dividend and the sub-sequent stock market price reaction (Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 2002; Chen, Firth and Gao, 2002; Vieira, 2005; and 
Hossain, Siddiquee and Rahman, 2006). These studies have found no significant evidence of associa-
tion between dividend announcements and reaction of stock market to these announcements. Further, 
some studies even have reported evidences of negative correlation between the announcements of 
dividend and the sub-sequent stock market share price reaction (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, 
Keown and Pinkerton, 1984; and Healy, Hathorn and Kirch, 1997).
 These mixed results of the past studies might be an outcome of different factors that mediates 
the dividend announcement effects. A number of factors are identified by literature that affects the 
dividend announcement effects. Baker, Powell and Veit (2002) and Baker and Powell (1999) have 
highlighted that firm specific factors may impact the association between the dividend announce-
ments and the sub-sequent reaction of stock market. Further, La Porta et al. (2000), and Ball et al. 
(2000) have argued that the ownership structure also plays a vital role in explaining the dividends 
information content and in turn the reaction of market to dividend announcements. 
 A number of studies, including Eddy and Seifert (1988), Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) Haw 
and Kim (1991), Healy et al. (1997), Said (2012), Vieira (2011), around the globe have tried to empiri-
cal test the association between different factors and dividend announcement effects. However, in 
Pakistan, no study until the date has tried to empirically figure out the variables that affect the 
dividend announcement effects of Pakistani firms. In this context, this study has made an attempt to 
determine the variables that explains the information content of dividends of Pakistani firms. Particu-
larly, this study has focused on the firm-specific factors and more specifically the firm size, ownership 
composition of a firm (whether a firm is family and non-family), leverage ratio and dividend yield.
Literature Review 
 This section presents the literature review of the past studies. First, the literature review of 
those studies has been discussed which focuses on association between the dividend announcements 
and the share price reaction. Later the focus is shifted to factors that moderate the above-mentioned 
relationship. 
 
Stock Market Reaction to Dividend Announcements
 A large number of researchers have analyzed the dividend policy and its impact on the value 
of thefirm since the seminal work of Miller and Modigliani (1961). They have used different theories 
to describe the link between the firm value and the dividend policy. Two prominent theories out of 
these are free cash flow (FCF) theory of Jensen (1986) and cash flow signaling (CFS) theory. CFS 
theory which is also called asymmetric information theory has been developed by a number of 
researchers including Ross (1977), Miller and Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and 
Williams (1985). This theory proposes that the firm’s managers, as compared to shareholders (inves-
tors), have more private information about the firm’s future prospects and they signal this private 
information to the market via dividend changes. Hence, when increase in dividends is announced by 
a firm, the stock market assumes that the future prospects of that particular firm are good and hence 
reacts positively. On the other hand, when a firm cuts dividend, the stock market assumes that the 
future prospects of that particular firm are not good and hence reacts negatively, which results in lower 
share prices of the firm. Therefore, in the context of CFS, it is expected that the stock market will react 
positively whenever dividends are announced by a firm. 
 The second theory i.e. FCF theory was developed by Jensen (1986) and is based on the 
agency relationship between managers and shareholders. This theory suggests that dividend plays a 
disciplinary role for the firm’s management. Distribution of free cash flows in the form of dividends 
decreases the conflict between managers and shareholders by making it less likely for managers to 
invest free cash flows in projects that have negative net present value. According to this argument, 
dividend announcements should result in increase in the stock prices. Therefore, like CFS theory, this 
theory also predicts positive correlation between dividend announcements and prices of stock.
 The empirical support for both the theories is mixed. Several studies including Aharony and 
Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976),  Gurgul et al. (2003), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Dasilas and 
Leventis (2011), and Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), have supported both these theories by reporting 
significant abnormal returns around announcement days. On other hand, other studies have reported 
evidence that does not support these theories (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 
2002; Vieira, 2005; Hossain et al., 2006; and Chen, et al., 2002). These studies have found no signifi-
cant abnormal returns around announcement dates. Further, some studies even have reported evidenc-
es of negative correlation between the dividend announcements and the subsequent reaction of stock 
market (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, et al., 1984; and Healy et al., 1997).
Moderating Role of Firm-Specific Factors
 Literature suggests that the mixed evidence as discussed above might be an outcome of 
different factors that moderates the stock market response to the dividend announcements. These 
factors include firm size, family ownership, leverage and dividend yield. We discuss these factors in 
details in the following paragraphs.
Family ownership
 Capulong et al. (2000) has stated that ownership composition and ownership concentration 
are the two key important dimensions of corporate ownership structures. Concentration of ownership 
deals with the distribution of power between the shareholders and the managers while on the other 
hand, composition of ownership deals with the identity of shareholders of a company and specifically 
the large shareholders. A large shareholder (also called block-holder) can be government, holding 
company, individual, bank, institutional investor or family. Thus, broadly speaking there are two 
categories of ownership composition: the family block-holder and non-family block-holder. Accord-
ing to Holderness and Sheehan (1988), and Gugler (2001), family block holder has different motiva-
tions and incentives to monitor the managers. Gorton and Kahl (1999) have argued that as compared 
to non-family block-holder, the family block-holders have greater incentive of monitoring the manag-
ers. Due to the better monitoring, the family block-holders affect the reaction of stock market to 
dividends announcements.  
 There are two leading theories that explain the relationship of family ownership with 
dividend announcements effects. These include the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory 
and Leland and Pyle’s (1977) general signaling theory. Under the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
agency cost model, it is argued that due to the better monitoring efforts of family owners, sharehold-
ers-managers interests are better aligned which reduces the agency conflicts and the agency costs. 
Therefore, if reducing agency conflicts is the motivation behind the announcement of dividend chang-
es, then the firms with family block-holder will experience weaker dividend announcement effects as 
compared to the firms with non-family block-holder. Under general Leland and Pyle’s (1977) theory 
of general signaling, it is argued that due to the better monitoring of managers by the family 
block-holders, the credibility of the manager’s decisions and the signals that they convey to the 
market increases. Therefore, due to higher credibility, the firms with family block-holders will experi-
ence stronger dividend announcement effects as compared to firms with non-family block-holder.
 Unlike the ownership concentration, only few researchers have empirically analyzed the 
dividend announcement effects in the context of family and non-family ownership. Therefore, this 
area is relatively unexplored and not enough evidences are available on this area. Recently, research-
ers have started exploring the relation between family ownership on dividend announcement effects. 
Setia-Atmaja, et al. (2004) are the first researchers who have analyzed the role of family ownership in 
mediating the dividend announcement effects in Australian environment. They reported positive 
relationship between family firms and dividend announcement effects. Contrary to Setia-Atmaja, et 
al. (2004), Vieira (2012) has reported no evidence from Portuguese Environment. 
 As discussed above, the agency cost theory predicts negative relationship while general 
signaling model predicts positive correlation between family ownership and dividend news effects. 
Hence, this study has formulated the following two competing hypothesis regarding relationship 
between family ownership and dividend announcement effects. 
H1a: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are negatively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are less than abnormal returns associ-
ated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
H1b: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are positively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are greater than abnormal returns 
associated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
Firm size
 The literature has identified the firm size as another potential variable that moderate the 
dividend announcement effects. The role of the size of the firm in determining the dividend announce-
ment effects can be described in the context of signaling or asymmetric information theory of John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). Under this theory, it is assert-
ed that as information asymmetry between equity holders and managers of firm is greater in case of 
the small size firms as compared to firms with large size; therefore, when small size firm tries to 
distribute more dividends, for the purpose of conveying signals to the outside investors about their 
future prospects, will experience greater dividend announcement effects. Therefore, in this context, 
negative relationship exists between the size of the firm and the dividend news effect.
 Empirical studies reports mixed results about the firm size relationship with the dividend 
announcement effects. Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Eddy and Seifert (1988) have reported negative 
association from the U.S. Amihud and Li (2006) and Yoon and Starks (1995). Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003) and Andres et al. (2011) have also supported signaling theory by reporting negative association 
from German environment. Vieira (2011), by utilizing the data of the UK, Portuguese and the French 
markets, have provided further evidence from the European market. She has reported interesting 
results. Her study found that dividend announcement effect is negatively correlated with the firm size 
only in the UK market while her study reported no evidence of significant association in the French 
and Portugal markets. Hussainey et al. (2011) and Zakaria et al. (2012) have also reported the same 
results from the U.K and the Malaysian Markets. 
 Based the on above literature and information asymmetric theory, this study has tested the 
following hypothesis:
H2: Reaction of stock market to the dividend news is negatively associated with the firm size. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of small-sized firms are greater than the abnormal 
returns associated with the dividend announcement of the large-sized firms.
Leverage
 Leverage is another firm specific variable that is identified by the literature as a potential 
determinant of the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Said (2012) and Vieira (2011) has 
defined leverage as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets. The role of leverage in determining 
the dividend announcement effects is explained both by Jensen’s (1986) version of FCF agency cost 
argument and signaling explanation of Ross (1977). Using Jensen’s (1986) argument, Borokhovich et 
al. (2005) have highlighted that the agency costs are lower in the firms that have higher debt ratios as 
managers in these firms are left with little cash flows under their discretions due to the payment of the 
debt and financial expenses. Therefore, dividends role in reducing agency costs is limited in these 
firms and hence a weaker dividend announcement effects will be experienced by the firm with higher 
leverage ratios. Under the second argument i.e. signaling theory of Ross (1977), it is argued that firms 
with good quality try to differentiate themselves from bad quality firms by using high leverage ratio. 
Therefore, investors interpret the dividend signals of the companies with higher leverage ratios as 
favorable as the investors anticipate that the managers of such good quality firm will be able to contin-
ue paying dividends in the future. 
 Empirical results regarding the association of the dividend news effects with leverage are 
mixed. Few studies have supported cash flow or agency theory by reporting negative association 
(Healy et al., 1997; and Alonso et al., 2005). Contrarily, Allen and Rachim (1996), Vieira (2011) and 
Zakaria et al. (2012) have supported signaling theory by reporting positive relation between the 
dividend announcement effects and leverage. 
 
 Literature suggests that the agency cost argument generally favors Pakistani environment 
more than the signaling theory regarding the role of leverage in determining different factors related 
to corporate finance and corporate performance (Nazir and Saita, 2013; Khan, Kaleem and Nazir, 
2012; and Satti, 2013). However, this study has tested two hypotheses based on the agency and the 
signaling theory in the light of empirical results reported from different countries. 
H3a: Negative association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are greater as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of the firms with high level of leverage.
H3b: Positive association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to the 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are lesser as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of firms with high level of leverage.
Dividend yield
 Dividend yield is one of the main factors that affect abnormal returns around dividend 
announcement days (Yoon and Starks, 1995; and Lee and Yan; 2003). The impact of dividend yield 
on share price reaction to dividend news can be explained in the context of agency cost and signaling 
theories. Both of the theories predict positive association between dividend announcement effects and 
dividend yield (Ariff and Finn, 1986; Lee, 1995; and Belde et al., 2005). Under the agency cost frame-
work, it is argued that high dividend yield helps in reducing agency conflicts in the firm. Hence, 
keeping other variables constant, the higher the dividend yield associated with the dividend announce-
ment, the stronger will be the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Contrarily, under the signal-
ing theory, it is argued that high dividend yield depicts that future prospects of a firm are good, there-
fore, dividend announcements that are accompanied by high dividend yield are perceived as a more 
favorable signal as compared to a dividend announcement with low dividend yield. Hence, a dividend 
announcement with high dividend yield induces stronger stock market reaction. 
 The earning response coefficient is dependent upon the earning retention rate, among other 
variables. Butler and Han (1994) argues that the share price reaction to the announcements is a 
function of earning surprise and earning response coefficient. They use dividend yield as a proxy for 
earning retention rate because actual earnings’ retention rate can go to unreasonable range if a firm has 
zero earnings or negative earnings. Dividend yield has been calculated as the per share dividend divid-
ed by the price of share five days before the announcement of dividend. Based on the above literature, 
this study has tested the following hypothesis:
H4: Positive association exists between the dividend yield and the dividend announcement effects. 
Hence, abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcements of the firms that are accompa-
nied by higher dividend yield will be greater as compared to the dividend announcement of the firms 
that are accompanied by lower dividend yield.
Growth opportunities
 Different studies have used growth opportunity as a control variable while examining 
relationship between different factors and stock market reaction to the dividend news (Vieira, 2005; 
Zakaria et al., 2012; Vieira, 2011; Neil and Robert, 2009; Vieira, 2012 and Andres et al., 2011). Past 
studies including Vieira (2011) and Andres et al. (2011) have used Tobin’s Q as a measure of inves-
tors’ expectation about the growth prospect of a firm and market to book value of equity (MV/BV) 
ratio as a proxy of Tobin’s Q. Thus, MV/BV has been used as a proxy of growth opportunity by this 
study also. According to Vieira (2011), high MV/BV shows that investors think that the firm has 
higher future growth prospects. Firms with lower MV/BV ratios are considered to have higher level 
of free cash flow and thus will be able to pay more dividends. Therefore, reaction of stock market is 
more strong to dividend news of firms that have lower MV/BV ratio, hence negative coefficient is 
expected for this variable. Among the past studies that have used MV/BV as control variable, Zakaria 
et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) have found no significant influence of this variable on the stock 
market reaction to the dividend news while Vieira (2011), Neil and Robert (2009) and Vieira (2005) 
have found negative relationship between  MV/BV and the dividend news effects. Apart from MV/BV 
ratio, this study also used price to earnings (P/E) ratio as proxy for investment opportunities by 
following Basu (1977) and Reinganum (1981). Both these studies reported negative association.
 
Methodology
Sample and Data Sources
 This section discusses the data sources, the data collection methods, the data analysis tools, 
and variables. For the purpose of the data collection, this study used simple random sampling 
technique. The sampling period ranges from year 2008 to 2012. During this sampling period, 136 
firms announced 206 annual dividends. Therefore, we analyze 206 annual dividend announcements of 
136 firms over the above-mentioned sampling period.
 The data of dividend announcements and the stock prices have been extracted from the KSE 
database. Data about the firm-specific variables and ownership structure were gathered from the 
annual reports of the firms.
Model Specification
 For testing the association of the above-mentioned variables with the dividend news effects, 
this study has utilized standard event study methodology. For generating abnormal returns market 
model has been utilized. Equation of the market model is specified as under:
Where,
Ritis return rate of security i at day t
Rmtis the rate of return of market at day t
αiis constant
βi isthe sensitivity of the expected asset return to the expected market return calculated as
 For the purpose of estimating the parameters of market model, 100 daily continuously 
compounded returns are used which ranged from approximately 145 days before the announcement 
date. KSE-100 Index is used as a market proxy. Ordinary least square method has been utilized for 
estimating the market model parameters. After estimating the parameters of market model, the follow-
ing equation has been used to calculate the expected returns:
Where,
E(Ri) is the expected return on stock iat day t
    is the estimated intercept of market model for stock i
    is the estimated beta of market model for stock i
For each dividend announcement, abnormal returns are calculated after estimating the market model 
parameters, by using the following equation:
Where,
ARit is the stock i abnormal return at day t
Rit is the actual stock i return at day t
 Abnormal returns, in case of each event (dividend announcement), are calculated for all 
event windows. After calculation of abnormal returns, average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumula-
tive abnormal returns (CAAR) are calculated for all event windows. After calculating AAR and 
CAAR, univariate and multivariate analysis has been performed. Before performing univariate and 
multivariate analyses to test the association between dividend news and aforementioned independent 
variables, the significance of the AAR and CAAR of the event windows mentioned before has been 
checked by using student t-test on overall sample.  
 For univariate analysis, independent samples t-test has been used while for multivariate 
analysis, regression analysis has been performed. In univariate analysis, independent sample t-test has 
been performed on AAR and CAAR of lower 50th and upper 50th percentile of each variable (exclud-
ing family ownership in case of which test has been conducted on AAR and CAAR of family and 
non-family groups). In multivariate analysis, regression has been run by using both AAR and CAAR 
as dependent variables. The following are the regression equations with a full set of explanatory 
variables:
ARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e ……(1)
CAARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e…(2)
Where,
AARt is average abnormal return of specific event window
CAARt is cumulative average abnormal return of specific event window
β1 is the co-efficient of family and indicates relationship between family ownership and AARt and 
CAARt
β2 is the co-efficient of LMV (firm size) and indicates relationship between firm size and AARt and 
CAARt
β3 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β4 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β5is the co-efficient of growth opportunity (MV/BV) and indicates relationship between MV/BV and 
AARt and CAARt
 Before performing these formal tests to determine the relationship between four aforemen-
tioned independent variables and stock market reaction to dividend news, a series of diagnostic tests 
were conducted to identify problems in the data. Details of these diagnostic tests and remedial actions 
are not reported for the sake of parsimony.
Results and Discussion
T-tests Results
 Table 1 below reports mean values of AAR and CAAR for the event windows ranging from 
five days prior to dividend announcement to five days after dividend announcements. All tables in this 
paper were constructed using asdoc program of Shah (2018).
 Table 1 shows that p-values of mean values of AAR and CAAR are statistically significant 
only in few event windows. For example, AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, CAARt0, AARt-2, 
AARt-5 and CAARt-2 are significant at five percent level while CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant 
only at the 10 percent level. Averages of all these significant AARs and CAARs are positive which 
shows that market reacts positively to the announcements of dividend. Moreover, significance of 
AARt-2, CAARt-2, and AART-1 indicates leakage of information about the dividend announcements 
prior to announcement of these dividends. 
 For further analysis, those event windows have been used analysis that have significant 
AARs and CAARs. Therefore, we use AARt-2, AARt-5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, and CAARt0 as depen-
dent variables in the regressions analysis to test their relationship with the previously mentioned four 
explanatory variables.
Table 1
Means and T-Tests of the Abnormal Returns in Different Event Windows
Univariate Analyses
 
This section presents and discusses results of the t-tests to find whether firm-specific variables 
moderate reaction of stock market to dividend news. The median values of each firm-specific variable 
is used to divide firms into two above 50th and below 50th percentiles, except for family ownership 
for which the groups have been made based on family vs. non-family status of firms. Then AAR and 
CAAR have been calculated for these groups of firms. Table 2 reports that mean differences of these 
abnormal returns under the heading of each firm-specific variable that have been used for making 
group of firms. For example, the column with heading ‘Size shows the mean abnormal returns of 
firms that are in the 50th top percentile of firm size minus mean abnormal returns of firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile of firm size.
 The results show that family firms have lower abnormal returns than non-family firms. The 
p-values show that the mean differences are significant only in case of AARt-5 at one percent level of 
significance and in case AARt-2 at five percent level of significance. Results also show that reaction 
of stock market to dividend news is stronger for smaller firms as compared to larger firms.  This is 
evident from the column with the heading ‘Size’, showing that mean differences of CAARt-2 and 
CAARt0 are negative and statistically significant. Results also depicts that firm’s leverage ratio 
significantly moderates the dividend news effects. For example, mean differences in abnormal returns 
are significantly higher for dividend announcements in firms with lower leverage ratios as compared 
to firms that have high leverage ratios. Finally, there is some evidence that firms with lower dividend 
yield experience more reaction to dividend announcements as compared to firms with higher 
dividend yield.
This section presents and discusses results of the t-test to find
Table 2
Mean Differences in Return
Regressions Results
 Regression analysis results are reported in Table 3. The coefficients of the dummy variables 
used to indicate family firms are negative in all the event windows, except CAARt-1 where it is 
positive. In line with the results reported in univariate analysis, coefficient of family dummy is signifi-
cant and negative in AARt-2 and AARt-5 while it is insignificant in case of the rest of the event 
windows. It shows that announcement effects of family firms are weaker as compared to announce-
ment effects of non-family firms. This finding supports the agency theory explanation that family 
ownership reduces conflict between principal and agent and hence dividends lose its importance as a 
tool to reduce agency costs.
 The results show that the firm size coefficient is negative and statistically significant in case 
of CAARt-2 and CAAR0 while coefficients of abnormal returns in other event windows are insignifi-
cant. Result of the regression analysis supports the findings of univariate analysis as reported in Table 
2. These findings show that abnormal returns due to dividend announcements are significantly lower 
for firms that are placed in the top 50th percentile of the firm size as compared to the firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile. These results are in line with information asymmetric theory of Miller and 
Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and Williams (1985) that predicts that small firms face 
more information asymmetry problems and hence dividends are an effective tool for them in reducing 
information asymmetry costs.
Table 3
Regression Results
 Leverage coefficient is negative and significant in case of AARt+5, CAARt-2 and CAARt-1. 
These results indicate that negative relationship exists between leverage and dividend news effects. 
Our results support the free cash flow argument of agency theory which suggests that agency costs are 
lower in firms that have high leverage ratio; hence dividend announcement effects are weaker in such 
firms. Positive and statistically significant dividend yield coefficient is reported in case of AARt+5 
and CAARt0 while it is insignificant in all other event windows. Generally, the results suggest that 
firms with higher dividend yield experience strong dividend announcement effects. 
 MV/BV and P/E ratio have been used as alternative proxies for firm’s investment opportuni-
ties. Results in Table 3 show that MV/BV has no significant influence on the dividend announcement 
effects. This finding is consistent with Zakaria et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) who found no 
significant influence of this variable on dividend announcement effects. However, the second proxy 
for investment opportunities, the P/E ratio, has statistically significant negative coefficient in case of 
AARt-5 and CAARt-1. These findings suggest that dividend announcement effects are weaker for 
firms with higher growth opportunities and stronger for firms that have less investment opportunities. 
Conclusion
 This study has empirically sought to determine the relation between the dividend announce-
ment effects and the firm-specific factors including family ownership, dividend yield, firm size and 
leverage ratio of firms.  Results of two-sample t-test indicate that only AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, 
CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant, therefore, cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal returns 
of these event windows were used as dependent variables in the regression analysis. Both multiple 
regression and univariate analyses have been employed to determine the moderating role of the 
firm-specific independent variables on the market reaction to the dividend news. The results of both 
univariate and regression analyses are consistent. Negative relation is reported between the abnormal 
returns and the family ownership. It affirms that the stock market gives lesser importance to the 
dividend announcement of family firms than the announcements of non-family firms. This might be 
because of lower level of agency problems in the family firms as suggested by the Jensen and Meck-
ling’s (1976) agency hypothesis. Further, this study discovered a negative association between the size 
of the firm and the dividend news effect. This negative relation is explained by the information asym-
metry theory of John and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). This 
finding is in line with the finding of other empirical studies such as Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Andres 
et al. (2011), Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Amihud and Li (2006). Next, a negative association is found 
between the abnormal returns and the leverage. This negative association is in line with Jensen’s (1986) 
agency theory. Further, a positive relation is found between the dividend yield and the dividend abnor-
mal returns. Among the control variables, this study found that investment opportunities measured by 
MV/BV have no effect on the share price reaction to the dividend announcement while P/E ratio has 
significant negative effect on abnormal returns. These findings show that the reaction of the stock 
market to the dividend announcement is heterogeneous. Firms with significant agency problems and 
information asymmetry problems experience positive abnormal stock returns when they announce 
dividends. 
References
Abeyratna, G., & Power, D.M.(2002). The Post-announcement Performance of Dividend-changing
 Companies: The Dividend-signalling Hypothesis Revisited. Journal of Accounting and
 Finance, 42, 131-151.
Aharony, J., & Swary, I. (1980). Quarterly Dividend and Earnings Announcements and Stockholders'
 Returns: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Finance, 35, 1-12.
Allen, D. E. and Rachim, V. S. (1996). Dividend policy and stock price volatility: Australian evidence.
 Journal of Applied Economics, 6, 175-88.
Alonso, P. D. A., Iturriaga, F. J. L., & Sanz, J. A. R. (2005). Financial decisions and growth opportuni-
 ties: a Spanish firm's panel data analysis. Applied Financial Economics, 15 (6), 391-407.
Amihud, Y., &tLi,K. (2006). The Declining Information Content of Dividend Announcements and the
 Effects of Institutional Holdings. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 41(3),
 637–60.
Andres, C., Betzer, A., Bongard, I.V.D., Haesner, C., &Theissen, E. (2011). Dividend Announcements
 Reconsidered: Dividend Changes versus Dividend Surprises. Social Science Research 
 Network, Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1763201.
Ariff, M., & Finn, F. (1986). Announcement effects and market efficiency in a thin market: an empiri 
 cal
 application to the Singapore equity market. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 6, 243-267.
Asquith, P., & Mullins, D.W. (1983). The Impact of Initiating Dividend Payments on Shareholders'
 Wealth. Journal of Business, 56, 77-96.
Ball, R., Kothari, S. P., & Robin, A. (2000). The effect of international institutional factors on properties
 of accounting earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29, 1–51.
Baker, H.K., & Powell G.E. (1999). How Corporate Managers View Dividend Policy. Quarterly Journal
 of Business and Economics, 38(2). 
Baker, H.K., Powell, G.E., & Veit E.T. (2002). Revisiting the Dividend Puzzle. Do All of the Pieces
 Now Fit? Review of Financial Economics, 11, 241- 261.
Basu, S. (1977).  Investment Performance of Common Stocks n Relation to their Price-Earnings Ratios:
 A Test of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The Journal Of Finance, 32(3), 663-682. 
Benesh, G.A., Keown, A.J., & Pinkerton, J.M. (1984). An Examination of Market Reaction to Substan-
 tial Shifts in Dividend Policy. The Journal of Financial Research, 7 (2), 131-142.
Bhattacharya, S. (1979) Imperfect Information. Dividend Policy and the "Bird in the Hand" Fallacy.
 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 10, 259-270.
Borokhovich, K.A., Brunarski, K.R., Harman, Y., & Kehr, J. (2005). Dividends, Corporate Monitors and
 Agency Costs. The Financial Review, 40(1), 37-65.
Butler, K.C., & Han, K. (1994) “Market response to earnings announcements: The effects of firm
 characteristics,” Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics 33, 3-20.
Capulong, M.D., Webb, E.D., & Zhuang, J.  (2000). Corporate Governance and Finance in East Asia: A
 Study of Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. Manila. Asian
 Development Bank.
Chen, G., Firth, M., & Gao, N.(2002). The Information Content of Concurrently Announced Earnings,
 Cash Dividends, and Stock Dividends: An Investigation of the Chinese Stock Market. Journal
 of International Financial, Management & Accounting 13 (2), 101-124.
Dasilas, A., & Leventis, S. (2011). Stock Market Reaction to Dividend Announcements: Evidence from
 the Greek Stock Market. International Review of Economics and Finance, 20, 302-311.
Dhillon, U.S., & Johnson, H.(1994). The Effect of Dividend Changes on Stock and Bond Prices. The
 Journal of Finance, 49 (1), 281-289.
Eddy, A., & Seifert, B. (1988). Firm Size and Dividend Announcements. The Journal of Financial
 Research, 11 (4), 295-302.
Gorton, G.B., & Kahl, M. (1999). Block-holder Identity, Equity Ownership Structures, and Hostile
 Takeovers. NBER Working Paper No. w7123. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/ab 
 stract=165132
Gugler, K. (Eds.) (2001). Corporate Governance and Economic Performance. USA: Oxford University
 Pres
Gugler, K., &Yurtoglu, B.B. (2003). Corporate Governance and Dividend Pay-Out Policy in Germany.
 European Economic Review, 47(4), 731–58.
Gurgul, H., Madjosz, P., & Mestel, R.  (2003). GARCH Modelling of Austrian Stock Market Reactions
 on Dividend Announcements. Working Paper Presented at VII Ogólnopolskie Seminarium
 Nauukowe.
Ghosh, C., & Woolridge, J.R. (1988). An Analysis of Shareholder Reaction to Dividend Cuts and Omis
 sions?. The Journal of Financial Research, 11 (4), 281-294.
Haw, I.H., & Kim, W.(1991). Firm Size and Dividend Announcement Effect. Journal of Accounting,
 Auditing and Finance, 6 (3), 325-347.
Healy, J., Hathorn, J., & Kirch, D. (1997). Earnings and the Differential Information Content of Initial
 Dividend Announcements. Accounting Enquiries, 6 (2), 187-220.
Holderness, C.G., & Sheehan, D.P. (1988). The Role ofMajority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corpora-
 tions. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 317-46.
Hossain, F., Siddiquee, M., & Rahman, M.I. (2006). Dividend Surprise and Market Reaction: Evidence
 from Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) Ltd. South Asian Journal of Management, 13.
Hussainey, K., Mgbame, C. O., & Chijoke-Mgbame, A. M. (2011). Dividend policy and share price
 volatility: UK evidence. The Journal of Risk Finance, 12 (1), 57-68.
Jensen, M.C., & Meckling, W.H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency costs and
 Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.
Javid, A.Y., & Iqbal, R. (2008). Ownership Concentration, Corporate Governance and Firm Perfor-
 mance: Evidence from Pakistan. The Pakistan Development Review, 47(4), 643-659.
Jensen, M.C.(1986). Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeover. American
 Economic Review, 76, 323-329.
John, K., & Williams, J. (1985). Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: a Signalling Equilibrium. Journal of
 Finance, 40, 1053-1070.
Khan, A., Kaleem, A., & Nazir, M.S. (2012). Impact of Financial Leverage on Agency cost of Free Cash
 Flow: Evidence from the Manufacturing sector of Pakistan. Journal of Basic and Applied
 Scientific Research, 2(7). 6694-6700.
La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. Vishny. (2000). Tunnelling. American Economic
 Review, Papers and Proceedings, 90, 22–27.
Lang, H.P., &Litzenberger, R. (1989). Dividend Announcements: Cash Flow Signalling VS Free Cash
 Flow Hypothesis. Journal of Financial Economics, 24(1), 181-191.
Lee, B.S. (1995). The response of stock prices to permanent and temporary shocks to dividends. Journal
 of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 30, 1-22.
Lee, B. S., & Yan, N. A. (2003). The market's differential reactions to forward-looking and 
 backward-looking dividend changes. Journal of Financial Research, 26, 449−468.
Leland, H., & Pyle, D.  (1977). Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure, Financial Intermediation.
 Journal of Finance, 32, 371-387.
Miller, M.H., & Modigliani, F.(1961). Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares. Journal of
 Business, 34, 411-443.
Miller, H.M, & Rock, K. (1985). Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information. The Journal of
 Finance, 40, 1031-1051.
Nazir, M.S., & Saita, H.K. (2013). Financial Leverage and Agency Cost: An Empirical Evidence of
 Pakistan. International Journal of Innovative and Applied Finance.4(4), 1,06-113.
Miller, M.H., & Rock, K. (1985). Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information. Journal of
 Finance, 40, 1031-1051. 
Neil, F., & Robert, W. (2009). Cross-Sectional Differences In The Profits, Returns and Risk of Firms
 Initiating Dividends. Journal of Managerial Finance, 35, 509. http://dx
 .doi.org/10.1108/03074350910956972
Pettit, R.R. (1972). Dividend Announcements, Security Performance, and Capital Market Efficiency.
 The Journal of Finance, 27 (5), 993-1007.
Reinganum, M.R. (1981). Misspecification of capital asset pricing: Empirical anomalies based on
 earnings' yields and market values. Journal of Financial Economics, 9, 19-46. 
Ross, S.A. (1977). The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive Signalling Approach. Bell
 Journal of Economics, 8 (1), 23-40.
Said, H.B. (2012). On the Determinants of Dividends’ Information Content. Journal of Management
 and Sustainability, 2(2), 276-292.
Sadaqat , M., & Butt , H. (2017). Role of Liquidity in Explaining Anomalous Returns: Evidence from
 Emerging Market . Business & Economic Review, 9(3), 1-35.
Satti, Z.W. (2013). Evidence of Agency Theory from the Banking Sector of Pakistan. Retrieved from
 https://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/560/01/
Setia-Atmaja, L.Y., Balachandran, B., & Skully, M.T. (2004). Ownership Structure and the Credibility
 of Special Signal: Evidence from Imputation Environment. Social Science Research Network,
 Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=488762
Shah, A. (2018). ASDOC: Stata module to create high-quality tables in MS Word from Stata output.
 Statistical Software Components S458466, Boston College Department of Economics.
PAKISTAN BUSINESS REVIEW 32
Vieira, E.F.S. (2005). Signalling with Dividends? New Evidence from Europe. Instituto Superior de
 Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa (ISCTE), PhD Thesis.
Vieira, E.F.S. (2011). Firm-Specific factors and the market reaction to dividend change announcements:
 Evidence from Europe. Marmara Journal of European Studies, 19(1), 1-25.
Vieira, E.F.S. (2012). Family Firms and the Market Reaction to Dividend News. Encontro Anual da
 European Financial Management Association, Retrieved from
 http://hdl.handle.net/10773/8864
Yilmaz, M.K., & Gulay, G. (2006). Dividend Policies and Price-Volume Reactions to Cash Dividends
 on the Stock Market: Evidence from the Istanbul Stock Exchange. Emerging Markets, Finance
 & Trade, 42 (4), 19-49.
Yoon, P.S., & Starks, L.T. (1995). Signaling, Investment Opportunities, and Dividend Announcements.
 Review of Financial Studies, 8(4), 995–1018.
Zakaria, Z., Muhammad, J., & Zulkifli, A.H. (2012). The Impact of Dividend Policy on the Share Price
 Volatility: Malaysian Construction and Material Companies. International Journal of Econom-
 ics and Management Sciences, 2(5), 1-8.
Volume 20 Issue 1, April, 2018Research
THE ROLE OF FIRM-SPECIFIC VARIABLES IN 
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Abstract
The finance literature reports mixed results about the dividend announcements and stock market 
reaction to those announcements. This study posits that the heterogeneous reaction of stock market to 
dividend announcements might be a result of several firm-specific financial and non-financial factors. 
In this vein, this study has tried to analyze the role of family-ownership, firm-size, leverage, and 
dividend yield in defining the dividend announcement effects. Using a sample of 206 dividend 
announcements of 136 firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period of 2008 to 2012, 
the results of both the univariate tests and the regression analysis show that the reaction of stock 
market to dividend announcements varies significantly across different groups of firms. Specifically, 
our results show that family ownership, firm-size, dividend yield and leverage significantly mediate  
the reaction of stock market around dividend announcement days. 
Keywords: Heterogeneous Reaction, Abnormal Returns, Family Ownership, Pakistan Stock 
Exchange.
JEL Classification: G 230
Introduction
 The corporate dividend policy have been a widely-debated subject in the domain of corpo-
rate finance and a large number of studies has explored different angles of dividend policy. One such 
angle is the stock market reaction to dividend announcements. Miller and Modigliani (1961), argues 
that dividend policy does not impact the firm value in perfect capital markets. However, Jensen’s 
(1986) Free Cash Flow (FCF) theory and Cash Flow Signaling Theory presented by Ross (1977), John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985) have rejected the argument of 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) by supporting notion that firm value is affected by dividend policy. Both 
these theories suggest positive correlation between dividend announcements and the reaction of the 
market to the dividend announcements. However, the empirical studies report mixed results regarding 
dividend announcement effects. 
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 Some studies including Aharony and Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976), Asquith and Mullins 
(1983), Gurgul et al. (2003), Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), Dasilas and Leventis (2011) have supported 
both these hypothesis by reporting positive abnormal returns around dividend announcement days. On 
the other hand, there are some other studies which have rejected the idea of positive correlation 
between the announcements of dividend and the sub-sequent stock market price reaction (Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 2002; Chen, Firth and Gao, 2002; Vieira, 2005; and 
Hossain, Siddiquee and Rahman, 2006). These studies have found no significant evidence of associa-
tion between dividend announcements and reaction of stock market to these announcements. Further, 
some studies even have reported evidences of negative correlation between the announcements of 
dividend and the sub-sequent stock market share price reaction (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, 
Keown and Pinkerton, 1984; and Healy, Hathorn and Kirch, 1997).
 These mixed results of the past studies might be an outcome of different factors that mediates 
the dividend announcement effects. A number of factors are identified by literature that affects the 
dividend announcement effects. Baker, Powell and Veit (2002) and Baker and Powell (1999) have 
highlighted that firm specific factors may impact the association between the dividend announce-
ments and the sub-sequent reaction of stock market. Further, La Porta et al. (2000), and Ball et al. 
(2000) have argued that the ownership structure also plays a vital role in explaining the dividends 
information content and in turn the reaction of market to dividend announcements. 
 A number of studies, including Eddy and Seifert (1988), Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) Haw 
and Kim (1991), Healy et al. (1997), Said (2012), Vieira (2011), around the globe have tried to empiri-
cal test the association between different factors and dividend announcement effects. However, in 
Pakistan, no study until the date has tried to empirically figure out the variables that affect the 
dividend announcement effects of Pakistani firms. In this context, this study has made an attempt to 
determine the variables that explains the information content of dividends of Pakistani firms. Particu-
larly, this study has focused on the firm-specific factors and more specifically the firm size, ownership 
composition of a firm (whether a firm is family and non-family), leverage ratio and dividend yield.
Literature Review 
 This section presents the literature review of the past studies. First, the literature review of 
those studies has been discussed which focuses on association between the dividend announcements 
and the share price reaction. Later the focus is shifted to factors that moderate the above-mentioned 
relationship. 
 
Stock Market Reaction to Dividend Announcements
 A large number of researchers have analyzed the dividend policy and its impact on the value 
of thefirm since the seminal work of Miller and Modigliani (1961). They have used different theories 
to describe the link between the firm value and the dividend policy. Two prominent theories out of 
these are free cash flow (FCF) theory of Jensen (1986) and cash flow signaling (CFS) theory. CFS 
theory which is also called asymmetric information theory has been developed by a number of 
researchers including Ross (1977), Miller and Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and 
Williams (1985). This theory proposes that the firm’s managers, as compared to shareholders (inves-
tors), have more private information about the firm’s future prospects and they signal this private 
information to the market via dividend changes. Hence, when increase in dividends is announced by 
a firm, the stock market assumes that the future prospects of that particular firm are good and hence 
reacts positively. On the other hand, when a firm cuts dividend, the stock market assumes that the 
future prospects of that particular firm are not good and hence reacts negatively, which results in lower 
share prices of the firm. Therefore, in the context of CFS, it is expected that the stock market will react 
positively whenever dividends are announced by a firm. 
 The second theory i.e. FCF theory was developed by Jensen (1986) and is based on the 
agency relationship between managers and shareholders. This theory suggests that dividend plays a 
disciplinary role for the firm’s management. Distribution of free cash flows in the form of dividends 
decreases the conflict between managers and shareholders by making it less likely for managers to 
invest free cash flows in projects that have negative net present value. According to this argument, 
dividend announcements should result in increase in the stock prices. Therefore, like CFS theory, this 
theory also predicts positive correlation between dividend announcements and prices of stock.
 The empirical support for both the theories is mixed. Several studies including Aharony and 
Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976),  Gurgul et al. (2003), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Dasilas and 
Leventis (2011), and Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), have supported both these theories by reporting 
significant abnormal returns around announcement days. On other hand, other studies have reported 
evidence that does not support these theories (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 
2002; Vieira, 2005; Hossain et al., 2006; and Chen, et al., 2002). These studies have found no signifi-
cant abnormal returns around announcement dates. Further, some studies even have reported evidenc-
es of negative correlation between the dividend announcements and the subsequent reaction of stock 
market (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, et al., 1984; and Healy et al., 1997).
Moderating Role of Firm-Specific Factors
 Literature suggests that the mixed evidence as discussed above might be an outcome of 
different factors that moderates the stock market response to the dividend announcements. These 
factors include firm size, family ownership, leverage and dividend yield. We discuss these factors in 
details in the following paragraphs.
Family ownership
 Capulong et al. (2000) has stated that ownership composition and ownership concentration 
are the two key important dimensions of corporate ownership structures. Concentration of ownership 
deals with the distribution of power between the shareholders and the managers while on the other 
hand, composition of ownership deals with the identity of shareholders of a company and specifically 
the large shareholders. A large shareholder (also called block-holder) can be government, holding 
company, individual, bank, institutional investor or family. Thus, broadly speaking there are two 
categories of ownership composition: the family block-holder and non-family block-holder. Accord-
ing to Holderness and Sheehan (1988), and Gugler (2001), family block holder has different motiva-
tions and incentives to monitor the managers. Gorton and Kahl (1999) have argued that as compared 
to non-family block-holder, the family block-holders have greater incentive of monitoring the manag-
ers. Due to the better monitoring, the family block-holders affect the reaction of stock market to 
dividends announcements.  
 There are two leading theories that explain the relationship of family ownership with 
dividend announcements effects. These include the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory 
and Leland and Pyle’s (1977) general signaling theory. Under the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
agency cost model, it is argued that due to the better monitoring efforts of family owners, sharehold-
ers-managers interests are better aligned which reduces the agency conflicts and the agency costs. 
Therefore, if reducing agency conflicts is the motivation behind the announcement of dividend chang-
es, then the firms with family block-holder will experience weaker dividend announcement effects as 
compared to the firms with non-family block-holder. Under general Leland and Pyle’s (1977) theory 
of general signaling, it is argued that due to the better monitoring of managers by the family 
block-holders, the credibility of the manager’s decisions and the signals that they convey to the 
market increases. Therefore, due to higher credibility, the firms with family block-holders will experi-
ence stronger dividend announcement effects as compared to firms with non-family block-holder.
 Unlike the ownership concentration, only few researchers have empirically analyzed the 
dividend announcement effects in the context of family and non-family ownership. Therefore, this 
area is relatively unexplored and not enough evidences are available on this area. Recently, research-
ers have started exploring the relation between family ownership on dividend announcement effects. 
Setia-Atmaja, et al. (2004) are the first researchers who have analyzed the role of family ownership in 
mediating the dividend announcement effects in Australian environment. They reported positive 
relationship between family firms and dividend announcement effects. Contrary to Setia-Atmaja, et 
al. (2004), Vieira (2012) has reported no evidence from Portuguese Environment. 
 As discussed above, the agency cost theory predicts negative relationship while general 
signaling model predicts positive correlation between family ownership and dividend news effects. 
Hence, this study has formulated the following two competing hypothesis regarding relationship 
between family ownership and dividend announcement effects. 
H1a: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are negatively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are less than abnormal returns associ-
ated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
H1b: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are positively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are greater than abnormal returns 
associated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
Firm size
 The literature has identified the firm size as another potential variable that moderate the 
dividend announcement effects. The role of the size of the firm in determining the dividend announce-
ment effects can be described in the context of signaling or asymmetric information theory of John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). Under this theory, it is assert-
ed that as information asymmetry between equity holders and managers of firm is greater in case of 
the small size firms as compared to firms with large size; therefore, when small size firm tries to 
distribute more dividends, for the purpose of conveying signals to the outside investors about their 
future prospects, will experience greater dividend announcement effects. Therefore, in this context, 
negative relationship exists between the size of the firm and the dividend news effect.
 Empirical studies reports mixed results about the firm size relationship with the dividend 
announcement effects. Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Eddy and Seifert (1988) have reported negative 
association from the U.S. Amihud and Li (2006) and Yoon and Starks (1995). Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003) and Andres et al. (2011) have also supported signaling theory by reporting negative association 
from German environment. Vieira (2011), by utilizing the data of the UK, Portuguese and the French 
markets, have provided further evidence from the European market. She has reported interesting 
results. Her study found that dividend announcement effect is negatively correlated with the firm size 
only in the UK market while her study reported no evidence of significant association in the French 
and Portugal markets. Hussainey et al. (2011) and Zakaria et al. (2012) have also reported the same 
results from the U.K and the Malaysian Markets. 
 Based the on above literature and information asymmetric theory, this study has tested the 
following hypothesis:
H2: Reaction of stock market to the dividend news is negatively associated with the firm size. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of small-sized firms are greater than the abnormal 
returns associated with the dividend announcement of the large-sized firms.
Leverage
 Leverage is another firm specific variable that is identified by the literature as a potential 
determinant of the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Said (2012) and Vieira (2011) has 
defined leverage as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets. The role of leverage in determining 
the dividend announcement effects is explained both by Jensen’s (1986) version of FCF agency cost 
argument and signaling explanation of Ross (1977). Using Jensen’s (1986) argument, Borokhovich et 
al. (2005) have highlighted that the agency costs are lower in the firms that have higher debt ratios as 
managers in these firms are left with little cash flows under their discretions due to the payment of the 
debt and financial expenses. Therefore, dividends role in reducing agency costs is limited in these 
firms and hence a weaker dividend announcement effects will be experienced by the firm with higher 
leverage ratios. Under the second argument i.e. signaling theory of Ross (1977), it is argued that firms 
with good quality try to differentiate themselves from bad quality firms by using high leverage ratio. 
Therefore, investors interpret the dividend signals of the companies with higher leverage ratios as 
favorable as the investors anticipate that the managers of such good quality firm will be able to contin-
ue paying dividends in the future. 
 Empirical results regarding the association of the dividend news effects with leverage are 
mixed. Few studies have supported cash flow or agency theory by reporting negative association 
(Healy et al., 1997; and Alonso et al., 2005). Contrarily, Allen and Rachim (1996), Vieira (2011) and 
Zakaria et al. (2012) have supported signaling theory by reporting positive relation between the 
dividend announcement effects and leverage. 
 
 Literature suggests that the agency cost argument generally favors Pakistani environment 
more than the signaling theory regarding the role of leverage in determining different factors related 
to corporate finance and corporate performance (Nazir and Saita, 2013; Khan, Kaleem and Nazir, 
2012; and Satti, 2013). However, this study has tested two hypotheses based on the agency and the 
signaling theory in the light of empirical results reported from different countries. 
H3a: Negative association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are greater as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of the firms with high level of leverage.
H3b: Positive association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to the 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are lesser as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of firms with high level of leverage.
Dividend yield
 Dividend yield is one of the main factors that affect abnormal returns around dividend 
announcement days (Yoon and Starks, 1995; and Lee and Yan; 2003). The impact of dividend yield 
on share price reaction to dividend news can be explained in the context of agency cost and signaling 
theories. Both of the theories predict positive association between dividend announcement effects and 
dividend yield (Ariff and Finn, 1986; Lee, 1995; and Belde et al., 2005). Under the agency cost frame-
work, it is argued that high dividend yield helps in reducing agency conflicts in the firm. Hence, 
keeping other variables constant, the higher the dividend yield associated with the dividend announce-
ment, the stronger will be the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Contrarily, under the signal-
ing theory, it is argued that high dividend yield depicts that future prospects of a firm are good, there-
fore, dividend announcements that are accompanied by high dividend yield are perceived as a more 
favorable signal as compared to a dividend announcement with low dividend yield. Hence, a dividend 
announcement with high dividend yield induces stronger stock market reaction. 
 The earning response coefficient is dependent upon the earning retention rate, among other 
variables. Butler and Han (1994) argues that the share price reaction to the announcements is a 
function of earning surprise and earning response coefficient. They use dividend yield as a proxy for 
earning retention rate because actual earnings’ retention rate can go to unreasonable range if a firm has 
zero earnings or negative earnings. Dividend yield has been calculated as the per share dividend divid-
ed by the price of share five days before the announcement of dividend. Based on the above literature, 
this study has tested the following hypothesis:
H4: Positive association exists between the dividend yield and the dividend announcement effects. 
Hence, abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcements of the firms that are accompa-
nied by higher dividend yield will be greater as compared to the dividend announcement of the firms 
that are accompanied by lower dividend yield.
Growth opportunities
 Different studies have used growth opportunity as a control variable while examining 
relationship between different factors and stock market reaction to the dividend news (Vieira, 2005; 
Zakaria et al., 2012; Vieira, 2011; Neil and Robert, 2009; Vieira, 2012 and Andres et al., 2011). Past 
studies including Vieira (2011) and Andres et al. (2011) have used Tobin’s Q as a measure of inves-
tors’ expectation about the growth prospect of a firm and market to book value of equity (MV/BV) 
ratio as a proxy of Tobin’s Q. Thus, MV/BV has been used as a proxy of growth opportunity by this 
study also. According to Vieira (2011), high MV/BV shows that investors think that the firm has 
higher future growth prospects. Firms with lower MV/BV ratios are considered to have higher level 
of free cash flow and thus will be able to pay more dividends. Therefore, reaction of stock market is 
more strong to dividend news of firms that have lower MV/BV ratio, hence negative coefficient is 
expected for this variable. Among the past studies that have used MV/BV as control variable, Zakaria 
et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) have found no significant influence of this variable on the stock 
market reaction to the dividend news while Vieira (2011), Neil and Robert (2009) and Vieira (2005) 
have found negative relationship between  MV/BV and the dividend news effects. Apart from MV/BV 
ratio, this study also used price to earnings (P/E) ratio as proxy for investment opportunities by 
following Basu (1977) and Reinganum (1981). Both these studies reported negative association.
 
Methodology
Sample and Data Sources
 This section discusses the data sources, the data collection methods, the data analysis tools, 
and variables. For the purpose of the data collection, this study used simple random sampling 
technique. The sampling period ranges from year 2008 to 2012. During this sampling period, 136 
firms announced 206 annual dividends. Therefore, we analyze 206 annual dividend announcements of 
136 firms over the above-mentioned sampling period.
 The data of dividend announcements and the stock prices have been extracted from the KSE 
database. Data about the firm-specific variables and ownership structure were gathered from the 
annual reports of the firms.
Model Specification
 For testing the association of the above-mentioned variables with the dividend news effects, 
this study has utilized standard event study methodology. For generating abnormal returns market 
model has been utilized. Equation of the market model is specified as under:
Where,
Ritis return rate of security i at day t
Rmtis the rate of return of market at day t
αiis constant
βi isthe sensitivity of the expected asset return to the expected market return calculated as
 For the purpose of estimating the parameters of market model, 100 daily continuously 
compounded returns are used which ranged from approximately 145 days before the announcement 
date. KSE-100 Index is used as a market proxy. Ordinary least square method has been utilized for 
estimating the market model parameters. After estimating the parameters of market model, the follow-
ing equation has been used to calculate the expected returns:
Where,
E(Ri) is the expected return on stock iat day t
    is the estimated intercept of market model for stock i
    is the estimated beta of market model for stock i
For each dividend announcement, abnormal returns are calculated after estimating the market model 
parameters, by using the following equation:
Where,
ARit is the stock i abnormal return at day t
Rit is the actual stock i return at day t
 Abnormal returns, in case of each event (dividend announcement), are calculated for all 
event windows. After calculation of abnormal returns, average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumula-
tive abnormal returns (CAAR) are calculated for all event windows. After calculating AAR and 
CAAR, univariate and multivariate analysis has been performed. Before performing univariate and 
multivariate analyses to test the association between dividend news and aforementioned independent 
variables, the significance of the AAR and CAAR of the event windows mentioned before has been 
checked by using student t-test on overall sample.  
 For univariate analysis, independent samples t-test has been used while for multivariate 
analysis, regression analysis has been performed. In univariate analysis, independent sample t-test has 
been performed on AAR and CAAR of lower 50th and upper 50th percentile of each variable (exclud-
ing family ownership in case of which test has been conducted on AAR and CAAR of family and 
non-family groups). In multivariate analysis, regression has been run by using both AAR and CAAR 
as dependent variables. The following are the regression equations with a full set of explanatory 
variables:
ARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e ……(1)
CAARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e…(2)
Where,
AARt is average abnormal return of specific event window
CAARt is cumulative average abnormal return of specific event window
β1 is the co-efficient of family and indicates relationship between family ownership and AARt and 
CAARt
β2 is the co-efficient of LMV (firm size) and indicates relationship between firm size and AARt and 
CAARt
β3 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β4 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β5is the co-efficient of growth opportunity (MV/BV) and indicates relationship between MV/BV and 
AARt and CAARt
 Before performing these formal tests to determine the relationship between four aforemen-
tioned independent variables and stock market reaction to dividend news, a series of diagnostic tests 
were conducted to identify problems in the data. Details of these diagnostic tests and remedial actions 
are not reported for the sake of parsimony.
Results and Discussion
T-tests Results
 Table 1 below reports mean values of AAR and CAAR for the event windows ranging from 
five days prior to dividend announcement to five days after dividend announcements. All tables in this 
paper were constructed using asdoc program of Shah (2018).
 Table 1 shows that p-values of mean values of AAR and CAAR are statistically significant 
only in few event windows. For example, AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, CAARt0, AARt-2, 
AARt-5 and CAARt-2 are significant at five percent level while CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant 
only at the 10 percent level. Averages of all these significant AARs and CAARs are positive which 
shows that market reacts positively to the announcements of dividend. Moreover, significance of 
AARt-2, CAARt-2, and AART-1 indicates leakage of information about the dividend announcements 
prior to announcement of these dividends. 
 For further analysis, those event windows have been used analysis that have significant 
AARs and CAARs. Therefore, we use AARt-2, AARt-5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, and CAARt0 as depen-
dent variables in the regressions analysis to test their relationship with the previously mentioned four 
explanatory variables.
Table 1
Means and T-Tests of the Abnormal Returns in Different Event Windows
Univariate Analyses
 
This section presents and discusses results of the t-tests to find whether firm-specific variables 
moderate reaction of stock market to dividend news. The median values of each firm-specific variable 
is used to divide firms into two above 50th and below 50th percentiles, except for family ownership 
for which the groups have been made based on family vs. non-family status of firms. Then AAR and 
CAAR have been calculated for these groups of firms. Table 2 reports that mean differences of these 
abnormal returns under the heading of each firm-specific variable that have been used for making 
group of firms. For example, the column with heading ‘Size shows the mean abnormal returns of 
firms that are in the 50th top percentile of firm size minus mean abnormal returns of firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile of firm size.
 The results show that family firms have lower abnormal returns than non-family firms. The 
p-values show that the mean differences are significant only in case of AARt-5 at one percent level of 
significance and in case AARt-2 at five percent level of significance. Results also show that reaction 
of stock market to dividend news is stronger for smaller firms as compared to larger firms.  This is 
evident from the column with the heading ‘Size’, showing that mean differences of CAARt-2 and 
CAARt0 are negative and statistically significant. Results also depicts that firm’s leverage ratio 
significantly moderates the dividend news effects. For example, mean differences in abnormal returns 
are significantly higher for dividend announcements in firms with lower leverage ratios as compared 
to firms that have high leverage ratios. Finally, there is some evidence that firms with lower dividend 
yield experience more reaction to dividend announcements as compared to firms with higher 
dividend yield.
This section presents and discusses results of the t-test to find
Table 2
Mean Differences in Return
Regressions Results
 Regression analysis results are reported in Table 3. The coefficients of the dummy variables 
used to indicate family firms are negative in all the event windows, except CAARt-1 where it is 
positive. In line with the results reported in univariate analysis, coefficient of family dummy is signifi-
cant and negative in AARt-2 and AARt-5 while it is insignificant in case of the rest of the event 
windows. It shows that announcement effects of family firms are weaker as compared to announce-
ment effects of non-family firms. This finding supports the agency theory explanation that family 
ownership reduces conflict between principal and agent and hence dividends lose its importance as a 
tool to reduce agency costs.
 The results show that the firm size coefficient is negative and statistically significant in case 
of CAARt-2 and CAAR0 while coefficients of abnormal returns in other event windows are insignifi-
cant. Result of the regression analysis supports the findings of univariate analysis as reported in Table 
2. These findings show that abnormal returns due to dividend announcements are significantly lower 
for firms that are placed in the top 50th percentile of the firm size as compared to the firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile. These results are in line with information asymmetric theory of Miller and 
Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and Williams (1985) that predicts that small firms face 
more information asymmetry problems and hence dividends are an effective tool for them in reducing 
information asymmetry costs.
Table 3
Regression Results
 Leverage coefficient is negative and significant in case of AARt+5, CAARt-2 and CAARt-1. 
These results indicate that negative relationship exists between leverage and dividend news effects. 
Our results support the free cash flow argument of agency theory which suggests that agency costs are 
lower in firms that have high leverage ratio; hence dividend announcement effects are weaker in such 
firms. Positive and statistically significant dividend yield coefficient is reported in case of AARt+5 
and CAARt0 while it is insignificant in all other event windows. Generally, the results suggest that 
firms with higher dividend yield experience strong dividend announcement effects. 
 MV/BV and P/E ratio have been used as alternative proxies for firm’s investment opportuni-
ties. Results in Table 3 show that MV/BV has no significant influence on the dividend announcement 
effects. This finding is consistent with Zakaria et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) who found no 
significant influence of this variable on dividend announcement effects. However, the second proxy 
for investment opportunities, the P/E ratio, has statistically significant negative coefficient in case of 
AARt-5 and CAARt-1. These findings suggest that dividend announcement effects are weaker for 
firms with higher growth opportunities and stronger for firms that have less investment opportunities. 
Conclusion
 This study has empirically sought to determine the relation between the dividend announce-
ment effects and the firm-specific factors including family ownership, dividend yield, firm size and 
leverage ratio of firms.  Results of two-sample t-test indicate that only AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, 
CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant, therefore, cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal returns 
of these event windows were used as dependent variables in the regression analysis. Both multiple 
regression and univariate analyses have been employed to determine the moderating role of the 
firm-specific independent variables on the market reaction to the dividend news. The results of both 
univariate and regression analyses are consistent. Negative relation is reported between the abnormal 
returns and the family ownership. It affirms that the stock market gives lesser importance to the 
dividend announcement of family firms than the announcements of non-family firms. This might be 
because of lower level of agency problems in the family firms as suggested by the Jensen and Meck-
ling’s (1976) agency hypothesis. Further, this study discovered a negative association between the size 
of the firm and the dividend news effect. This negative relation is explained by the information asym-
metry theory of John and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). This 
finding is in line with the finding of other empirical studies such as Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Andres 
et al. (2011), Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Amihud and Li (2006). Next, a negative association is found 
between the abnormal returns and the leverage. This negative association is in line with Jensen’s (1986) 
agency theory. Further, a positive relation is found between the dividend yield and the dividend abnor-
mal returns. Among the control variables, this study found that investment opportunities measured by 
MV/BV have no effect on the share price reaction to the dividend announcement while P/E ratio has 
significant negative effect on abnormal returns. These findings show that the reaction of the stock 
market to the dividend announcement is heterogeneous. Firms with significant agency problems and 
information asymmetry problems experience positive abnormal stock returns when they announce 
dividends. 
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THE ROLE OF FIRM-SPECIFIC VARIABLES IN 
EXPLAINING HETEROGENEOUS STOCK 
MARKET REACTIONS TO DIVIDEND
ANNOUNCEMENTS
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Abstract
The finance literature reports mixed results about the dividend announcements and stock market 
reaction to those announcements. This study posits that the heterogeneous reaction of stock market to 
dividend announcements might be a result of several firm-specific financial and non-financial factors. 
In this vein, this study has tried to analyze the role of family-ownership, firm-size, leverage, and 
dividend yield in defining the dividend announcement effects. Using a sample of 206 dividend 
announcements of 136 firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period of 2008 to 2012, 
the results of both the univariate tests and the regression analysis show that the reaction of stock 
market to dividend announcements varies significantly across different groups of firms. Specifically, 
our results show that family ownership, firm-size, dividend yield and leverage significantly mediate  
the reaction of stock market around dividend announcement days. 
Keywords: Heterogeneous Reaction, Abnormal Returns, Family Ownership, Pakistan Stock 
Exchange.
JEL Classification: G 230
Introduction
 The corporate dividend policy have been a widely-debated subject in the domain of corpo-
rate finance and a large number of studies has explored different angles of dividend policy. One such 
angle is the stock market reaction to dividend announcements. Miller and Modigliani (1961), argues 
that dividend policy does not impact the firm value in perfect capital markets. However, Jensen’s 
(1986) Free Cash Flow (FCF) theory and Cash Flow Signaling Theory presented by Ross (1977), John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985) have rejected the argument of 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) by supporting notion that firm value is affected by dividend policy. Both 
these theories suggest positive correlation between dividend announcements and the reaction of the 
market to the dividend announcements. However, the empirical studies report mixed results regarding 
dividend announcement effects. 
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 Some studies including Aharony and Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976), Asquith and Mullins 
(1983), Gurgul et al. (2003), Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), Dasilas and Leventis (2011) have supported 
both these hypothesis by reporting positive abnormal returns around dividend announcement days. On 
the other hand, there are some other studies which have rejected the idea of positive correlation 
between the announcements of dividend and the sub-sequent stock market price reaction (Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 2002; Chen, Firth and Gao, 2002; Vieira, 2005; and 
Hossain, Siddiquee and Rahman, 2006). These studies have found no significant evidence of associa-
tion between dividend announcements and reaction of stock market to these announcements. Further, 
some studies even have reported evidences of negative correlation between the announcements of 
dividend and the sub-sequent stock market share price reaction (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, 
Keown and Pinkerton, 1984; and Healy, Hathorn and Kirch, 1997).
 These mixed results of the past studies might be an outcome of different factors that mediates 
the dividend announcement effects. A number of factors are identified by literature that affects the 
dividend announcement effects. Baker, Powell and Veit (2002) and Baker and Powell (1999) have 
highlighted that firm specific factors may impact the association between the dividend announce-
ments and the sub-sequent reaction of stock market. Further, La Porta et al. (2000), and Ball et al. 
(2000) have argued that the ownership structure also plays a vital role in explaining the dividends 
information content and in turn the reaction of market to dividend announcements. 
 A number of studies, including Eddy and Seifert (1988), Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) Haw 
and Kim (1991), Healy et al. (1997), Said (2012), Vieira (2011), around the globe have tried to empiri-
cal test the association between different factors and dividend announcement effects. However, in 
Pakistan, no study until the date has tried to empirically figure out the variables that affect the 
dividend announcement effects of Pakistani firms. In this context, this study has made an attempt to 
determine the variables that explains the information content of dividends of Pakistani firms. Particu-
larly, this study has focused on the firm-specific factors and more specifically the firm size, ownership 
composition of a firm (whether a firm is family and non-family), leverage ratio and dividend yield.
Literature Review 
 This section presents the literature review of the past studies. First, the literature review of 
those studies has been discussed which focuses on association between the dividend announcements 
and the share price reaction. Later the focus is shifted to factors that moderate the above-mentioned 
relationship. 
 
Stock Market Reaction to Dividend Announcements
 A large number of researchers have analyzed the dividend policy and its impact on the value 
of thefirm since the seminal work of Miller and Modigliani (1961). They have used different theories 
to describe the link between the firm value and the dividend policy. Two prominent theories out of 
these are free cash flow (FCF) theory of Jensen (1986) and cash flow signaling (CFS) theory. CFS 
theory which is also called asymmetric information theory has been developed by a number of 
researchers including Ross (1977), Miller and Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and 
Williams (1985). This theory proposes that the firm’s managers, as compared to shareholders (inves-
tors), have more private information about the firm’s future prospects and they signal this private 
information to the market via dividend changes. Hence, when increase in dividends is announced by 
a firm, the stock market assumes that the future prospects of that particular firm are good and hence 
reacts positively. On the other hand, when a firm cuts dividend, the stock market assumes that the 
future prospects of that particular firm are not good and hence reacts negatively, which results in lower 
share prices of the firm. Therefore, in the context of CFS, it is expected that the stock market will react 
positively whenever dividends are announced by a firm. 
 The second theory i.e. FCF theory was developed by Jensen (1986) and is based on the 
agency relationship between managers and shareholders. This theory suggests that dividend plays a 
disciplinary role for the firm’s management. Distribution of free cash flows in the form of dividends 
decreases the conflict between managers and shareholders by making it less likely for managers to 
invest free cash flows in projects that have negative net present value. According to this argument, 
dividend announcements should result in increase in the stock prices. Therefore, like CFS theory, this 
theory also predicts positive correlation between dividend announcements and prices of stock.
 The empirical support for both the theories is mixed. Several studies including Aharony and 
Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976),  Gurgul et al. (2003), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Dasilas and 
Leventis (2011), and Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), have supported both these theories by reporting 
significant abnormal returns around announcement days. On other hand, other studies have reported 
evidence that does not support these theories (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 
2002; Vieira, 2005; Hossain et al., 2006; and Chen, et al., 2002). These studies have found no signifi-
cant abnormal returns around announcement dates. Further, some studies even have reported evidenc-
es of negative correlation between the dividend announcements and the subsequent reaction of stock 
market (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, et al., 1984; and Healy et al., 1997).
Moderating Role of Firm-Specific Factors
 Literature suggests that the mixed evidence as discussed above might be an outcome of 
different factors that moderates the stock market response to the dividend announcements. These 
factors include firm size, family ownership, leverage and dividend yield. We discuss these factors in 
details in the following paragraphs.
Family ownership
 Capulong et al. (2000) has stated that ownership composition and ownership concentration 
are the two key important dimensions of corporate ownership structures. Concentration of ownership 
deals with the distribution of power between the shareholders and the managers while on the other 
hand, composition of ownership deals with the identity of shareholders of a company and specifically 
the large shareholders. A large shareholder (also called block-holder) can be government, holding 
company, individual, bank, institutional investor or family. Thus, broadly speaking there are two 
categories of ownership composition: the family block-holder and non-family block-holder. Accord-
ing to Holderness and Sheehan (1988), and Gugler (2001), family block holder has different motiva-
tions and incentives to monitor the managers. Gorton and Kahl (1999) have argued that as compared 
to non-family block-holder, the family block-holders have greater incentive of monitoring the manag-
ers. Due to the better monitoring, the family block-holders affect the reaction of stock market to 
dividends announcements.  
 There are two leading theories that explain the relationship of family ownership with 
dividend announcements effects. These include the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory 
and Leland and Pyle’s (1977) general signaling theory. Under the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
agency cost model, it is argued that due to the better monitoring efforts of family owners, sharehold-
ers-managers interests are better aligned which reduces the agency conflicts and the agency costs. 
Therefore, if reducing agency conflicts is the motivation behind the announcement of dividend chang-
es, then the firms with family block-holder will experience weaker dividend announcement effects as 
compared to the firms with non-family block-holder. Under general Leland and Pyle’s (1977) theory 
of general signaling, it is argued that due to the better monitoring of managers by the family 
block-holders, the credibility of the manager’s decisions and the signals that they convey to the 
market increases. Therefore, due to higher credibility, the firms with family block-holders will experi-
ence stronger dividend announcement effects as compared to firms with non-family block-holder.
 Unlike the ownership concentration, only few researchers have empirically analyzed the 
dividend announcement effects in the context of family and non-family ownership. Therefore, this 
area is relatively unexplored and not enough evidences are available on this area. Recently, research-
ers have started exploring the relation between family ownership on dividend announcement effects. 
Setia-Atmaja, et al. (2004) are the first researchers who have analyzed the role of family ownership in 
mediating the dividend announcement effects in Australian environment. They reported positive 
relationship between family firms and dividend announcement effects. Contrary to Setia-Atmaja, et 
al. (2004), Vieira (2012) has reported no evidence from Portuguese Environment. 
 As discussed above, the agency cost theory predicts negative relationship while general 
signaling model predicts positive correlation between family ownership and dividend news effects. 
Hence, this study has formulated the following two competing hypothesis regarding relationship 
between family ownership and dividend announcement effects. 
H1a: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are negatively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are less than abnormal returns associ-
ated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
H1b: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are positively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are greater than abnormal returns 
associated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
Firm size
 The literature has identified the firm size as another potential variable that moderate the 
dividend announcement effects. The role of the size of the firm in determining the dividend announce-
ment effects can be described in the context of signaling or asymmetric information theory of John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). Under this theory, it is assert-
ed that as information asymmetry between equity holders and managers of firm is greater in case of 
the small size firms as compared to firms with large size; therefore, when small size firm tries to 
distribute more dividends, for the purpose of conveying signals to the outside investors about their 
future prospects, will experience greater dividend announcement effects. Therefore, in this context, 
negative relationship exists between the size of the firm and the dividend news effect.
 Empirical studies reports mixed results about the firm size relationship with the dividend 
announcement effects. Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Eddy and Seifert (1988) have reported negative 
association from the U.S. Amihud and Li (2006) and Yoon and Starks (1995). Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003) and Andres et al. (2011) have also supported signaling theory by reporting negative association 
from German environment. Vieira (2011), by utilizing the data of the UK, Portuguese and the French 
markets, have provided further evidence from the European market. She has reported interesting 
results. Her study found that dividend announcement effect is negatively correlated with the firm size 
only in the UK market while her study reported no evidence of significant association in the French 
and Portugal markets. Hussainey et al. (2011) and Zakaria et al. (2012) have also reported the same 
results from the U.K and the Malaysian Markets. 
 Based the on above literature and information asymmetric theory, this study has tested the 
following hypothesis:
H2: Reaction of stock market to the dividend news is negatively associated with the firm size. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of small-sized firms are greater than the abnormal 
returns associated with the dividend announcement of the large-sized firms.
Leverage
 Leverage is another firm specific variable that is identified by the literature as a potential 
determinant of the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Said (2012) and Vieira (2011) has 
defined leverage as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets. The role of leverage in determining 
the dividend announcement effects is explained both by Jensen’s (1986) version of FCF agency cost 
argument and signaling explanation of Ross (1977). Using Jensen’s (1986) argument, Borokhovich et 
al. (2005) have highlighted that the agency costs are lower in the firms that have higher debt ratios as 
managers in these firms are left with little cash flows under their discretions due to the payment of the 
debt and financial expenses. Therefore, dividends role in reducing agency costs is limited in these 
firms and hence a weaker dividend announcement effects will be experienced by the firm with higher 
leverage ratios. Under the second argument i.e. signaling theory of Ross (1977), it is argued that firms 
with good quality try to differentiate themselves from bad quality firms by using high leverage ratio. 
Therefore, investors interpret the dividend signals of the companies with higher leverage ratios as 
favorable as the investors anticipate that the managers of such good quality firm will be able to contin-
ue paying dividends in the future. 
 Empirical results regarding the association of the dividend news effects with leverage are 
mixed. Few studies have supported cash flow or agency theory by reporting negative association 
(Healy et al., 1997; and Alonso et al., 2005). Contrarily, Allen and Rachim (1996), Vieira (2011) and 
Zakaria et al. (2012) have supported signaling theory by reporting positive relation between the 
dividend announcement effects and leverage. 
 
 Literature suggests that the agency cost argument generally favors Pakistani environment 
more than the signaling theory regarding the role of leverage in determining different factors related 
to corporate finance and corporate performance (Nazir and Saita, 2013; Khan, Kaleem and Nazir, 
2012; and Satti, 2013). However, this study has tested two hypotheses based on the agency and the 
signaling theory in the light of empirical results reported from different countries. 
H3a: Negative association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are greater as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of the firms with high level of leverage.
H3b: Positive association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to the 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are lesser as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of firms with high level of leverage.
Dividend yield
 Dividend yield is one of the main factors that affect abnormal returns around dividend 
announcement days (Yoon and Starks, 1995; and Lee and Yan; 2003). The impact of dividend yield 
on share price reaction to dividend news can be explained in the context of agency cost and signaling 
theories. Both of the theories predict positive association between dividend announcement effects and 
dividend yield (Ariff and Finn, 1986; Lee, 1995; and Belde et al., 2005). Under the agency cost frame-
work, it is argued that high dividend yield helps in reducing agency conflicts in the firm. Hence, 
keeping other variables constant, the higher the dividend yield associated with the dividend announce-
ment, the stronger will be the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Contrarily, under the signal-
ing theory, it is argued that high dividend yield depicts that future prospects of a firm are good, there-
fore, dividend announcements that are accompanied by high dividend yield are perceived as a more 
favorable signal as compared to a dividend announcement with low dividend yield. Hence, a dividend 
announcement with high dividend yield induces stronger stock market reaction. 
 The earning response coefficient is dependent upon the earning retention rate, among other 
variables. Butler and Han (1994) argues that the share price reaction to the announcements is a 
function of earning surprise and earning response coefficient. They use dividend yield as a proxy for 
earning retention rate because actual earnings’ retention rate can go to unreasonable range if a firm has 
zero earnings or negative earnings. Dividend yield has been calculated as the per share dividend divid-
ed by the price of share five days before the announcement of dividend. Based on the above literature, 
this study has tested the following hypothesis:
H4: Positive association exists between the dividend yield and the dividend announcement effects. 
Hence, abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcements of the firms that are accompa-
nied by higher dividend yield will be greater as compared to the dividend announcement of the firms 
that are accompanied by lower dividend yield.
Growth opportunities
 Different studies have used growth opportunity as a control variable while examining 
relationship between different factors and stock market reaction to the dividend news (Vieira, 2005; 
Zakaria et al., 2012; Vieira, 2011; Neil and Robert, 2009; Vieira, 2012 and Andres et al., 2011). Past 
studies including Vieira (2011) and Andres et al. (2011) have used Tobin’s Q as a measure of inves-
tors’ expectation about the growth prospect of a firm and market to book value of equity (MV/BV) 
ratio as a proxy of Tobin’s Q. Thus, MV/BV has been used as a proxy of growth opportunity by this 
study also. According to Vieira (2011), high MV/BV shows that investors think that the firm has 
higher future growth prospects. Firms with lower MV/BV ratios are considered to have higher level 
of free cash flow and thus will be able to pay more dividends. Therefore, reaction of stock market is 
more strong to dividend news of firms that have lower MV/BV ratio, hence negative coefficient is 
expected for this variable. Among the past studies that have used MV/BV as control variable, Zakaria 
et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) have found no significant influence of this variable on the stock 
market reaction to the dividend news while Vieira (2011), Neil and Robert (2009) and Vieira (2005) 
have found negative relationship between  MV/BV and the dividend news effects. Apart from MV/BV 
ratio, this study also used price to earnings (P/E) ratio as proxy for investment opportunities by 
following Basu (1977) and Reinganum (1981). Both these studies reported negative association.
 
Methodology
Sample and Data Sources
 This section discusses the data sources, the data collection methods, the data analysis tools, 
and variables. For the purpose of the data collection, this study used simple random sampling 
technique. The sampling period ranges from year 2008 to 2012. During this sampling period, 136 
firms announced 206 annual dividends. Therefore, we analyze 206 annual dividend announcements of 
136 firms over the above-mentioned sampling period.
 The data of dividend announcements and the stock prices have been extracted from the KSE 
database. Data about the firm-specific variables and ownership structure were gathered from the 
annual reports of the firms.
Model Specification
 For testing the association of the above-mentioned variables with the dividend news effects, 
this study has utilized standard event study methodology. For generating abnormal returns market 
model has been utilized. Equation of the market model is specified as under:
Where,
Ritis return rate of security i at day t
Rmtis the rate of return of market at day t
αiis constant
βi isthe sensitivity of the expected asset return to the expected market return calculated as
 For the purpose of estimating the parameters of market model, 100 daily continuously 
compounded returns are used which ranged from approximately 145 days before the announcement 
date. KSE-100 Index is used as a market proxy. Ordinary least square method has been utilized for 
estimating the market model parameters. After estimating the parameters of market model, the follow-
ing equation has been used to calculate the expected returns:
Where,
E(Ri) is the expected return on stock iat day t
    is the estimated intercept of market model for stock i
    is the estimated beta of market model for stock i
For each dividend announcement, abnormal returns are calculated after estimating the market model 
parameters, by using the following equation:
Where,
ARit is the stock i abnormal return at day t
Rit is the actual stock i return at day t
 Abnormal returns, in case of each event (dividend announcement), are calculated for all 
event windows. After calculation of abnormal returns, average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumula-
tive abnormal returns (CAAR) are calculated for all event windows. After calculating AAR and 
CAAR, univariate and multivariate analysis has been performed. Before performing univariate and 
multivariate analyses to test the association between dividend news and aforementioned independent 
variables, the significance of the AAR and CAAR of the event windows mentioned before has been 
checked by using student t-test on overall sample.  
 For univariate analysis, independent samples t-test has been used while for multivariate 
analysis, regression analysis has been performed. In univariate analysis, independent sample t-test has 
been performed on AAR and CAAR of lower 50th and upper 50th percentile of each variable (exclud-
ing family ownership in case of which test has been conducted on AAR and CAAR of family and 
non-family groups). In multivariate analysis, regression has been run by using both AAR and CAAR 
as dependent variables. The following are the regression equations with a full set of explanatory 
variables:
ARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e ……(1)
CAARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e…(2)
Where,
AARt is average abnormal return of specific event window
CAARt is cumulative average abnormal return of specific event window
β1 is the co-efficient of family and indicates relationship between family ownership and AARt and 
CAARt
β2 is the co-efficient of LMV (firm size) and indicates relationship between firm size and AARt and 
CAARt
β3 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β4 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β5is the co-efficient of growth opportunity (MV/BV) and indicates relationship between MV/BV and 
AARt and CAARt
 Before performing these formal tests to determine the relationship between four aforemen-
tioned independent variables and stock market reaction to dividend news, a series of diagnostic tests 
were conducted to identify problems in the data. Details of these diagnostic tests and remedial actions 
are not reported for the sake of parsimony.
Results and Discussion
T-tests Results
 Table 1 below reports mean values of AAR and CAAR for the event windows ranging from 
five days prior to dividend announcement to five days after dividend announcements. All tables in this 
paper were constructed using asdoc program of Shah (2018).
 Table 1 shows that p-values of mean values of AAR and CAAR are statistically significant 
only in few event windows. For example, AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, CAARt0, AARt-2, 
AARt-5 and CAARt-2 are significant at five percent level while CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant 
only at the 10 percent level. Averages of all these significant AARs and CAARs are positive which 
shows that market reacts positively to the announcements of dividend. Moreover, significance of 
AARt-2, CAARt-2, and AART-1 indicates leakage of information about the dividend announcements 
prior to announcement of these dividends. 
 For further analysis, those event windows have been used analysis that have significant 
AARs and CAARs. Therefore, we use AARt-2, AARt-5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, and CAARt0 as depen-
dent variables in the regressions analysis to test their relationship with the previously mentioned four 
explanatory variables.
Table 1
Means and T-Tests of the Abnormal Returns in Different Event Windows
Univariate Analyses
 
This section presents and discusses results of the t-tests to find whether firm-specific variables 
moderate reaction of stock market to dividend news. The median values of each firm-specific variable 
is used to divide firms into two above 50th and below 50th percentiles, except for family ownership 
for which the groups have been made based on family vs. non-family status of firms. Then AAR and 
CAAR have been calculated for these groups of firms. Table 2 reports that mean differences of these 
abnormal returns under the heading of each firm-specific variable that have been used for making 
group of firms. For example, the column with heading ‘Size shows the mean abnormal returns of 
firms that are in the 50th top percentile of firm size minus mean abnormal returns of firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile of firm size.
 The results show that family firms have lower abnormal returns than non-family firms. The 
p-values show that the mean differences are significant only in case of AARt-5 at one percent level of 
significance and in case AARt-2 at five percent level of significance. Results also show that reaction 
of stock market to dividend news is stronger for smaller firms as compared to larger firms.  This is 
evident from the column with the heading ‘Size’, showing that mean differences of CAARt-2 and 
CAARt0 are negative and statistically significant. Results also depicts that firm’s leverage ratio 
significantly moderates the dividend news effects. For example, mean differences in abnormal returns 
are significantly higher for dividend announcements in firms with lower leverage ratios as compared 
to firms that have high leverage ratios. Finally, there is some evidence that firms with lower dividend 
yield experience more reaction to dividend announcements as compared to firms with higher 
dividend yield.
This section presents and discusses results of the t-test to find
Table 2
Mean Differences in Return
Regressions Results
 Regression analysis results are reported in Table 3. The coefficients of the dummy variables 
used to indicate family firms are negative in all the event windows, except CAARt-1 where it is 
positive. In line with the results reported in univariate analysis, coefficient of family dummy is signifi-
cant and negative in AARt-2 and AARt-5 while it is insignificant in case of the rest of the event 
windows. It shows that announcement effects of family firms are weaker as compared to announce-
ment effects of non-family firms. This finding supports the agency theory explanation that family 
ownership reduces conflict between principal and agent and hence dividends lose its importance as a 
tool to reduce agency costs.
 The results show that the firm size coefficient is negative and statistically significant in case 
of CAARt-2 and CAAR0 while coefficients of abnormal returns in other event windows are insignifi-
cant. Result of the regression analysis supports the findings of univariate analysis as reported in Table 
2. These findings show that abnormal returns due to dividend announcements are significantly lower 
for firms that are placed in the top 50th percentile of the firm size as compared to the firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile. These results are in line with information asymmetric theory of Miller and 
Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and Williams (1985) that predicts that small firms face 
more information asymmetry problems and hence dividends are an effective tool for them in reducing 
information asymmetry costs.
Table 3
Regression Results
 Leverage coefficient is negative and significant in case of AARt+5, CAARt-2 and CAARt-1. 
These results indicate that negative relationship exists between leverage and dividend news effects. 
Our results support the free cash flow argument of agency theory which suggests that agency costs are 
lower in firms that have high leverage ratio; hence dividend announcement effects are weaker in such 
firms. Positive and statistically significant dividend yield coefficient is reported in case of AARt+5 
and CAARt0 while it is insignificant in all other event windows. Generally, the results suggest that 
firms with higher dividend yield experience strong dividend announcement effects. 
 MV/BV and P/E ratio have been used as alternative proxies for firm’s investment opportuni-
ties. Results in Table 3 show that MV/BV has no significant influence on the dividend announcement 
effects. This finding is consistent with Zakaria et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) who found no 
significant influence of this variable on dividend announcement effects. However, the second proxy 
for investment opportunities, the P/E ratio, has statistically significant negative coefficient in case of 
AARt-5 and CAARt-1. These findings suggest that dividend announcement effects are weaker for 
firms with higher growth opportunities and stronger for firms that have less investment opportunities. 
Conclusion
 This study has empirically sought to determine the relation between the dividend announce-
ment effects and the firm-specific factors including family ownership, dividend yield, firm size and 
leverage ratio of firms.  Results of two-sample t-test indicate that only AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, 
CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant, therefore, cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal returns 
of these event windows were used as dependent variables in the regression analysis. Both multiple 
regression and univariate analyses have been employed to determine the moderating role of the 
firm-specific independent variables on the market reaction to the dividend news. The results of both 
univariate and regression analyses are consistent. Negative relation is reported between the abnormal 
returns and the family ownership. It affirms that the stock market gives lesser importance to the 
dividend announcement of family firms than the announcements of non-family firms. This might be 
because of lower level of agency problems in the family firms as suggested by the Jensen and Meck-
ling’s (1976) agency hypothesis. Further, this study discovered a negative association between the size 
of the firm and the dividend news effect. This negative relation is explained by the information asym-
metry theory of John and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). This 
finding is in line with the finding of other empirical studies such as Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Andres 
et al. (2011), Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Amihud and Li (2006). Next, a negative association is found 
between the abnormal returns and the leverage. This negative association is in line with Jensen’s (1986) 
agency theory. Further, a positive relation is found between the dividend yield and the dividend abnor-
mal returns. Among the control variables, this study found that investment opportunities measured by 
MV/BV have no effect on the share price reaction to the dividend announcement while P/E ratio has 
significant negative effect on abnormal returns. These findings show that the reaction of the stock 
market to the dividend announcement is heterogeneous. Firms with significant agency problems and 
information asymmetry problems experience positive abnormal stock returns when they announce 
dividends. 
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Abstract
The finance literature reports mixed results about the dividend announcements and stock market 
reaction to those announcements. This study posits that the heterogeneous reaction of stock market to 
dividend announcements might be a result of several firm-specific financial and non-financial factors. 
In this vein, this study has tried to analyze the role of family-ownership, firm-size, leverage, and 
dividend yield in defining the dividend announcement effects. Using a sample of 206 dividend 
announcements of 136 firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period of 2008 to 2012, 
the results of both the univariate tests and the regression analysis show that the reaction of stock 
market to dividend announcements varies significantly across different groups of firms. Specifically, 
our results show that family ownership, firm-size, dividend yield and leverage significantly mediate  
the reaction of stock market around dividend announcement days. 
Keywords: Heterogeneous Reaction, Abnormal Returns, Family Ownership, Pakistan Stock 
Exchange.
JEL Classification: G 230
Introduction
 The corporate dividend policy have been a widely-debated subject in the domain of corpo-
rate finance and a large number of studies has explored different angles of dividend policy. One such 
angle is the stock market reaction to dividend announcements. Miller and Modigliani (1961), argues 
that dividend policy does not impact the firm value in perfect capital markets. However, Jensen’s 
(1986) Free Cash Flow (FCF) theory and Cash Flow Signaling Theory presented by Ross (1977), John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985) have rejected the argument of 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) by supporting notion that firm value is affected by dividend policy. Both 
these theories suggest positive correlation between dividend announcements and the reaction of the 
market to the dividend announcements. However, the empirical studies report mixed results regarding 
dividend announcement effects. 
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 Some studies including Aharony and Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976), Asquith and Mullins 
(1983), Gurgul et al. (2003), Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), Dasilas and Leventis (2011) have supported 
both these hypothesis by reporting positive abnormal returns around dividend announcement days. On 
the other hand, there are some other studies which have rejected the idea of positive correlation 
between the announcements of dividend and the sub-sequent stock market price reaction (Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 2002; Chen, Firth and Gao, 2002; Vieira, 2005; and 
Hossain, Siddiquee and Rahman, 2006). These studies have found no significant evidence of associa-
tion between dividend announcements and reaction of stock market to these announcements. Further, 
some studies even have reported evidences of negative correlation between the announcements of 
dividend and the sub-sequent stock market share price reaction (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, 
Keown and Pinkerton, 1984; and Healy, Hathorn and Kirch, 1997).
 These mixed results of the past studies might be an outcome of different factors that mediates 
the dividend announcement effects. A number of factors are identified by literature that affects the 
dividend announcement effects. Baker, Powell and Veit (2002) and Baker and Powell (1999) have 
highlighted that firm specific factors may impact the association between the dividend announce-
ments and the sub-sequent reaction of stock market. Further, La Porta et al. (2000), and Ball et al. 
(2000) have argued that the ownership structure also plays a vital role in explaining the dividends 
information content and in turn the reaction of market to dividend announcements. 
 A number of studies, including Eddy and Seifert (1988), Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) Haw 
and Kim (1991), Healy et al. (1997), Said (2012), Vieira (2011), around the globe have tried to empiri-
cal test the association between different factors and dividend announcement effects. However, in 
Pakistan, no study until the date has tried to empirically figure out the variables that affect the 
dividend announcement effects of Pakistani firms. In this context, this study has made an attempt to 
determine the variables that explains the information content of dividends of Pakistani firms. Particu-
larly, this study has focused on the firm-specific factors and more specifically the firm size, ownership 
composition of a firm (whether a firm is family and non-family), leverage ratio and dividend yield.
Literature Review 
 This section presents the literature review of the past studies. First, the literature review of 
those studies has been discussed which focuses on association between the dividend announcements 
and the share price reaction. Later the focus is shifted to factors that moderate the above-mentioned 
relationship. 
 
Stock Market Reaction to Dividend Announcements
 A large number of researchers have analyzed the dividend policy and its impact on the value 
of thefirm since the seminal work of Miller and Modigliani (1961). They have used different theories 
to describe the link between the firm value and the dividend policy. Two prominent theories out of 
these are free cash flow (FCF) theory of Jensen (1986) and cash flow signaling (CFS) theory. CFS 
theory which is also called asymmetric information theory has been developed by a number of 
researchers including Ross (1977), Miller and Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and 
Williams (1985). This theory proposes that the firm’s managers, as compared to shareholders (inves-
tors), have more private information about the firm’s future prospects and they signal this private 
information to the market via dividend changes. Hence, when increase in dividends is announced by 
a firm, the stock market assumes that the future prospects of that particular firm are good and hence 
reacts positively. On the other hand, when a firm cuts dividend, the stock market assumes that the 
future prospects of that particular firm are not good and hence reacts negatively, which results in lower 
share prices of the firm. Therefore, in the context of CFS, it is expected that the stock market will react 
positively whenever dividends are announced by a firm. 
 The second theory i.e. FCF theory was developed by Jensen (1986) and is based on the 
agency relationship between managers and shareholders. This theory suggests that dividend plays a 
disciplinary role for the firm’s management. Distribution of free cash flows in the form of dividends 
decreases the conflict between managers and shareholders by making it less likely for managers to 
invest free cash flows in projects that have negative net present value. According to this argument, 
dividend announcements should result in increase in the stock prices. Therefore, like CFS theory, this 
theory also predicts positive correlation between dividend announcements and prices of stock.
 The empirical support for both the theories is mixed. Several studies including Aharony and 
Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976),  Gurgul et al. (2003), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Dasilas and 
Leventis (2011), and Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), have supported both these theories by reporting 
significant abnormal returns around announcement days. On other hand, other studies have reported 
evidence that does not support these theories (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 
2002; Vieira, 2005; Hossain et al., 2006; and Chen, et al., 2002). These studies have found no signifi-
cant abnormal returns around announcement dates. Further, some studies even have reported evidenc-
es of negative correlation between the dividend announcements and the subsequent reaction of stock 
market (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, et al., 1984; and Healy et al., 1997).
Moderating Role of Firm-Specific Factors
 Literature suggests that the mixed evidence as discussed above might be an outcome of 
different factors that moderates the stock market response to the dividend announcements. These 
factors include firm size, family ownership, leverage and dividend yield. We discuss these factors in 
details in the following paragraphs.
Family ownership
 Capulong et al. (2000) has stated that ownership composition and ownership concentration 
are the two key important dimensions of corporate ownership structures. Concentration of ownership 
deals with the distribution of power between the shareholders and the managers while on the other 
hand, composition of ownership deals with the identity of shareholders of a company and specifically 
the large shareholders. A large shareholder (also called block-holder) can be government, holding 
company, individual, bank, institutional investor or family. Thus, broadly speaking there are two 
categories of ownership composition: the family block-holder and non-family block-holder. Accord-
ing to Holderness and Sheehan (1988), and Gugler (2001), family block holder has different motiva-
tions and incentives to monitor the managers. Gorton and Kahl (1999) have argued that as compared 
to non-family block-holder, the family block-holders have greater incentive of monitoring the manag-
ers. Due to the better monitoring, the family block-holders affect the reaction of stock market to 
dividends announcements.  
 There are two leading theories that explain the relationship of family ownership with 
dividend announcements effects. These include the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory 
and Leland and Pyle’s (1977) general signaling theory. Under the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
agency cost model, it is argued that due to the better monitoring efforts of family owners, sharehold-
ers-managers interests are better aligned which reduces the agency conflicts and the agency costs. 
Therefore, if reducing agency conflicts is the motivation behind the announcement of dividend chang-
es, then the firms with family block-holder will experience weaker dividend announcement effects as 
compared to the firms with non-family block-holder. Under general Leland and Pyle’s (1977) theory 
of general signaling, it is argued that due to the better monitoring of managers by the family 
block-holders, the credibility of the manager’s decisions and the signals that they convey to the 
market increases. Therefore, due to higher credibility, the firms with family block-holders will experi-
ence stronger dividend announcement effects as compared to firms with non-family block-holder.
 Unlike the ownership concentration, only few researchers have empirically analyzed the 
dividend announcement effects in the context of family and non-family ownership. Therefore, this 
area is relatively unexplored and not enough evidences are available on this area. Recently, research-
ers have started exploring the relation between family ownership on dividend announcement effects. 
Setia-Atmaja, et al. (2004) are the first researchers who have analyzed the role of family ownership in 
mediating the dividend announcement effects in Australian environment. They reported positive 
relationship between family firms and dividend announcement effects. Contrary to Setia-Atmaja, et 
al. (2004), Vieira (2012) has reported no evidence from Portuguese Environment. 
 As discussed above, the agency cost theory predicts negative relationship while general 
signaling model predicts positive correlation between family ownership and dividend news effects. 
Hence, this study has formulated the following two competing hypothesis regarding relationship 
between family ownership and dividend announcement effects. 
H1a: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are negatively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are less than abnormal returns associ-
ated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
H1b: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are positively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are greater than abnormal returns 
associated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
Firm size
 The literature has identified the firm size as another potential variable that moderate the 
dividend announcement effects. The role of the size of the firm in determining the dividend announce-
ment effects can be described in the context of signaling or asymmetric information theory of John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). Under this theory, it is assert-
ed that as information asymmetry between equity holders and managers of firm is greater in case of 
the small size firms as compared to firms with large size; therefore, when small size firm tries to 
distribute more dividends, for the purpose of conveying signals to the outside investors about their 
future prospects, will experience greater dividend announcement effects. Therefore, in this context, 
negative relationship exists between the size of the firm and the dividend news effect.
 Empirical studies reports mixed results about the firm size relationship with the dividend 
announcement effects. Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Eddy and Seifert (1988) have reported negative 
association from the U.S. Amihud and Li (2006) and Yoon and Starks (1995). Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003) and Andres et al. (2011) have also supported signaling theory by reporting negative association 
from German environment. Vieira (2011), by utilizing the data of the UK, Portuguese and the French 
markets, have provided further evidence from the European market. She has reported interesting 
results. Her study found that dividend announcement effect is negatively correlated with the firm size 
only in the UK market while her study reported no evidence of significant association in the French 
and Portugal markets. Hussainey et al. (2011) and Zakaria et al. (2012) have also reported the same 
results from the U.K and the Malaysian Markets. 
 Based the on above literature and information asymmetric theory, this study has tested the 
following hypothesis:
H2: Reaction of stock market to the dividend news is negatively associated with the firm size. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of small-sized firms are greater than the abnormal 
returns associated with the dividend announcement of the large-sized firms.
Leverage
 Leverage is another firm specific variable that is identified by the literature as a potential 
determinant of the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Said (2012) and Vieira (2011) has 
defined leverage as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets. The role of leverage in determining 
the dividend announcement effects is explained both by Jensen’s (1986) version of FCF agency cost 
argument and signaling explanation of Ross (1977). Using Jensen’s (1986) argument, Borokhovich et 
al. (2005) have highlighted that the agency costs are lower in the firms that have higher debt ratios as 
managers in these firms are left with little cash flows under their discretions due to the payment of the 
debt and financial expenses. Therefore, dividends role in reducing agency costs is limited in these 
firms and hence a weaker dividend announcement effects will be experienced by the firm with higher 
leverage ratios. Under the second argument i.e. signaling theory of Ross (1977), it is argued that firms 
with good quality try to differentiate themselves from bad quality firms by using high leverage ratio. 
Therefore, investors interpret the dividend signals of the companies with higher leverage ratios as 
favorable as the investors anticipate that the managers of such good quality firm will be able to contin-
ue paying dividends in the future. 
 Empirical results regarding the association of the dividend news effects with leverage are 
mixed. Few studies have supported cash flow or agency theory by reporting negative association 
(Healy et al., 1997; and Alonso et al., 2005). Contrarily, Allen and Rachim (1996), Vieira (2011) and 
Zakaria et al. (2012) have supported signaling theory by reporting positive relation between the 
dividend announcement effects and leverage. 
 
 Literature suggests that the agency cost argument generally favors Pakistani environment 
more than the signaling theory regarding the role of leverage in determining different factors related 
to corporate finance and corporate performance (Nazir and Saita, 2013; Khan, Kaleem and Nazir, 
2012; and Satti, 2013). However, this study has tested two hypotheses based on the agency and the 
signaling theory in the light of empirical results reported from different countries. 
H3a: Negative association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are greater as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of the firms with high level of leverage.
H3b: Positive association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to the 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are lesser as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of firms with high level of leverage.
Dividend yield
 Dividend yield is one of the main factors that affect abnormal returns around dividend 
announcement days (Yoon and Starks, 1995; and Lee and Yan; 2003). The impact of dividend yield 
on share price reaction to dividend news can be explained in the context of agency cost and signaling 
theories. Both of the theories predict positive association between dividend announcement effects and 
dividend yield (Ariff and Finn, 1986; Lee, 1995; and Belde et al., 2005). Under the agency cost frame-
work, it is argued that high dividend yield helps in reducing agency conflicts in the firm. Hence, 
keeping other variables constant, the higher the dividend yield associated with the dividend announce-
ment, the stronger will be the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Contrarily, under the signal-
ing theory, it is argued that high dividend yield depicts that future prospects of a firm are good, there-
fore, dividend announcements that are accompanied by high dividend yield are perceived as a more 
favorable signal as compared to a dividend announcement with low dividend yield. Hence, a dividend 
announcement with high dividend yield induces stronger stock market reaction. 
 The earning response coefficient is dependent upon the earning retention rate, among other 
variables. Butler and Han (1994) argues that the share price reaction to the announcements is a 
function of earning surprise and earning response coefficient. They use dividend yield as a proxy for 
earning retention rate because actual earnings’ retention rate can go to unreasonable range if a firm has 
zero earnings or negative earnings. Dividend yield has been calculated as the per share dividend divid-
ed by the price of share five days before the announcement of dividend. Based on the above literature, 
this study has tested the following hypothesis:
H4: Positive association exists between the dividend yield and the dividend announcement effects. 
Hence, abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcements of the firms that are accompa-
nied by higher dividend yield will be greater as compared to the dividend announcement of the firms 
that are accompanied by lower dividend yield.
Growth opportunities
 Different studies have used growth opportunity as a control variable while examining 
relationship between different factors and stock market reaction to the dividend news (Vieira, 2005; 
Zakaria et al., 2012; Vieira, 2011; Neil and Robert, 2009; Vieira, 2012 and Andres et al., 2011). Past 
studies including Vieira (2011) and Andres et al. (2011) have used Tobin’s Q as a measure of inves-
tors’ expectation about the growth prospect of a firm and market to book value of equity (MV/BV) 
ratio as a proxy of Tobin’s Q. Thus, MV/BV has been used as a proxy of growth opportunity by this 
study also. According to Vieira (2011), high MV/BV shows that investors think that the firm has 
higher future growth prospects. Firms with lower MV/BV ratios are considered to have higher level 
of free cash flow and thus will be able to pay more dividends. Therefore, reaction of stock market is 
more strong to dividend news of firms that have lower MV/BV ratio, hence negative coefficient is 
expected for this variable. Among the past studies that have used MV/BV as control variable, Zakaria 
et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) have found no significant influence of this variable on the stock 
market reaction to the dividend news while Vieira (2011), Neil and Robert (2009) and Vieira (2005) 
have found negative relationship between  MV/BV and the dividend news effects. Apart from MV/BV 
ratio, this study also used price to earnings (P/E) ratio as proxy for investment opportunities by 
following Basu (1977) and Reinganum (1981). Both these studies reported negative association.
 
Methodology
Sample and Data Sources
 This section discusses the data sources, the data collection methods, the data analysis tools, 
and variables. For the purpose of the data collection, this study used simple random sampling 
technique. The sampling period ranges from year 2008 to 2012. During this sampling period, 136 
firms announced 206 annual dividends. Therefore, we analyze 206 annual dividend announcements of 
136 firms over the above-mentioned sampling period.
 The data of dividend announcements and the stock prices have been extracted from the KSE 
database. Data about the firm-specific variables and ownership structure were gathered from the 
annual reports of the firms.
Model Specification
 For testing the association of the above-mentioned variables with the dividend news effects, 
this study has utilized standard event study methodology. For generating abnormal returns market 
model has been utilized. Equation of the market model is specified as under:
Where,
Ritis return rate of security i at day t
Rmtis the rate of return of market at day t
αiis constant
βi isthe sensitivity of the expected asset return to the expected market return calculated as
 For the purpose of estimating the parameters of market model, 100 daily continuously 
compounded returns are used which ranged from approximately 145 days before the announcement 
date. KSE-100 Index is used as a market proxy. Ordinary least square method has been utilized for 
estimating the market model parameters. After estimating the parameters of market model, the follow-
ing equation has been used to calculate the expected returns:
Where,
E(Ri) is the expected return on stock iat day t
    is the estimated intercept of market model for stock i
    is the estimated beta of market model for stock i
For each dividend announcement, abnormal returns are calculated after estimating the market model 
parameters, by using the following equation:
Where,
ARit is the stock i abnormal return at day t
Rit is the actual stock i return at day t
 Abnormal returns, in case of each event (dividend announcement), are calculated for all 
event windows. After calculation of abnormal returns, average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumula-
tive abnormal returns (CAAR) are calculated for all event windows. After calculating AAR and 
CAAR, univariate and multivariate analysis has been performed. Before performing univariate and 
multivariate analyses to test the association between dividend news and aforementioned independent 
variables, the significance of the AAR and CAAR of the event windows mentioned before has been 
checked by using student t-test on overall sample.  
 For univariate analysis, independent samples t-test has been used while for multivariate 
analysis, regression analysis has been performed. In univariate analysis, independent sample t-test has 
been performed on AAR and CAAR of lower 50th and upper 50th percentile of each variable (exclud-
ing family ownership in case of which test has been conducted on AAR and CAAR of family and 
non-family groups). In multivariate analysis, regression has been run by using both AAR and CAAR 
as dependent variables. The following are the regression equations with a full set of explanatory 
variables:
ARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e ……(1)
CAARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e…(2)
Where,
AARt is average abnormal return of specific event window
CAARt is cumulative average abnormal return of specific event window
β1 is the co-efficient of family and indicates relationship between family ownership and AARt and 
CAARt
β2 is the co-efficient of LMV (firm size) and indicates relationship between firm size and AARt and 
CAARt
β3 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β4 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β5is the co-efficient of growth opportunity (MV/BV) and indicates relationship between MV/BV and 
AARt and CAARt
 Before performing these formal tests to determine the relationship between four aforemen-
tioned independent variables and stock market reaction to dividend news, a series of diagnostic tests 
were conducted to identify problems in the data. Details of these diagnostic tests and remedial actions 
are not reported for the sake of parsimony.
Results and Discussion
T-tests Results
 Table 1 below reports mean values of AAR and CAAR for the event windows ranging from 
five days prior to dividend announcement to five days after dividend announcements. All tables in this 
paper were constructed using asdoc program of Shah (2018).
 Table 1 shows that p-values of mean values of AAR and CAAR are statistically significant 
only in few event windows. For example, AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, CAARt0, AARt-2, 
AARt-5 and CAARt-2 are significant at five percent level while CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant 
only at the 10 percent level. Averages of all these significant AARs and CAARs are positive which 
shows that market reacts positively to the announcements of dividend. Moreover, significance of 
AARt-2, CAARt-2, and AART-1 indicates leakage of information about the dividend announcements 
prior to announcement of these dividends. 
 For further analysis, those event windows have been used analysis that have significant 
AARs and CAARs. Therefore, we use AARt-2, AARt-5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, and CAARt0 as depen-
dent variables in the regressions analysis to test their relationship with the previously mentioned four 
explanatory variables.
Table 1
Means and T-Tests of the Abnormal Returns in Different Event Windows
Univariate Analyses
 
This section presents and discusses results of the t-tests to find whether firm-specific variables 
moderate reaction of stock market to dividend news. The median values of each firm-specific variable 
is used to divide firms into two above 50th and below 50th percentiles, except for family ownership 
for which the groups have been made based on family vs. non-family status of firms. Then AAR and 
CAAR have been calculated for these groups of firms. Table 2 reports that mean differences of these 
abnormal returns under the heading of each firm-specific variable that have been used for making 
group of firms. For example, the column with heading ‘Size shows the mean abnormal returns of 
firms that are in the 50th top percentile of firm size minus mean abnormal returns of firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile of firm size.
 The results show that family firms have lower abnormal returns than non-family firms. The 
p-values show that the mean differences are significant only in case of AARt-5 at one percent level of 
significance and in case AARt-2 at five percent level of significance. Results also show that reaction 
of stock market to dividend news is stronger for smaller firms as compared to larger firms.  This is 
evident from the column with the heading ‘Size’, showing that mean differences of CAARt-2 and 
CAARt0 are negative and statistically significant. Results also depicts that firm’s leverage ratio 
significantly moderates the dividend news effects. For example, mean differences in abnormal returns 
are significantly higher for dividend announcements in firms with lower leverage ratios as compared 
to firms that have high leverage ratios. Finally, there is some evidence that firms with lower dividend 
yield experience more reaction to dividend announcements as compared to firms with higher 
dividend yield.
This section presents and discusses results of the t-test to find
Table 2
Mean Differences in Return
Regressions Results
 Regression analysis results are reported in Table 3. The coefficients of the dummy variables 
used to indicate family firms are negative in all the event windows, except CAARt-1 where it is 
positive. In line with the results reported in univariate analysis, coefficient of family dummy is signifi-
cant and negative in AARt-2 and AARt-5 while it is insignificant in case of the rest of the event 
windows. It shows that announcement effects of family firms are weaker as compared to announce-
ment effects of non-family firms. This finding supports the agency theory explanation that family 
ownership reduces conflict between principal and agent and hence dividends lose its importance as a 
tool to reduce agency costs.
 The results show that the firm size coefficient is negative and statistically significant in case 
of CAARt-2 and CAAR0 while coefficients of abnormal returns in other event windows are insignifi-
cant. Result of the regression analysis supports the findings of univariate analysis as reported in Table 
2. These findings show that abnormal returns due to dividend announcements are significantly lower 
for firms that are placed in the top 50th percentile of the firm size as compared to the firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile. These results are in line with information asymmetric theory of Miller and 
Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and Williams (1985) that predicts that small firms face 
more information asymmetry problems and hence dividends are an effective tool for them in reducing 
information asymmetry costs.
Table 3
Regression Results
 Leverage coefficient is negative and significant in case of AARt+5, CAARt-2 and CAARt-1. 
These results indicate that negative relationship exists between leverage and dividend news effects. 
Our results support the free cash flow argument of agency theory which suggests that agency costs are 
lower in firms that have high leverage ratio; hence dividend announcement effects are weaker in such 
firms. Positive and statistically significant dividend yield coefficient is reported in case of AARt+5 
and CAARt0 while it is insignificant in all other event windows. Generally, the results suggest that 
firms with higher dividend yield experience strong dividend announcement effects. 
 MV/BV and P/E ratio have been used as alternative proxies for firm’s investment opportuni-
ties. Results in Table 3 show that MV/BV has no significant influence on the dividend announcement 
effects. This finding is consistent with Zakaria et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) who found no 
significant influence of this variable on dividend announcement effects. However, the second proxy 
for investment opportunities, the P/E ratio, has statistically significant negative coefficient in case of 
AARt-5 and CAARt-1. These findings suggest that dividend announcement effects are weaker for 
firms with higher growth opportunities and stronger for firms that have less investment opportunities. 
Conclusion
 This study has empirically sought to determine the relation between the dividend announce-
ment effects and the firm-specific factors including family ownership, dividend yield, firm size and 
leverage ratio of firms.  Results of two-sample t-test indicate that only AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, 
CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant, therefore, cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal returns 
of these event windows were used as dependent variables in the regression analysis. Both multiple 
regression and univariate analyses have been employed to determine the moderating role of the 
firm-specific independent variables on the market reaction to the dividend news. The results of both 
univariate and regression analyses are consistent. Negative relation is reported between the abnormal 
returns and the family ownership. It affirms that the stock market gives lesser importance to the 
dividend announcement of family firms than the announcements of non-family firms. This might be 
because of lower level of agency problems in the family firms as suggested by the Jensen and Meck-
ling’s (1976) agency hypothesis. Further, this study discovered a negative association between the size 
of the firm and the dividend news effect. This negative relation is explained by the information asym-
metry theory of John and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). This 
finding is in line with the finding of other empirical studies such as Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Andres 
et al. (2011), Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Amihud and Li (2006). Next, a negative association is found 
between the abnormal returns and the leverage. This negative association is in line with Jensen’s (1986) 
agency theory. Further, a positive relation is found between the dividend yield and the dividend abnor-
mal returns. Among the control variables, this study found that investment opportunities measured by 
MV/BV have no effect on the share price reaction to the dividend announcement while P/E ratio has 
significant negative effect on abnormal returns. These findings show that the reaction of the stock 
market to the dividend announcement is heterogeneous. Firms with significant agency problems and 
information asymmetry problems experience positive abnormal stock returns when they announce 
dividends. 
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THE ROLE OF FIRM-SPECIFIC VARIABLES IN 
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Abstract
The finance literature reports mixed results about the dividend announcements and stock market 
reaction to those announcements. This study posits that the heterogeneous reaction of stock market to 
dividend announcements might be a result of several firm-specific financial and non-financial factors. 
In this vein, this study has tried to analyze the role of family-ownership, firm-size, leverage, and 
dividend yield in defining the dividend announcement effects. Using a sample of 206 dividend 
announcements of 136 firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period of 2008 to 2012, 
the results of both the univariate tests and the regression analysis show that the reaction of stock 
market to dividend announcements varies significantly across different groups of firms. Specifically, 
our results show that family ownership, firm-size, dividend yield and leverage significantly mediate  
the reaction of stock market around dividend announcement days. 
Keywords: Heterogeneous Reaction, Abnormal Returns, Family Ownership, Pakistan Stock 
Exchange.
JEL Classification: G 230
Introduction
 The corporate dividend policy have been a widely-debated subject in the domain of corpo-
rate finance and a large number of studies has explored different angles of dividend policy. One such 
angle is the stock market reaction to dividend announcements. Miller and Modigliani (1961), argues 
that dividend policy does not impact the firm value in perfect capital markets. However, Jensen’s 
(1986) Free Cash Flow (FCF) theory and Cash Flow Signaling Theory presented by Ross (1977), John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985) have rejected the argument of 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) by supporting notion that firm value is affected by dividend policy. Both 
these theories suggest positive correlation between dividend announcements and the reaction of the 
market to the dividend announcements. However, the empirical studies report mixed results regarding 
dividend announcement effects. 
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 Some studies including Aharony and Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976), Asquith and Mullins 
(1983), Gurgul et al. (2003), Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), Dasilas and Leventis (2011) have supported 
both these hypothesis by reporting positive abnormal returns around dividend announcement days. On 
the other hand, there are some other studies which have rejected the idea of positive correlation 
between the announcements of dividend and the sub-sequent stock market price reaction (Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 2002; Chen, Firth and Gao, 2002; Vieira, 2005; and 
Hossain, Siddiquee and Rahman, 2006). These studies have found no significant evidence of associa-
tion between dividend announcements and reaction of stock market to these announcements. Further, 
some studies even have reported evidences of negative correlation between the announcements of 
dividend and the sub-sequent stock market share price reaction (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, 
Keown and Pinkerton, 1984; and Healy, Hathorn and Kirch, 1997).
 These mixed results of the past studies might be an outcome of different factors that mediates 
the dividend announcement effects. A number of factors are identified by literature that affects the 
dividend announcement effects. Baker, Powell and Veit (2002) and Baker and Powell (1999) have 
highlighted that firm specific factors may impact the association between the dividend announce-
ments and the sub-sequent reaction of stock market. Further, La Porta et al. (2000), and Ball et al. 
(2000) have argued that the ownership structure also plays a vital role in explaining the dividends 
information content and in turn the reaction of market to dividend announcements. 
 A number of studies, including Eddy and Seifert (1988), Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) Haw 
and Kim (1991), Healy et al. (1997), Said (2012), Vieira (2011), around the globe have tried to empiri-
cal test the association between different factors and dividend announcement effects. However, in 
Pakistan, no study until the date has tried to empirically figure out the variables that affect the 
dividend announcement effects of Pakistani firms. In this context, this study has made an attempt to 
determine the variables that explains the information content of dividends of Pakistani firms. Particu-
larly, this study has focused on the firm-specific factors and more specifically the firm size, ownership 
composition of a firm (whether a firm is family and non-family), leverage ratio and dividend yield.
Literature Review 
 This section presents the literature review of the past studies. First, the literature review of 
those studies has been discussed which focuses on association between the dividend announcements 
and the share price reaction. Later the focus is shifted to factors that moderate the above-mentioned 
relationship. 
 
Stock Market Reaction to Dividend Announcements
 A large number of researchers have analyzed the dividend policy and its impact on the value 
of thefirm since the seminal work of Miller and Modigliani (1961). They have used different theories 
to describe the link between the firm value and the dividend policy. Two prominent theories out of 
these are free cash flow (FCF) theory of Jensen (1986) and cash flow signaling (CFS) theory. CFS 
theory which is also called asymmetric information theory has been developed by a number of 
researchers including Ross (1977), Miller and Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and 
Williams (1985). This theory proposes that the firm’s managers, as compared to shareholders (inves-
tors), have more private information about the firm’s future prospects and they signal this private 
information to the market via dividend changes. Hence, when increase in dividends is announced by 
a firm, the stock market assumes that the future prospects of that particular firm are good and hence 
reacts positively. On the other hand, when a firm cuts dividend, the stock market assumes that the 
future prospects of that particular firm are not good and hence reacts negatively, which results in lower 
share prices of the firm. Therefore, in the context of CFS, it is expected that the stock market will react 
positively whenever dividends are announced by a firm. 
 The second theory i.e. FCF theory was developed by Jensen (1986) and is based on the 
agency relationship between managers and shareholders. This theory suggests that dividend plays a 
disciplinary role for the firm’s management. Distribution of free cash flows in the form of dividends 
decreases the conflict between managers and shareholders by making it less likely for managers to 
invest free cash flows in projects that have negative net present value. According to this argument, 
dividend announcements should result in increase in the stock prices. Therefore, like CFS theory, this 
theory also predicts positive correlation between dividend announcements and prices of stock.
 The empirical support for both the theories is mixed. Several studies including Aharony and 
Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976),  Gurgul et al. (2003), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Dasilas and 
Leventis (2011), and Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), have supported both these theories by reporting 
significant abnormal returns around announcement days. On other hand, other studies have reported 
evidence that does not support these theories (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 
2002; Vieira, 2005; Hossain et al., 2006; and Chen, et al., 2002). These studies have found no signifi-
cant abnormal returns around announcement dates. Further, some studies even have reported evidenc-
es of negative correlation between the dividend announcements and the subsequent reaction of stock 
market (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, et al., 1984; and Healy et al., 1997).
Moderating Role of Firm-Specific Factors
 Literature suggests that the mixed evidence as discussed above might be an outcome of 
different factors that moderates the stock market response to the dividend announcements. These 
factors include firm size, family ownership, leverage and dividend yield. We discuss these factors in 
details in the following paragraphs.
Family ownership
 Capulong et al. (2000) has stated that ownership composition and ownership concentration 
are the two key important dimensions of corporate ownership structures. Concentration of ownership 
deals with the distribution of power between the shareholders and the managers while on the other 
hand, composition of ownership deals with the identity of shareholders of a company and specifically 
the large shareholders. A large shareholder (also called block-holder) can be government, holding 
company, individual, bank, institutional investor or family. Thus, broadly speaking there are two 
categories of ownership composition: the family block-holder and non-family block-holder. Accord-
ing to Holderness and Sheehan (1988), and Gugler (2001), family block holder has different motiva-
tions and incentives to monitor the managers. Gorton and Kahl (1999) have argued that as compared 
to non-family block-holder, the family block-holders have greater incentive of monitoring the manag-
ers. Due to the better monitoring, the family block-holders affect the reaction of stock market to 
dividends announcements.  
 There are two leading theories that explain the relationship of family ownership with 
dividend announcements effects. These include the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory 
and Leland and Pyle’s (1977) general signaling theory. Under the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
agency cost model, it is argued that due to the better monitoring efforts of family owners, sharehold-
ers-managers interests are better aligned which reduces the agency conflicts and the agency costs. 
Therefore, if reducing agency conflicts is the motivation behind the announcement of dividend chang-
es, then the firms with family block-holder will experience weaker dividend announcement effects as 
compared to the firms with non-family block-holder. Under general Leland and Pyle’s (1977) theory 
of general signaling, it is argued that due to the better monitoring of managers by the family 
block-holders, the credibility of the manager’s decisions and the signals that they convey to the 
market increases. Therefore, due to higher credibility, the firms with family block-holders will experi-
ence stronger dividend announcement effects as compared to firms with non-family block-holder.
 Unlike the ownership concentration, only few researchers have empirically analyzed the 
dividend announcement effects in the context of family and non-family ownership. Therefore, this 
area is relatively unexplored and not enough evidences are available on this area. Recently, research-
ers have started exploring the relation between family ownership on dividend announcement effects. 
Setia-Atmaja, et al. (2004) are the first researchers who have analyzed the role of family ownership in 
mediating the dividend announcement effects in Australian environment. They reported positive 
relationship between family firms and dividend announcement effects. Contrary to Setia-Atmaja, et 
al. (2004), Vieira (2012) has reported no evidence from Portuguese Environment. 
 As discussed above, the agency cost theory predicts negative relationship while general 
signaling model predicts positive correlation between family ownership and dividend news effects. 
Hence, this study has formulated the following two competing hypothesis regarding relationship 
between family ownership and dividend announcement effects. 
H1a: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are negatively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are less than abnormal returns associ-
ated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
H1b: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are positively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are greater than abnormal returns 
associated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
Firm size
 The literature has identified the firm size as another potential variable that moderate the 
dividend announcement effects. The role of the size of the firm in determining the dividend announce-
ment effects can be described in the context of signaling or asymmetric information theory of John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). Under this theory, it is assert-
ed that as information asymmetry between equity holders and managers of firm is greater in case of 
the small size firms as compared to firms with large size; therefore, when small size firm tries to 
distribute more dividends, for the purpose of conveying signals to the outside investors about their 
future prospects, will experience greater dividend announcement effects. Therefore, in this context, 
negative relationship exists between the size of the firm and the dividend news effect.
 Empirical studies reports mixed results about the firm size relationship with the dividend 
announcement effects. Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Eddy and Seifert (1988) have reported negative 
association from the U.S. Amihud and Li (2006) and Yoon and Starks (1995). Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003) and Andres et al. (2011) have also supported signaling theory by reporting negative association 
from German environment. Vieira (2011), by utilizing the data of the UK, Portuguese and the French 
markets, have provided further evidence from the European market. She has reported interesting 
results. Her study found that dividend announcement effect is negatively correlated with the firm size 
only in the UK market while her study reported no evidence of significant association in the French 
and Portugal markets. Hussainey et al. (2011) and Zakaria et al. (2012) have also reported the same 
results from the U.K and the Malaysian Markets. 
 Based the on above literature and information asymmetric theory, this study has tested the 
following hypothesis:
H2: Reaction of stock market to the dividend news is negatively associated with the firm size. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of small-sized firms are greater than the abnormal 
returns associated with the dividend announcement of the large-sized firms.
Leverage
 Leverage is another firm specific variable that is identified by the literature as a potential 
determinant of the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Said (2012) and Vieira (2011) has 
defined leverage as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets. The role of leverage in determining 
the dividend announcement effects is explained both by Jensen’s (1986) version of FCF agency cost 
argument and signaling explanation of Ross (1977). Using Jensen’s (1986) argument, Borokhovich et 
al. (2005) have highlighted that the agency costs are lower in the firms that have higher debt ratios as 
managers in these firms are left with little cash flows under their discretions due to the payment of the 
debt and financial expenses. Therefore, dividends role in reducing agency costs is limited in these 
firms and hence a weaker dividend announcement effects will be experienced by the firm with higher 
leverage ratios. Under the second argument i.e. signaling theory of Ross (1977), it is argued that firms 
with good quality try to differentiate themselves from bad quality firms by using high leverage ratio. 
Therefore, investors interpret the dividend signals of the companies with higher leverage ratios as 
favorable as the investors anticipate that the managers of such good quality firm will be able to contin-
ue paying dividends in the future. 
 Empirical results regarding the association of the dividend news effects with leverage are 
mixed. Few studies have supported cash flow or agency theory by reporting negative association 
(Healy et al., 1997; and Alonso et al., 2005). Contrarily, Allen and Rachim (1996), Vieira (2011) and 
Zakaria et al. (2012) have supported signaling theory by reporting positive relation between the 
dividend announcement effects and leverage. 
 
 Literature suggests that the agency cost argument generally favors Pakistani environment 
more than the signaling theory regarding the role of leverage in determining different factors related 
to corporate finance and corporate performance (Nazir and Saita, 2013; Khan, Kaleem and Nazir, 
2012; and Satti, 2013). However, this study has tested two hypotheses based on the agency and the 
signaling theory in the light of empirical results reported from different countries. 
H3a: Negative association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are greater as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of the firms with high level of leverage.
H3b: Positive association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to the 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are lesser as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of firms with high level of leverage.
Dividend yield
 Dividend yield is one of the main factors that affect abnormal returns around dividend 
announcement days (Yoon and Starks, 1995; and Lee and Yan; 2003). The impact of dividend yield 
on share price reaction to dividend news can be explained in the context of agency cost and signaling 
theories. Both of the theories predict positive association between dividend announcement effects and 
dividend yield (Ariff and Finn, 1986; Lee, 1995; and Belde et al., 2005). Under the agency cost frame-
work, it is argued that high dividend yield helps in reducing agency conflicts in the firm. Hence, 
keeping other variables constant, the higher the dividend yield associated with the dividend announce-
ment, the stronger will be the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Contrarily, under the signal-
ing theory, it is argued that high dividend yield depicts that future prospects of a firm are good, there-
fore, dividend announcements that are accompanied by high dividend yield are perceived as a more 
favorable signal as compared to a dividend announcement with low dividend yield. Hence, a dividend 
announcement with high dividend yield induces stronger stock market reaction. 
 The earning response coefficient is dependent upon the earning retention rate, among other 
variables. Butler and Han (1994) argues that the share price reaction to the announcements is a 
function of earning surprise and earning response coefficient. They use dividend yield as a proxy for 
earning retention rate because actual earnings’ retention rate can go to unreasonable range if a firm has 
zero earnings or negative earnings. Dividend yield has been calculated as the per share dividend divid-
ed by the price of share five days before the announcement of dividend. Based on the above literature, 
this study has tested the following hypothesis:
H4: Positive association exists between the dividend yield and the dividend announcement effects. 
Hence, abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcements of the firms that are accompa-
nied by higher dividend yield will be greater as compared to the dividend announcement of the firms 
that are accompanied by lower dividend yield.
Growth opportunities
 Different studies have used growth opportunity as a control variable while examining 
relationship between different factors and stock market reaction to the dividend news (Vieira, 2005; 
Zakaria et al., 2012; Vieira, 2011; Neil and Robert, 2009; Vieira, 2012 and Andres et al., 2011). Past 
studies including Vieira (2011) and Andres et al. (2011) have used Tobin’s Q as a measure of inves-
tors’ expectation about the growth prospect of a firm and market to book value of equity (MV/BV) 
ratio as a proxy of Tobin’s Q. Thus, MV/BV has been used as a proxy of growth opportunity by this 
study also. According to Vieira (2011), high MV/BV shows that investors think that the firm has 
higher future growth prospects. Firms with lower MV/BV ratios are considered to have higher level 
of free cash flow and thus will be able to pay more dividends. Therefore, reaction of stock market is 
more strong to dividend news of firms that have lower MV/BV ratio, hence negative coefficient is 
expected for this variable. Among the past studies that have used MV/BV as control variable, Zakaria 
et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) have found no significant influence of this variable on the stock 
market reaction to the dividend news while Vieira (2011), Neil and Robert (2009) and Vieira (2005) 
have found negative relationship between  MV/BV and the dividend news effects. Apart from MV/BV 
ratio, this study also used price to earnings (P/E) ratio as proxy for investment opportunities by 
following Basu (1977) and Reinganum (1981). Both these studies reported negative association.
 
Methodology
Sample and Data Sources
 This section discusses the data sources, the data collection methods, the data analysis tools, 
and variables. For the purpose of the data collection, this study used simple random sampling 
technique. The sampling period ranges from year 2008 to 2012. During this sampling period, 136 
firms announced 206 annual dividends. Therefore, we analyze 206 annual dividend announcements of 
136 firms over the above-mentioned sampling period.
 The data of dividend announcements and the stock prices have been extracted from the KSE 
database. Data about the firm-specific variables and ownership structure were gathered from the 
annual reports of the firms.
Model Specification
 For testing the association of the above-mentioned variables with the dividend news effects, 
this study has utilized standard event study methodology. For generating abnormal returns market 
model has been utilized. Equation of the market model is specified as under:
Where,
Ritis return rate of security i at day t
Rmtis the rate of return of market at day t
αiis constant
βi isthe sensitivity of the expected asset return to the expected market return calculated as
 For the purpose of estimating the parameters of market model, 100 daily continuously 
compounded returns are used which ranged from approximately 145 days before the announcement 
date. KSE-100 Index is used as a market proxy. Ordinary least square method has been utilized for 
estimating the market model parameters. After estimating the parameters of market model, the follow-
ing equation has been used to calculate the expected returns:
Where,
E(Ri) is the expected return on stock iat day t
    is the estimated intercept of market model for stock i
    is the estimated beta of market model for stock i
For each dividend announcement, abnormal returns are calculated after estimating the market model 
parameters, by using the following equation:
Where,
ARit is the stock i abnormal return at day t
Rit is the actual stock i return at day t
 Abnormal returns, in case of each event (dividend announcement), are calculated for all 
event windows. After calculation of abnormal returns, average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumula-
tive abnormal returns (CAAR) are calculated for all event windows. After calculating AAR and 
CAAR, univariate and multivariate analysis has been performed. Before performing univariate and 
multivariate analyses to test the association between dividend news and aforementioned independent 
variables, the significance of the AAR and CAAR of the event windows mentioned before has been 
checked by using student t-test on overall sample.  
 For univariate analysis, independent samples t-test has been used while for multivariate 
analysis, regression analysis has been performed. In univariate analysis, independent sample t-test has 
been performed on AAR and CAAR of lower 50th and upper 50th percentile of each variable (exclud-
ing family ownership in case of which test has been conducted on AAR and CAAR of family and 
non-family groups). In multivariate analysis, regression has been run by using both AAR and CAAR 
as dependent variables. The following are the regression equations with a full set of explanatory 
variables:
ARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e ……(1)
CAARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e…(2)
Where,
AARt is average abnormal return of specific event window
CAARt is cumulative average abnormal return of specific event window
β1 is the co-efficient of family and indicates relationship between family ownership and AARt and 
CAARt
β2 is the co-efficient of LMV (firm size) and indicates relationship between firm size and AARt and 
CAARt
β3 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β4 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β5is the co-efficient of growth opportunity (MV/BV) and indicates relationship between MV/BV and 
AARt and CAARt
 Before performing these formal tests to determine the relationship between four aforemen-
tioned independent variables and stock market reaction to dividend news, a series of diagnostic tests 
were conducted to identify problems in the data. Details of these diagnostic tests and remedial actions 
are not reported for the sake of parsimony.
Results and Discussion
T-tests Results
 Table 1 below reports mean values of AAR and CAAR for the event windows ranging from 
five days prior to dividend announcement to five days after dividend announcements. All tables in this 
paper were constructed using asdoc program of Shah (2018).
 Table 1 shows that p-values of mean values of AAR and CAAR are statistically significant 
only in few event windows. For example, AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, CAARt0, AARt-2, 
AARt-5 and CAARt-2 are significant at five percent level while CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant 
only at the 10 percent level. Averages of all these significant AARs and CAARs are positive which 
shows that market reacts positively to the announcements of dividend. Moreover, significance of 
AARt-2, CAARt-2, and AART-1 indicates leakage of information about the dividend announcements 
prior to announcement of these dividends. 
 For further analysis, those event windows have been used analysis that have significant 
AARs and CAARs. Therefore, we use AARt-2, AARt-5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, and CAARt0 as depen-
dent variables in the regressions analysis to test their relationship with the previously mentioned four 
explanatory variables.
Table 1
Means and T-Tests of the Abnormal Returns in Different Event Windows
Univariate Analyses
 
This section presents and discusses results of the t-tests to find whether firm-specific variables 
moderate reaction of stock market to dividend news. The median values of each firm-specific variable 
is used to divide firms into two above 50th and below 50th percentiles, except for family ownership 
for which the groups have been made based on family vs. non-family status of firms. Then AAR and 
CAAR have been calculated for these groups of firms. Table 2 reports that mean differences of these 
abnormal returns under the heading of each firm-specific variable that have been used for making 
group of firms. For example, the column with heading ‘Size shows the mean abnormal returns of 
firms that are in the 50th top percentile of firm size minus mean abnormal returns of firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile of firm size.
 The results show that family firms have lower abnormal returns than non-family firms. The 
p-values show that the mean differences are significant only in case of AARt-5 at one percent level of 
significance and in case AARt-2 at five percent level of significance. Results also show that reaction 
of stock market to dividend news is stronger for smaller firms as compared to larger firms.  This is 
evident from the column with the heading ‘Size’, showing that mean differences of CAARt-2 and 
CAARt0 are negative and statistically significant. Results also depicts that firm’s leverage ratio 
significantly moderates the dividend news effects. For example, mean differences in abnormal returns 
are significantly higher for dividend announcements in firms with lower leverage ratios as compared 
to firms that have high leverage ratios. Finally, there is some evidence that firms with lower dividend 
yield experience more reaction to dividend announcements as compared to firms with higher 
dividend yield.
This section presents and discusses results of the t-test to find
Table 2
Mean Differences in Return
Regressions Results
 Regression analysis results are reported in Table 3. The coefficients of the dummy variables 
used to indicate family firms are negative in all the event windows, except CAARt-1 where it is 
positive. In line with the results reported in univariate analysis, coefficient of family dummy is signifi-
cant and negative in AARt-2 and AARt-5 while it is insignificant in case of the rest of the event 
windows. It shows that announcement effects of family firms are weaker as compared to announce-
ment effects of non-family firms. This finding supports the agency theory explanation that family 
ownership reduces conflict between principal and agent and hence dividends lose its importance as a 
tool to reduce agency costs.
 The results show that the firm size coefficient is negative and statistically significant in case 
of CAARt-2 and CAAR0 while coefficients of abnormal returns in other event windows are insignifi-
cant. Result of the regression analysis supports the findings of univariate analysis as reported in Table 
2. These findings show that abnormal returns due to dividend announcements are significantly lower 
for firms that are placed in the top 50th percentile of the firm size as compared to the firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile. These results are in line with information asymmetric theory of Miller and 
Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and Williams (1985) that predicts that small firms face 
more information asymmetry problems and hence dividends are an effective tool for them in reducing 
information asymmetry costs.
Table 3
Regression Results
 Leverage coefficient is negative and significant in case of AARt+5, CAARt-2 and CAARt-1. 
These results indicate that negative relationship exists between leverage and dividend news effects. 
Our results support the free cash flow argument of agency theory which suggests that agency costs are 
lower in firms that have high leverage ratio; hence dividend announcement effects are weaker in such 
firms. Positive and statistically significant dividend yield coefficient is reported in case of AARt+5 
and CAARt0 while it is insignificant in all other event windows. Generally, the results suggest that 
firms with higher dividend yield experience strong dividend announcement effects. 
 MV/BV and P/E ratio have been used as alternative proxies for firm’s investment opportuni-
ties. Results in Table 3 show that MV/BV has no significant influence on the dividend announcement 
effects. This finding is consistent with Zakaria et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) who found no 
significant influence of this variable on dividend announcement effects. However, the second proxy 
for investment opportunities, the P/E ratio, has statistically significant negative coefficient in case of 
AARt-5 and CAARt-1. These findings suggest that dividend announcement effects are weaker for 
firms with higher growth opportunities and stronger for firms that have less investment opportunities. 
Conclusion
 This study has empirically sought to determine the relation between the dividend announce-
ment effects and the firm-specific factors including family ownership, dividend yield, firm size and 
leverage ratio of firms.  Results of two-sample t-test indicate that only AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, 
CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant, therefore, cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal returns 
of these event windows were used as dependent variables in the regression analysis. Both multiple 
regression and univariate analyses have been employed to determine the moderating role of the 
firm-specific independent variables on the market reaction to the dividend news. The results of both 
univariate and regression analyses are consistent. Negative relation is reported between the abnormal 
returns and the family ownership. It affirms that the stock market gives lesser importance to the 
dividend announcement of family firms than the announcements of non-family firms. This might be 
because of lower level of agency problems in the family firms as suggested by the Jensen and Meck-
ling’s (1976) agency hypothesis. Further, this study discovered a negative association between the size 
of the firm and the dividend news effect. This negative relation is explained by the information asym-
metry theory of John and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). This 
finding is in line with the finding of other empirical studies such as Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Andres 
et al. (2011), Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Amihud and Li (2006). Next, a negative association is found 
between the abnormal returns and the leverage. This negative association is in line with Jensen’s (1986) 
agency theory. Further, a positive relation is found between the dividend yield and the dividend abnor-
mal returns. Among the control variables, this study found that investment opportunities measured by 
MV/BV have no effect on the share price reaction to the dividend announcement while P/E ratio has 
significant negative effect on abnormal returns. These findings show that the reaction of the stock 
market to the dividend announcement is heterogeneous. Firms with significant agency problems and 
information asymmetry problems experience positive abnormal stock returns when they announce 
dividends. 
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THE ROLE OF FIRM-SPECIFIC VARIABLES IN 
EXPLAINING HETEROGENEOUS STOCK 
MARKET REACTIONS TO DIVIDEND
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Abstract
The finance literature reports mixed results about the dividend announcements and stock market 
reaction to those announcements. This study posits that the heterogeneous reaction of stock market to 
dividend announcements might be a result of several firm-specific financial and non-financial factors. 
In this vein, this study has tried to analyze the role of family-ownership, firm-size, leverage, and 
dividend yield in defining the dividend announcement effects. Using a sample of 206 dividend 
announcements of 136 firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period of 2008 to 2012, 
the results of both the univariate tests and the regression analysis show that the reaction of stock 
market to dividend announcements varies significantly across different groups of firms. Specifically, 
our results show that family ownership, firm-size, dividend yield and leverage significantly mediate  
the reaction of stock market around dividend announcement days. 
Keywords: Heterogeneous Reaction, Abnormal Returns, Family Ownership, Pakistan Stock 
Exchange.
JEL Classification: G 230
Introduction
 The corporate dividend policy have been a widely-debated subject in the domain of corpo-
rate finance and a large number of studies has explored different angles of dividend policy. One such 
angle is the stock market reaction to dividend announcements. Miller and Modigliani (1961), argues 
that dividend policy does not impact the firm value in perfect capital markets. However, Jensen’s 
(1986) Free Cash Flow (FCF) theory and Cash Flow Signaling Theory presented by Ross (1977), John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985) have rejected the argument of 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) by supporting notion that firm value is affected by dividend policy. Both 
these theories suggest positive correlation between dividend announcements and the reaction of the 
market to the dividend announcements. However, the empirical studies report mixed results regarding 
dividend announcement effects. 
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 Some studies including Aharony and Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976), Asquith and Mullins 
(1983), Gurgul et al. (2003), Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), Dasilas and Leventis (2011) have supported 
both these hypothesis by reporting positive abnormal returns around dividend announcement days. On 
the other hand, there are some other studies which have rejected the idea of positive correlation 
between the announcements of dividend and the sub-sequent stock market price reaction (Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 2002; Chen, Firth and Gao, 2002; Vieira, 2005; and 
Hossain, Siddiquee and Rahman, 2006). These studies have found no significant evidence of associa-
tion between dividend announcements and reaction of stock market to these announcements. Further, 
some studies even have reported evidences of negative correlation between the announcements of 
dividend and the sub-sequent stock market share price reaction (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, 
Keown and Pinkerton, 1984; and Healy, Hathorn and Kirch, 1997).
 These mixed results of the past studies might be an outcome of different factors that mediates 
the dividend announcement effects. A number of factors are identified by literature that affects the 
dividend announcement effects. Baker, Powell and Veit (2002) and Baker and Powell (1999) have 
highlighted that firm specific factors may impact the association between the dividend announce-
ments and the sub-sequent reaction of stock market. Further, La Porta et al. (2000), and Ball et al. 
(2000) have argued that the ownership structure also plays a vital role in explaining the dividends 
information content and in turn the reaction of market to dividend announcements. 
 A number of studies, including Eddy and Seifert (1988), Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) Haw 
and Kim (1991), Healy et al. (1997), Said (2012), Vieira (2011), around the globe have tried to empiri-
cal test the association between different factors and dividend announcement effects. However, in 
Pakistan, no study until the date has tried to empirically figure out the variables that affect the 
dividend announcement effects of Pakistani firms. In this context, this study has made an attempt to 
determine the variables that explains the information content of dividends of Pakistani firms. Particu-
larly, this study has focused on the firm-specific factors and more specifically the firm size, ownership 
composition of a firm (whether a firm is family and non-family), leverage ratio and dividend yield.
Literature Review 
 This section presents the literature review of the past studies. First, the literature review of 
those studies has been discussed which focuses on association between the dividend announcements 
and the share price reaction. Later the focus is shifted to factors that moderate the above-mentioned 
relationship. 
 
Stock Market Reaction to Dividend Announcements
 A large number of researchers have analyzed the dividend policy and its impact on the value 
of thefirm since the seminal work of Miller and Modigliani (1961). They have used different theories 
to describe the link between the firm value and the dividend policy. Two prominent theories out of 
these are free cash flow (FCF) theory of Jensen (1986) and cash flow signaling (CFS) theory. CFS 
theory which is also called asymmetric information theory has been developed by a number of 
researchers including Ross (1977), Miller and Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and 
Williams (1985). This theory proposes that the firm’s managers, as compared to shareholders (inves-
tors), have more private information about the firm’s future prospects and they signal this private 
information to the market via dividend changes. Hence, when increase in dividends is announced by 
a firm, the stock market assumes that the future prospects of that particular firm are good and hence 
reacts positively. On the other hand, when a firm cuts dividend, the stock market assumes that the 
future prospects of that particular firm are not good and hence reacts negatively, which results in lower 
share prices of the firm. Therefore, in the context of CFS, it is expected that the stock market will react 
positively whenever dividends are announced by a firm. 
 The second theory i.e. FCF theory was developed by Jensen (1986) and is based on the 
agency relationship between managers and shareholders. This theory suggests that dividend plays a 
disciplinary role for the firm’s management. Distribution of free cash flows in the form of dividends 
decreases the conflict between managers and shareholders by making it less likely for managers to 
invest free cash flows in projects that have negative net present value. According to this argument, 
dividend announcements should result in increase in the stock prices. Therefore, like CFS theory, this 
theory also predicts positive correlation between dividend announcements and prices of stock.
 The empirical support for both the theories is mixed. Several studies including Aharony and 
Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976),  Gurgul et al. (2003), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Dasilas and 
Leventis (2011), and Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), have supported both these theories by reporting 
significant abnormal returns around announcement days. On other hand, other studies have reported 
evidence that does not support these theories (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 
2002; Vieira, 2005; Hossain et al., 2006; and Chen, et al., 2002). These studies have found no signifi-
cant abnormal returns around announcement dates. Further, some studies even have reported evidenc-
es of negative correlation between the dividend announcements and the subsequent reaction of stock 
market (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, et al., 1984; and Healy et al., 1997).
Moderating Role of Firm-Specific Factors
 Literature suggests that the mixed evidence as discussed above might be an outcome of 
different factors that moderates the stock market response to the dividend announcements. These 
factors include firm size, family ownership, leverage and dividend yield. We discuss these factors in 
details in the following paragraphs.
Family ownership
 Capulong et al. (2000) has stated that ownership composition and ownership concentration 
are the two key important dimensions of corporate ownership structures. Concentration of ownership 
deals with the distribution of power between the shareholders and the managers while on the other 
hand, composition of ownership deals with the identity of shareholders of a company and specifically 
the large shareholders. A large shareholder (also called block-holder) can be government, holding 
company, individual, bank, institutional investor or family. Thus, broadly speaking there are two 
categories of ownership composition: the family block-holder and non-family block-holder. Accord-
ing to Holderness and Sheehan (1988), and Gugler (2001), family block holder has different motiva-
tions and incentives to monitor the managers. Gorton and Kahl (1999) have argued that as compared 
to non-family block-holder, the family block-holders have greater incentive of monitoring the manag-
ers. Due to the better monitoring, the family block-holders affect the reaction of stock market to 
dividends announcements.  
 There are two leading theories that explain the relationship of family ownership with 
dividend announcements effects. These include the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory 
and Leland and Pyle’s (1977) general signaling theory. Under the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
agency cost model, it is argued that due to the better monitoring efforts of family owners, sharehold-
ers-managers interests are better aligned which reduces the agency conflicts and the agency costs. 
Therefore, if reducing agency conflicts is the motivation behind the announcement of dividend chang-
es, then the firms with family block-holder will experience weaker dividend announcement effects as 
compared to the firms with non-family block-holder. Under general Leland and Pyle’s (1977) theory 
of general signaling, it is argued that due to the better monitoring of managers by the family 
block-holders, the credibility of the manager’s decisions and the signals that they convey to the 
market increases. Therefore, due to higher credibility, the firms with family block-holders will experi-
ence stronger dividend announcement effects as compared to firms with non-family block-holder.
 Unlike the ownership concentration, only few researchers have empirically analyzed the 
dividend announcement effects in the context of family and non-family ownership. Therefore, this 
area is relatively unexplored and not enough evidences are available on this area. Recently, research-
ers have started exploring the relation between family ownership on dividend announcement effects. 
Setia-Atmaja, et al. (2004) are the first researchers who have analyzed the role of family ownership in 
mediating the dividend announcement effects in Australian environment. They reported positive 
relationship between family firms and dividend announcement effects. Contrary to Setia-Atmaja, et 
al. (2004), Vieira (2012) has reported no evidence from Portuguese Environment. 
 As discussed above, the agency cost theory predicts negative relationship while general 
signaling model predicts positive correlation between family ownership and dividend news effects. 
Hence, this study has formulated the following two competing hypothesis regarding relationship 
between family ownership and dividend announcement effects. 
H1a: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are negatively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are less than abnormal returns associ-
ated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
H1b: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are positively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are greater than abnormal returns 
associated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
Firm size
 The literature has identified the firm size as another potential variable that moderate the 
dividend announcement effects. The role of the size of the firm in determining the dividend announce-
ment effects can be described in the context of signaling or asymmetric information theory of John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). Under this theory, it is assert-
ed that as information asymmetry between equity holders and managers of firm is greater in case of 
the small size firms as compared to firms with large size; therefore, when small size firm tries to 
distribute more dividends, for the purpose of conveying signals to the outside investors about their 
future prospects, will experience greater dividend announcement effects. Therefore, in this context, 
negative relationship exists between the size of the firm and the dividend news effect.
 Empirical studies reports mixed results about the firm size relationship with the dividend 
announcement effects. Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Eddy and Seifert (1988) have reported negative 
association from the U.S. Amihud and Li (2006) and Yoon and Starks (1995). Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003) and Andres et al. (2011) have also supported signaling theory by reporting negative association 
from German environment. Vieira (2011), by utilizing the data of the UK, Portuguese and the French 
markets, have provided further evidence from the European market. She has reported interesting 
results. Her study found that dividend announcement effect is negatively correlated with the firm size 
only in the UK market while her study reported no evidence of significant association in the French 
and Portugal markets. Hussainey et al. (2011) and Zakaria et al. (2012) have also reported the same 
results from the U.K and the Malaysian Markets. 
 Based the on above literature and information asymmetric theory, this study has tested the 
following hypothesis:
H2: Reaction of stock market to the dividend news is negatively associated with the firm size. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of small-sized firms are greater than the abnormal 
returns associated with the dividend announcement of the large-sized firms.
Leverage
 Leverage is another firm specific variable that is identified by the literature as a potential 
determinant of the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Said (2012) and Vieira (2011) has 
defined leverage as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets. The role of leverage in determining 
the dividend announcement effects is explained both by Jensen’s (1986) version of FCF agency cost 
argument and signaling explanation of Ross (1977). Using Jensen’s (1986) argument, Borokhovich et 
al. (2005) have highlighted that the agency costs are lower in the firms that have higher debt ratios as 
managers in these firms are left with little cash flows under their discretions due to the payment of the 
debt and financial expenses. Therefore, dividends role in reducing agency costs is limited in these 
firms and hence a weaker dividend announcement effects will be experienced by the firm with higher 
leverage ratios. Under the second argument i.e. signaling theory of Ross (1977), it is argued that firms 
with good quality try to differentiate themselves from bad quality firms by using high leverage ratio. 
Therefore, investors interpret the dividend signals of the companies with higher leverage ratios as 
favorable as the investors anticipate that the managers of such good quality firm will be able to contin-
ue paying dividends in the future. 
 Empirical results regarding the association of the dividend news effects with leverage are 
mixed. Few studies have supported cash flow or agency theory by reporting negative association 
(Healy et al., 1997; and Alonso et al., 2005). Contrarily, Allen and Rachim (1996), Vieira (2011) and 
Zakaria et al. (2012) have supported signaling theory by reporting positive relation between the 
dividend announcement effects and leverage. 
 
 Literature suggests that the agency cost argument generally favors Pakistani environment 
more than the signaling theory regarding the role of leverage in determining different factors related 
to corporate finance and corporate performance (Nazir and Saita, 2013; Khan, Kaleem and Nazir, 
2012; and Satti, 2013). However, this study has tested two hypotheses based on the agency and the 
signaling theory in the light of empirical results reported from different countries. 
H3a: Negative association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are greater as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of the firms with high level of leverage.
H3b: Positive association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to the 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are lesser as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of firms with high level of leverage.
Dividend yield
 Dividend yield is one of the main factors that affect abnormal returns around dividend 
announcement days (Yoon and Starks, 1995; and Lee and Yan; 2003). The impact of dividend yield 
on share price reaction to dividend news can be explained in the context of agency cost and signaling 
theories. Both of the theories predict positive association between dividend announcement effects and 
dividend yield (Ariff and Finn, 1986; Lee, 1995; and Belde et al., 2005). Under the agency cost frame-
work, it is argued that high dividend yield helps in reducing agency conflicts in the firm. Hence, 
keeping other variables constant, the higher the dividend yield associated with the dividend announce-
ment, the stronger will be the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Contrarily, under the signal-
ing theory, it is argued that high dividend yield depicts that future prospects of a firm are good, there-
fore, dividend announcements that are accompanied by high dividend yield are perceived as a more 
favorable signal as compared to a dividend announcement with low dividend yield. Hence, a dividend 
announcement with high dividend yield induces stronger stock market reaction. 
 The earning response coefficient is dependent upon the earning retention rate, among other 
variables. Butler and Han (1994) argues that the share price reaction to the announcements is a 
function of earning surprise and earning response coefficient. They use dividend yield as a proxy for 
earning retention rate because actual earnings’ retention rate can go to unreasonable range if a firm has 
zero earnings or negative earnings. Dividend yield has been calculated as the per share dividend divid-
ed by the price of share five days before the announcement of dividend. Based on the above literature, 
this study has tested the following hypothesis:
H4: Positive association exists between the dividend yield and the dividend announcement effects. 
Hence, abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcements of the firms that are accompa-
nied by higher dividend yield will be greater as compared to the dividend announcement of the firms 
that are accompanied by lower dividend yield.
Growth opportunities
 Different studies have used growth opportunity as a control variable while examining 
relationship between different factors and stock market reaction to the dividend news (Vieira, 2005; 
Zakaria et al., 2012; Vieira, 2011; Neil and Robert, 2009; Vieira, 2012 and Andres et al., 2011). Past 
studies including Vieira (2011) and Andres et al. (2011) have used Tobin’s Q as a measure of inves-
tors’ expectation about the growth prospect of a firm and market to book value of equity (MV/BV) 
ratio as a proxy of Tobin’s Q. Thus, MV/BV has been used as a proxy of growth opportunity by this 
study also. According to Vieira (2011), high MV/BV shows that investors think that the firm has 
higher future growth prospects. Firms with lower MV/BV ratios are considered to have higher level 
of free cash flow and thus will be able to pay more dividends. Therefore, reaction of stock market is 
more strong to dividend news of firms that have lower MV/BV ratio, hence negative coefficient is 
expected for this variable. Among the past studies that have used MV/BV as control variable, Zakaria 
et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) have found no significant influence of this variable on the stock 
market reaction to the dividend news while Vieira (2011), Neil and Robert (2009) and Vieira (2005) 
have found negative relationship between  MV/BV and the dividend news effects. Apart from MV/BV 
ratio, this study also used price to earnings (P/E) ratio as proxy for investment opportunities by 
following Basu (1977) and Reinganum (1981). Both these studies reported negative association.
 
Methodology
Sample and Data Sources
 This section discusses the data sources, the data collection methods, the data analysis tools, 
and variables. For the purpose of the data collection, this study used simple random sampling 
technique. The sampling period ranges from year 2008 to 2012. During this sampling period, 136 
firms announced 206 annual dividends. Therefore, we analyze 206 annual dividend announcements of 
136 firms over the above-mentioned sampling period.
 The data of dividend announcements and the stock prices have been extracted from the KSE 
database. Data about the firm-specific variables and ownership structure were gathered from the 
annual reports of the firms.
Model Specification
 For testing the association of the above-mentioned variables with the dividend news effects, 
this study has utilized standard event study methodology. For generating abnormal returns market 
model has been utilized. Equation of the market model is specified as under:
Where,
Ritis return rate of security i at day t
Rmtis the rate of return of market at day t
αiis constant
βi isthe sensitivity of the expected asset return to the expected market return calculated as
 For the purpose of estimating the parameters of market model, 100 daily continuously 
compounded returns are used which ranged from approximately 145 days before the announcement 
date. KSE-100 Index is used as a market proxy. Ordinary least square method has been utilized for 
estimating the market model parameters. After estimating the parameters of market model, the follow-
ing equation has been used to calculate the expected returns:
Where,
E(Ri) is the expected return on stock iat day t
    is the estimated intercept of market model for stock i
    is the estimated beta of market model for stock i
For each dividend announcement, abnormal returns are calculated after estimating the market model 
parameters, by using the following equation:
Where,
ARit is the stock i abnormal return at day t
Rit is the actual stock i return at day t
 Abnormal returns, in case of each event (dividend announcement), are calculated for all 
event windows. After calculation of abnormal returns, average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumula-
tive abnormal returns (CAAR) are calculated for all event windows. After calculating AAR and 
CAAR, univariate and multivariate analysis has been performed. Before performing univariate and 
multivariate analyses to test the association between dividend news and aforementioned independent 
variables, the significance of the AAR and CAAR of the event windows mentioned before has been 
checked by using student t-test on overall sample.  
 For univariate analysis, independent samples t-test has been used while for multivariate 
analysis, regression analysis has been performed. In univariate analysis, independent sample t-test has 
been performed on AAR and CAAR of lower 50th and upper 50th percentile of each variable (exclud-
ing family ownership in case of which test has been conducted on AAR and CAAR of family and 
non-family groups). In multivariate analysis, regression has been run by using both AAR and CAAR 
as dependent variables. The following are the regression equations with a full set of explanatory 
variables:
ARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e ……(1)
CAARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e…(2)
Where,
AARt is average abnormal return of specific event window
CAARt is cumulative average abnormal return of specific event window
β1 is the co-efficient of family and indicates relationship between family ownership and AARt and 
CAARt
β2 is the co-efficient of LMV (firm size) and indicates relationship between firm size and AARt and 
CAARt
β3 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β4 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β5is the co-efficient of growth opportunity (MV/BV) and indicates relationship between MV/BV and 
AARt and CAARt
 Before performing these formal tests to determine the relationship between four aforemen-
tioned independent variables and stock market reaction to dividend news, a series of diagnostic tests 
were conducted to identify problems in the data. Details of these diagnostic tests and remedial actions 
are not reported for the sake of parsimony.
Results and Discussion
T-tests Results
 Table 1 below reports mean values of AAR and CAAR for the event windows ranging from 
five days prior to dividend announcement to five days after dividend announcements. All tables in this 
paper were constructed using asdoc program of Shah (2018).
 Table 1 shows that p-values of mean values of AAR and CAAR are statistically significant 
only in few event windows. For example, AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, CAARt0, AARt-2, 
AARt-5 and CAARt-2 are significant at five percent level while CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant 
only at the 10 percent level. Averages of all these significant AARs and CAARs are positive which 
shows that market reacts positively to the announcements of dividend. Moreover, significance of 
AARt-2, CAARt-2, and AART-1 indicates leakage of information about the dividend announcements 
prior to announcement of these dividends. 
 For further analysis, those event windows have been used analysis that have significant 
AARs and CAARs. Therefore, we use AARt-2, AARt-5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, and CAARt0 as depen-
dent variables in the regressions analysis to test their relationship with the previously mentioned four 
explanatory variables.
Table 1
Means and T-Tests of the Abnormal Returns in Different Event Windows
Univariate Analyses
 
This section presents and discusses results of the t-tests to find whether firm-specific variables 
moderate reaction of stock market to dividend news. The median values of each firm-specific variable 
is used to divide firms into two above 50th and below 50th percentiles, except for family ownership 
for which the groups have been made based on family vs. non-family status of firms. Then AAR and 
CAAR have been calculated for these groups of firms. Table 2 reports that mean differences of these 
abnormal returns under the heading of each firm-specific variable that have been used for making 
group of firms. For example, the column with heading ‘Size shows the mean abnormal returns of 
firms that are in the 50th top percentile of firm size minus mean abnormal returns of firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile of firm size.
 The results show that family firms have lower abnormal returns than non-family firms. The 
p-values show that the mean differences are significant only in case of AARt-5 at one percent level of 
significance and in case AARt-2 at five percent level of significance. Results also show that reaction 
of stock market to dividend news is stronger for smaller firms as compared to larger firms.  This is 
evident from the column with the heading ‘Size’, showing that mean differences of CAARt-2 and 
CAARt0 are negative and statistically significant. Results also depicts that firm’s leverage ratio 
significantly moderates the dividend news effects. For example, mean differences in abnormal returns 
are significantly higher for dividend announcements in firms with lower leverage ratios as compared 
to firms that have high leverage ratios. Finally, there is some evidence that firms with lower dividend 
yield experience more reaction to dividend announcements as compared to firms with higher 
dividend yield.
This section presents and discusses results of the t-test to find
Table 2
Mean Differences in Return
Regressions Results
 Regression analysis results are reported in Table 3. The coefficients of the dummy variables 
used to indicate family firms are negative in all the event windows, except CAARt-1 where it is 
positive. In line with the results reported in univariate analysis, coefficient of family dummy is signifi-
cant and negative in AARt-2 and AARt-5 while it is insignificant in case of the rest of the event 
windows. It shows that announcement effects of family firms are weaker as compared to announce-
ment effects of non-family firms. This finding supports the agency theory explanation that family 
ownership reduces conflict between principal and agent and hence dividends lose its importance as a 
tool to reduce agency costs.
 The results show that the firm size coefficient is negative and statistically significant in case 
of CAARt-2 and CAAR0 while coefficients of abnormal returns in other event windows are insignifi-
cant. Result of the regression analysis supports the findings of univariate analysis as reported in Table 
2. These findings show that abnormal returns due to dividend announcements are significantly lower 
for firms that are placed in the top 50th percentile of the firm size as compared to the firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile. These results are in line with information asymmetric theory of Miller and 
Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and Williams (1985) that predicts that small firms face 
more information asymmetry problems and hence dividends are an effective tool for them in reducing 
information asymmetry costs.
Table 3
Regression Results
 Leverage coefficient is negative and significant in case of AARt+5, CAARt-2 and CAARt-1. 
These results indicate that negative relationship exists between leverage and dividend news effects. 
Our results support the free cash flow argument of agency theory which suggests that agency costs are 
lower in firms that have high leverage ratio; hence dividend announcement effects are weaker in such 
firms. Positive and statistically significant dividend yield coefficient is reported in case of AARt+5 
and CAARt0 while it is insignificant in all other event windows. Generally, the results suggest that 
firms with higher dividend yield experience strong dividend announcement effects. 
 MV/BV and P/E ratio have been used as alternative proxies for firm’s investment opportuni-
ties. Results in Table 3 show that MV/BV has no significant influence on the dividend announcement 
effects. This finding is consistent with Zakaria et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) who found no 
significant influence of this variable on dividend announcement effects. However, the second proxy 
for investment opportunities, the P/E ratio, has statistically significant negative coefficient in case of 
AARt-5 and CAARt-1. These findings suggest that dividend announcement effects are weaker for 
firms with higher growth opportunities and stronger for firms that have less investment opportunities. 
Conclusion
 This study has empirically sought to determine the relation between the dividend announce-
ment effects and the firm-specific factors including family ownership, dividend yield, firm size and 
leverage ratio of firms.  Results of two-sample t-test indicate that only AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, 
CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant, therefore, cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal returns 
of these event windows were used as dependent variables in the regression analysis. Both multiple 
regression and univariate analyses have been employed to determine the moderating role of the 
firm-specific independent variables on the market reaction to the dividend news. The results of both 
univariate and regression analyses are consistent. Negative relation is reported between the abnormal 
returns and the family ownership. It affirms that the stock market gives lesser importance to the 
dividend announcement of family firms than the announcements of non-family firms. This might be 
because of lower level of agency problems in the family firms as suggested by the Jensen and Meck-
ling’s (1976) agency hypothesis. Further, this study discovered a negative association between the size 
of the firm and the dividend news effect. This negative relation is explained by the information asym-
metry theory of John and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). This 
finding is in line with the finding of other empirical studies such as Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Andres 
et al. (2011), Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Amihud and Li (2006). Next, a negative association is found 
between the abnormal returns and the leverage. This negative association is in line with Jensen’s (1986) 
agency theory. Further, a positive relation is found between the dividend yield and the dividend abnor-
mal returns. Among the control variables, this study found that investment opportunities measured by 
MV/BV have no effect on the share price reaction to the dividend announcement while P/E ratio has 
significant negative effect on abnormal returns. These findings show that the reaction of the stock 
market to the dividend announcement is heterogeneous. Firms with significant agency problems and 
information asymmetry problems experience positive abnormal stock returns when they announce 
dividends. 
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THE ROLE OF FIRM-SPECIFIC VARIABLES IN 
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Abstract
The finance literature reports mixed results about the dividend announcements and stock market 
reaction to those announcements. This study posits that the heterogeneous reaction of stock market to 
dividend announcements might be a result of several firm-specific financial and non-financial factors. 
In this vein, this study has tried to analyze the role of family-ownership, firm-size, leverage, and 
dividend yield in defining the dividend announcement effects. Using a sample of 206 dividend 
announcements of 136 firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period of 2008 to 2012, 
the results of both the univariate tests and the regression analysis show that the reaction of stock 
market to dividend announcements varies significantly across different groups of firms. Specifically, 
our results show that family ownership, firm-size, dividend yield and leverage significantly mediate  
the reaction of stock market around dividend announcement days. 
Keywords: Heterogeneous Reaction, Abnormal Returns, Family Ownership, Pakistan Stock 
Exchange.
JEL Classification: G 230
Introduction
 The corporate dividend policy have been a widely-debated subject in the domain of corpo-
rate finance and a large number of studies has explored different angles of dividend policy. One such 
angle is the stock market reaction to dividend announcements. Miller and Modigliani (1961), argues 
that dividend policy does not impact the firm value in perfect capital markets. However, Jensen’s 
(1986) Free Cash Flow (FCF) theory and Cash Flow Signaling Theory presented by Ross (1977), John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985) have rejected the argument of 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) by supporting notion that firm value is affected by dividend policy. Both 
these theories suggest positive correlation between dividend announcements and the reaction of the 
market to the dividend announcements. However, the empirical studies report mixed results regarding 
dividend announcement effects. 
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 Some studies including Aharony and Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976), Asquith and Mullins 
(1983), Gurgul et al. (2003), Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), Dasilas and Leventis (2011) have supported 
both these hypothesis by reporting positive abnormal returns around dividend announcement days. On 
the other hand, there are some other studies which have rejected the idea of positive correlation 
between the announcements of dividend and the sub-sequent stock market price reaction (Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 2002; Chen, Firth and Gao, 2002; Vieira, 2005; and 
Hossain, Siddiquee and Rahman, 2006). These studies have found no significant evidence of associa-
tion between dividend announcements and reaction of stock market to these announcements. Further, 
some studies even have reported evidences of negative correlation between the announcements of 
dividend and the sub-sequent stock market share price reaction (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, 
Keown and Pinkerton, 1984; and Healy, Hathorn and Kirch, 1997).
 These mixed results of the past studies might be an outcome of different factors that mediates 
the dividend announcement effects. A number of factors are identified by literature that affects the 
dividend announcement effects. Baker, Powell and Veit (2002) and Baker and Powell (1999) have 
highlighted that firm specific factors may impact the association between the dividend announce-
ments and the sub-sequent reaction of stock market. Further, La Porta et al. (2000), and Ball et al. 
(2000) have argued that the ownership structure also plays a vital role in explaining the dividends 
information content and in turn the reaction of market to dividend announcements. 
 A number of studies, including Eddy and Seifert (1988), Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) Haw 
and Kim (1991), Healy et al. (1997), Said (2012), Vieira (2011), around the globe have tried to empiri-
cal test the association between different factors and dividend announcement effects. However, in 
Pakistan, no study until the date has tried to empirically figure out the variables that affect the 
dividend announcement effects of Pakistani firms. In this context, this study has made an attempt to 
determine the variables that explains the information content of dividends of Pakistani firms. Particu-
larly, this study has focused on the firm-specific factors and more specifically the firm size, ownership 
composition of a firm (whether a firm is family and non-family), leverage ratio and dividend yield.
Literature Review 
 This section presents the literature review of the past studies. First, the literature review of 
those studies has been discussed which focuses on association between the dividend announcements 
and the share price reaction. Later the focus is shifted to factors that moderate the above-mentioned 
relationship. 
 
Stock Market Reaction to Dividend Announcements
 A large number of researchers have analyzed the dividend policy and its impact on the value 
of thefirm since the seminal work of Miller and Modigliani (1961). They have used different theories 
to describe the link between the firm value and the dividend policy. Two prominent theories out of 
these are free cash flow (FCF) theory of Jensen (1986) and cash flow signaling (CFS) theory. CFS 
theory which is also called asymmetric information theory has been developed by a number of 
researchers including Ross (1977), Miller and Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and 
Williams (1985). This theory proposes that the firm’s managers, as compared to shareholders (inves-
tors), have more private information about the firm’s future prospects and they signal this private 
information to the market via dividend changes. Hence, when increase in dividends is announced by 
a firm, the stock market assumes that the future prospects of that particular firm are good and hence 
reacts positively. On the other hand, when a firm cuts dividend, the stock market assumes that the 
future prospects of that particular firm are not good and hence reacts negatively, which results in lower 
share prices of the firm. Therefore, in the context of CFS, it is expected that the stock market will react 
positively whenever dividends are announced by a firm. 
 The second theory i.e. FCF theory was developed by Jensen (1986) and is based on the 
agency relationship between managers and shareholders. This theory suggests that dividend plays a 
disciplinary role for the firm’s management. Distribution of free cash flows in the form of dividends 
decreases the conflict between managers and shareholders by making it less likely for managers to 
invest free cash flows in projects that have negative net present value. According to this argument, 
dividend announcements should result in increase in the stock prices. Therefore, like CFS theory, this 
theory also predicts positive correlation between dividend announcements and prices of stock.
 The empirical support for both the theories is mixed. Several studies including Aharony and 
Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976),  Gurgul et al. (2003), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Dasilas and 
Leventis (2011), and Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), have supported both these theories by reporting 
significant abnormal returns around announcement days. On other hand, other studies have reported 
evidence that does not support these theories (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 
2002; Vieira, 2005; Hossain et al., 2006; and Chen, et al., 2002). These studies have found no signifi-
cant abnormal returns around announcement dates. Further, some studies even have reported evidenc-
es of negative correlation between the dividend announcements and the subsequent reaction of stock 
market (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, et al., 1984; and Healy et al., 1997).
Moderating Role of Firm-Specific Factors
 Literature suggests that the mixed evidence as discussed above might be an outcome of 
different factors that moderates the stock market response to the dividend announcements. These 
factors include firm size, family ownership, leverage and dividend yield. We discuss these factors in 
details in the following paragraphs.
Family ownership
 Capulong et al. (2000) has stated that ownership composition and ownership concentration 
are the two key important dimensions of corporate ownership structures. Concentration of ownership 
deals with the distribution of power between the shareholders and the managers while on the other 
hand, composition of ownership deals with the identity of shareholders of a company and specifically 
the large shareholders. A large shareholder (also called block-holder) can be government, holding 
company, individual, bank, institutional investor or family. Thus, broadly speaking there are two 
categories of ownership composition: the family block-holder and non-family block-holder. Accord-
ing to Holderness and Sheehan (1988), and Gugler (2001), family block holder has different motiva-
tions and incentives to monitor the managers. Gorton and Kahl (1999) have argued that as compared 
to non-family block-holder, the family block-holders have greater incentive of monitoring the manag-
ers. Due to the better monitoring, the family block-holders affect the reaction of stock market to 
dividends announcements.  
 There are two leading theories that explain the relationship of family ownership with 
dividend announcements effects. These include the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory 
and Leland and Pyle’s (1977) general signaling theory. Under the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
agency cost model, it is argued that due to the better monitoring efforts of family owners, sharehold-
ers-managers interests are better aligned which reduces the agency conflicts and the agency costs. 
Therefore, if reducing agency conflicts is the motivation behind the announcement of dividend chang-
es, then the firms with family block-holder will experience weaker dividend announcement effects as 
compared to the firms with non-family block-holder. Under general Leland and Pyle’s (1977) theory 
of general signaling, it is argued that due to the better monitoring of managers by the family 
block-holders, the credibility of the manager’s decisions and the signals that they convey to the 
market increases. Therefore, due to higher credibility, the firms with family block-holders will experi-
ence stronger dividend announcement effects as compared to firms with non-family block-holder.
 Unlike the ownership concentration, only few researchers have empirically analyzed the 
dividend announcement effects in the context of family and non-family ownership. Therefore, this 
area is relatively unexplored and not enough evidences are available on this area. Recently, research-
ers have started exploring the relation between family ownership on dividend announcement effects. 
Setia-Atmaja, et al. (2004) are the first researchers who have analyzed the role of family ownership in 
mediating the dividend announcement effects in Australian environment. They reported positive 
relationship between family firms and dividend announcement effects. Contrary to Setia-Atmaja, et 
al. (2004), Vieira (2012) has reported no evidence from Portuguese Environment. 
 As discussed above, the agency cost theory predicts negative relationship while general 
signaling model predicts positive correlation between family ownership and dividend news effects. 
Hence, this study has formulated the following two competing hypothesis regarding relationship 
between family ownership and dividend announcement effects. 
H1a: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are negatively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are less than abnormal returns associ-
ated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
H1b: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are positively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are greater than abnormal returns 
associated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
Firm size
 The literature has identified the firm size as another potential variable that moderate the 
dividend announcement effects. The role of the size of the firm in determining the dividend announce-
ment effects can be described in the context of signaling or asymmetric information theory of John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). Under this theory, it is assert-
ed that as information asymmetry between equity holders and managers of firm is greater in case of 
the small size firms as compared to firms with large size; therefore, when small size firm tries to 
distribute more dividends, for the purpose of conveying signals to the outside investors about their 
future prospects, will experience greater dividend announcement effects. Therefore, in this context, 
negative relationship exists between the size of the firm and the dividend news effect.
 Empirical studies reports mixed results about the firm size relationship with the dividend 
announcement effects. Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Eddy and Seifert (1988) have reported negative 
association from the U.S. Amihud and Li (2006) and Yoon and Starks (1995). Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003) and Andres et al. (2011) have also supported signaling theory by reporting negative association 
from German environment. Vieira (2011), by utilizing the data of the UK, Portuguese and the French 
markets, have provided further evidence from the European market. She has reported interesting 
results. Her study found that dividend announcement effect is negatively correlated with the firm size 
only in the UK market while her study reported no evidence of significant association in the French 
and Portugal markets. Hussainey et al. (2011) and Zakaria et al. (2012) have also reported the same 
results from the U.K and the Malaysian Markets. 
 Based the on above literature and information asymmetric theory, this study has tested the 
following hypothesis:
H2: Reaction of stock market to the dividend news is negatively associated with the firm size. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of small-sized firms are greater than the abnormal 
returns associated with the dividend announcement of the large-sized firms.
Leverage
 Leverage is another firm specific variable that is identified by the literature as a potential 
determinant of the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Said (2012) and Vieira (2011) has 
defined leverage as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets. The role of leverage in determining 
the dividend announcement effects is explained both by Jensen’s (1986) version of FCF agency cost 
argument and signaling explanation of Ross (1977). Using Jensen’s (1986) argument, Borokhovich et 
al. (2005) have highlighted that the agency costs are lower in the firms that have higher debt ratios as 
managers in these firms are left with little cash flows under their discretions due to the payment of the 
debt and financial expenses. Therefore, dividends role in reducing agency costs is limited in these 
firms and hence a weaker dividend announcement effects will be experienced by the firm with higher 
leverage ratios. Under the second argument i.e. signaling theory of Ross (1977), it is argued that firms 
with good quality try to differentiate themselves from bad quality firms by using high leverage ratio. 
Therefore, investors interpret the dividend signals of the companies with higher leverage ratios as 
favorable as the investors anticipate that the managers of such good quality firm will be able to contin-
ue paying dividends in the future. 
 Empirical results regarding the association of the dividend news effects with leverage are 
mixed. Few studies have supported cash flow or agency theory by reporting negative association 
(Healy et al., 1997; and Alonso et al., 2005). Contrarily, Allen and Rachim (1996), Vieira (2011) and 
Zakaria et al. (2012) have supported signaling theory by reporting positive relation between the 
dividend announcement effects and leverage. 
 
 Literature suggests that the agency cost argument generally favors Pakistani environment 
more than the signaling theory regarding the role of leverage in determining different factors related 
to corporate finance and corporate performance (Nazir and Saita, 2013; Khan, Kaleem and Nazir, 
2012; and Satti, 2013). However, this study has tested two hypotheses based on the agency and the 
signaling theory in the light of empirical results reported from different countries. 
H3a: Negative association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are greater as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of the firms with high level of leverage.
H3b: Positive association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to the 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are lesser as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of firms with high level of leverage.
Dividend yield
 Dividend yield is one of the main factors that affect abnormal returns around dividend 
announcement days (Yoon and Starks, 1995; and Lee and Yan; 2003). The impact of dividend yield 
on share price reaction to dividend news can be explained in the context of agency cost and signaling 
theories. Both of the theories predict positive association between dividend announcement effects and 
dividend yield (Ariff and Finn, 1986; Lee, 1995; and Belde et al., 2005). Under the agency cost frame-
work, it is argued that high dividend yield helps in reducing agency conflicts in the firm. Hence, 
keeping other variables constant, the higher the dividend yield associated with the dividend announce-
ment, the stronger will be the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Contrarily, under the signal-
ing theory, it is argued that high dividend yield depicts that future prospects of a firm are good, there-
fore, dividend announcements that are accompanied by high dividend yield are perceived as a more 
favorable signal as compared to a dividend announcement with low dividend yield. Hence, a dividend 
announcement with high dividend yield induces stronger stock market reaction. 
 The earning response coefficient is dependent upon the earning retention rate, among other 
variables. Butler and Han (1994) argues that the share price reaction to the announcements is a 
function of earning surprise and earning response coefficient. They use dividend yield as a proxy for 
earning retention rate because actual earnings’ retention rate can go to unreasonable range if a firm has 
zero earnings or negative earnings. Dividend yield has been calculated as the per share dividend divid-
ed by the price of share five days before the announcement of dividend. Based on the above literature, 
this study has tested the following hypothesis:
H4: Positive association exists between the dividend yield and the dividend announcement effects. 
Hence, abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcements of the firms that are accompa-
nied by higher dividend yield will be greater as compared to the dividend announcement of the firms 
that are accompanied by lower dividend yield.
Growth opportunities
 Different studies have used growth opportunity as a control variable while examining 
relationship between different factors and stock market reaction to the dividend news (Vieira, 2005; 
Zakaria et al., 2012; Vieira, 2011; Neil and Robert, 2009; Vieira, 2012 and Andres et al., 2011). Past 
studies including Vieira (2011) and Andres et al. (2011) have used Tobin’s Q as a measure of inves-
tors’ expectation about the growth prospect of a firm and market to book value of equity (MV/BV) 
ratio as a proxy of Tobin’s Q. Thus, MV/BV has been used as a proxy of growth opportunity by this 
study also. According to Vieira (2011), high MV/BV shows that investors think that the firm has 
higher future growth prospects. Firms with lower MV/BV ratios are considered to have higher level 
of free cash flow and thus will be able to pay more dividends. Therefore, reaction of stock market is 
more strong to dividend news of firms that have lower MV/BV ratio, hence negative coefficient is 
expected for this variable. Among the past studies that have used MV/BV as control variable, Zakaria 
et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) have found no significant influence of this variable on the stock 
market reaction to the dividend news while Vieira (2011), Neil and Robert (2009) and Vieira (2005) 
have found negative relationship between  MV/BV and the dividend news effects. Apart from MV/BV 
ratio, this study also used price to earnings (P/E) ratio as proxy for investment opportunities by 
following Basu (1977) and Reinganum (1981). Both these studies reported negative association.
 
Methodology
Sample and Data Sources
 This section discusses the data sources, the data collection methods, the data analysis tools, 
and variables. For the purpose of the data collection, this study used simple random sampling 
technique. The sampling period ranges from year 2008 to 2012. During this sampling period, 136 
firms announced 206 annual dividends. Therefore, we analyze 206 annual dividend announcements of 
136 firms over the above-mentioned sampling period.
 The data of dividend announcements and the stock prices have been extracted from the KSE 
database. Data about the firm-specific variables and ownership structure were gathered from the 
annual reports of the firms.
Model Specification
 For testing the association of the above-mentioned variables with the dividend news effects, 
this study has utilized standard event study methodology. For generating abnormal returns market 
model has been utilized. Equation of the market model is specified as under:
Where,
Ritis return rate of security i at day t
Rmtis the rate of return of market at day t
αiis constant
βi isthe sensitivity of the expected asset return to the expected market return calculated as
 For the purpose of estimating the parameters of market model, 100 daily continuously 
compounded returns are used which ranged from approximately 145 days before the announcement 
date. KSE-100 Index is used as a market proxy. Ordinary least square method has been utilized for 
estimating the market model parameters. After estimating the parameters of market model, the follow-
ing equation has been used to calculate the expected returns:
Where,
E(Ri) is the expected return on stock iat day t
    is the estimated intercept of market model for stock i
    is the estimated beta of market model for stock i
For each dividend announcement, abnormal returns are calculated after estimating the market model 
parameters, by using the following equation:
Where,
ARit is the stock i abnormal return at day t
Rit is the actual stock i return at day t
 Abnormal returns, in case of each event (dividend announcement), are calculated for all 
event windows. After calculation of abnormal returns, average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumula-
tive abnormal returns (CAAR) are calculated for all event windows. After calculating AAR and 
CAAR, univariate and multivariate analysis has been performed. Before performing univariate and 
multivariate analyses to test the association between dividend news and aforementioned independent 
variables, the significance of the AAR and CAAR of the event windows mentioned before has been 
checked by using student t-test on overall sample.  
 For univariate analysis, independent samples t-test has been used while for multivariate 
analysis, regression analysis has been performed. In univariate analysis, independent sample t-test has 
been performed on AAR and CAAR of lower 50th and upper 50th percentile of each variable (exclud-
ing family ownership in case of which test has been conducted on AAR and CAAR of family and 
non-family groups). In multivariate analysis, regression has been run by using both AAR and CAAR 
as dependent variables. The following are the regression equations with a full set of explanatory 
variables:
ARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e ……(1)
CAARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e…(2)
Where,
AARt is average abnormal return of specific event window
CAARt is cumulative average abnormal return of specific event window
β1 is the co-efficient of family and indicates relationship between family ownership and AARt and 
CAARt
β2 is the co-efficient of LMV (firm size) and indicates relationship between firm size and AARt and 
CAARt
β3 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β4 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β5is the co-efficient of growth opportunity (MV/BV) and indicates relationship between MV/BV and 
AARt and CAARt
 Before performing these formal tests to determine the relationship between four aforemen-
tioned independent variables and stock market reaction to dividend news, a series of diagnostic tests 
were conducted to identify problems in the data. Details of these diagnostic tests and remedial actions 
are not reported for the sake of parsimony.
Results and Discussion
T-tests Results
 Table 1 below reports mean values of AAR and CAAR for the event windows ranging from 
five days prior to dividend announcement to five days after dividend announcements. All tables in this 
paper were constructed using asdoc program of Shah (2018).
 Table 1 shows that p-values of mean values of AAR and CAAR are statistically significant 
only in few event windows. For example, AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, CAARt0, AARt-2, 
AARt-5 and CAARt-2 are significant at five percent level while CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant 
only at the 10 percent level. Averages of all these significant AARs and CAARs are positive which 
shows that market reacts positively to the announcements of dividend. Moreover, significance of 
AARt-2, CAARt-2, and AART-1 indicates leakage of information about the dividend announcements 
prior to announcement of these dividends. 
 For further analysis, those event windows have been used analysis that have significant 
AARs and CAARs. Therefore, we use AARt-2, AARt-5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, and CAARt0 as depen-
dent variables in the regressions analysis to test their relationship with the previously mentioned four 
explanatory variables.
Table 1
Means and T-Tests of the Abnormal Returns in Different Event Windows
Univariate Analyses
 
This section presents and discusses results of the t-tests to find whether firm-specific variables 
moderate reaction of stock market to dividend news. The median values of each firm-specific variable 
is used to divide firms into two above 50th and below 50th percentiles, except for family ownership 
for which the groups have been made based on family vs. non-family status of firms. Then AAR and 
CAAR have been calculated for these groups of firms. Table 2 reports that mean differences of these 
abnormal returns under the heading of each firm-specific variable that have been used for making 
group of firms. For example, the column with heading ‘Size shows the mean abnormal returns of 
firms that are in the 50th top percentile of firm size minus mean abnormal returns of firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile of firm size.
 The results show that family firms have lower abnormal returns than non-family firms. The 
p-values show that the mean differences are significant only in case of AARt-5 at one percent level of 
significance and in case AARt-2 at five percent level of significance. Results also show that reaction 
of stock market to dividend news is stronger for smaller firms as compared to larger firms.  This is 
evident from the column with the heading ‘Size’, showing that mean differences of CAARt-2 and 
CAARt0 are negative and statistically significant. Results also depicts that firm’s leverage ratio 
significantly moderates the dividend news effects. For example, mean differences in abnormal returns 
are significantly higher for dividend announcements in firms with lower leverage ratios as compared 
to firms that have high leverage ratios. Finally, there is some evidence that firms with lower dividend 
yield experience more reaction to dividend announcements as compared to firms with higher 
dividend yield.
This section presents and discusses results of the t-test to find
Table 2
Mean Differences in Return
Regressions Results
 Regression analysis results are reported in Table 3. The coefficients of the dummy variables 
used to indicate family firms are negative in all the event windows, except CAARt-1 where it is 
positive. In line with the results reported in univariate analysis, coefficient of family dummy is signifi-
cant and negative in AARt-2 and AARt-5 while it is insignificant in case of the rest of the event 
windows. It shows that announcement effects of family firms are weaker as compared to announce-
ment effects of non-family firms. This finding supports the agency theory explanation that family 
ownership reduces conflict between principal and agent and hence dividends lose its importance as a 
tool to reduce agency costs.
 The results show that the firm size coefficient is negative and statistically significant in case 
of CAARt-2 and CAAR0 while coefficients of abnormal returns in other event windows are insignifi-
cant. Result of the regression analysis supports the findings of univariate analysis as reported in Table 
2. These findings show that abnormal returns due to dividend announcements are significantly lower 
for firms that are placed in the top 50th percentile of the firm size as compared to the firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile. These results are in line with information asymmetric theory of Miller and 
Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and Williams (1985) that predicts that small firms face 
more information asymmetry problems and hence dividends are an effective tool for them in reducing 
information asymmetry costs.
Table 3
Regression Results
 Leverage coefficient is negative and significant in case of AARt+5, CAARt-2 and CAARt-1. 
These results indicate that negative relationship exists between leverage and dividend news effects. 
Our results support the free cash flow argument of agency theory which suggests that agency costs are 
lower in firms that have high leverage ratio; hence dividend announcement effects are weaker in such 
firms. Positive and statistically significant dividend yield coefficient is reported in case of AARt+5 
and CAARt0 while it is insignificant in all other event windows. Generally, the results suggest that 
firms with higher dividend yield experience strong dividend announcement effects. 
 MV/BV and P/E ratio have been used as alternative proxies for firm’s investment opportuni-
ties. Results in Table 3 show that MV/BV has no significant influence on the dividend announcement 
effects. This finding is consistent with Zakaria et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) who found no 
significant influence of this variable on dividend announcement effects. However, the second proxy 
for investment opportunities, the P/E ratio, has statistically significant negative coefficient in case of 
AARt-5 and CAARt-1. These findings suggest that dividend announcement effects are weaker for 
firms with higher growth opportunities and stronger for firms that have less investment opportunities. 
Conclusion
 This study has empirically sought to determine the relation between the dividend announce-
ment effects and the firm-specific factors including family ownership, dividend yield, firm size and 
leverage ratio of firms.  Results of two-sample t-test indicate that only AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, 
CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant, therefore, cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal returns 
of these event windows were used as dependent variables in the regression analysis. Both multiple 
regression and univariate analyses have been employed to determine the moderating role of the 
firm-specific independent variables on the market reaction to the dividend news. The results of both 
univariate and regression analyses are consistent. Negative relation is reported between the abnormal 
returns and the family ownership. It affirms that the stock market gives lesser importance to the 
dividend announcement of family firms than the announcements of non-family firms. This might be 
because of lower level of agency problems in the family firms as suggested by the Jensen and Meck-
ling’s (1976) agency hypothesis. Further, this study discovered a negative association between the size 
of the firm and the dividend news effect. This negative relation is explained by the information asym-
metry theory of John and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). This 
finding is in line with the finding of other empirical studies such as Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Andres 
et al. (2011), Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Amihud and Li (2006). Next, a negative association is found 
between the abnormal returns and the leverage. This negative association is in line with Jensen’s (1986) 
agency theory. Further, a positive relation is found between the dividend yield and the dividend abnor-
mal returns. Among the control variables, this study found that investment opportunities measured by 
MV/BV have no effect on the share price reaction to the dividend announcement while P/E ratio has 
significant negative effect on abnormal returns. These findings show that the reaction of the stock 
market to the dividend announcement is heterogeneous. Firms with significant agency problems and 
information asymmetry problems experience positive abnormal stock returns when they announce 
dividends. 
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Abstract
The finance literature reports mixed results about the dividend announcements and stock market 
reaction to those announcements. This study posits that the heterogeneous reaction of stock market to 
dividend announcements might be a result of several firm-specific financial and non-financial factors. 
In this vein, this study has tried to analyze the role of family-ownership, firm-size, leverage, and 
dividend yield in defining the dividend announcement effects. Using a sample of 206 dividend 
announcements of 136 firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period of 2008 to 2012, 
the results of both the univariate tests and the regression analysis show that the reaction of stock 
market to dividend announcements varies significantly across different groups of firms. Specifically, 
our results show that family ownership, firm-size, dividend yield and leverage significantly mediate  
the reaction of stock market around dividend announcement days. 
Keywords: Heterogeneous Reaction, Abnormal Returns, Family Ownership, Pakistan Stock 
Exchange.
JEL Classification: G 230
Introduction
 The corporate dividend policy have been a widely-debated subject in the domain of corpo-
rate finance and a large number of studies has explored different angles of dividend policy. One such 
angle is the stock market reaction to dividend announcements. Miller and Modigliani (1961), argues 
that dividend policy does not impact the firm value in perfect capital markets. However, Jensen’s 
(1986) Free Cash Flow (FCF) theory and Cash Flow Signaling Theory presented by Ross (1977), John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985) have rejected the argument of 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) by supporting notion that firm value is affected by dividend policy. Both 
these theories suggest positive correlation between dividend announcements and the reaction of the 
market to the dividend announcements. However, the empirical studies report mixed results regarding 
dividend announcement effects. 
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 Some studies including Aharony and Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976), Asquith and Mullins 
(1983), Gurgul et al. (2003), Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), Dasilas and Leventis (2011) have supported 
both these hypothesis by reporting positive abnormal returns around dividend announcement days. On 
the other hand, there are some other studies which have rejected the idea of positive correlation 
between the announcements of dividend and the sub-sequent stock market price reaction (Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 2002; Chen, Firth and Gao, 2002; Vieira, 2005; and 
Hossain, Siddiquee and Rahman, 2006). These studies have found no significant evidence of associa-
tion between dividend announcements and reaction of stock market to these announcements. Further, 
some studies even have reported evidences of negative correlation between the announcements of 
dividend and the sub-sequent stock market share price reaction (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, 
Keown and Pinkerton, 1984; and Healy, Hathorn and Kirch, 1997).
 These mixed results of the past studies might be an outcome of different factors that mediates 
the dividend announcement effects. A number of factors are identified by literature that affects the 
dividend announcement effects. Baker, Powell and Veit (2002) and Baker and Powell (1999) have 
highlighted that firm specific factors may impact the association between the dividend announce-
ments and the sub-sequent reaction of stock market. Further, La Porta et al. (2000), and Ball et al. 
(2000) have argued that the ownership structure also plays a vital role in explaining the dividends 
information content and in turn the reaction of market to dividend announcements. 
 A number of studies, including Eddy and Seifert (1988), Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) Haw 
and Kim (1991), Healy et al. (1997), Said (2012), Vieira (2011), around the globe have tried to empiri-
cal test the association between different factors and dividend announcement effects. However, in 
Pakistan, no study until the date has tried to empirically figure out the variables that affect the 
dividend announcement effects of Pakistani firms. In this context, this study has made an attempt to 
determine the variables that explains the information content of dividends of Pakistani firms. Particu-
larly, this study has focused on the firm-specific factors and more specifically the firm size, ownership 
composition of a firm (whether a firm is family and non-family), leverage ratio and dividend yield.
Literature Review 
 This section presents the literature review of the past studies. First, the literature review of 
those studies has been discussed which focuses on association between the dividend announcements 
and the share price reaction. Later the focus is shifted to factors that moderate the above-mentioned 
relationship. 
 
Stock Market Reaction to Dividend Announcements
 A large number of researchers have analyzed the dividend policy and its impact on the value 
of thefirm since the seminal work of Miller and Modigliani (1961). They have used different theories 
to describe the link between the firm value and the dividend policy. Two prominent theories out of 
these are free cash flow (FCF) theory of Jensen (1986) and cash flow signaling (CFS) theory. CFS 
theory which is also called asymmetric information theory has been developed by a number of 
researchers including Ross (1977), Miller and Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and 
Williams (1985). This theory proposes that the firm’s managers, as compared to shareholders (inves-
tors), have more private information about the firm’s future prospects and they signal this private 
information to the market via dividend changes. Hence, when increase in dividends is announced by 
a firm, the stock market assumes that the future prospects of that particular firm are good and hence 
reacts positively. On the other hand, when a firm cuts dividend, the stock market assumes that the 
future prospects of that particular firm are not good and hence reacts negatively, which results in lower 
share prices of the firm. Therefore, in the context of CFS, it is expected that the stock market will react 
positively whenever dividends are announced by a firm. 
 The second theory i.e. FCF theory was developed by Jensen (1986) and is based on the 
agency relationship between managers and shareholders. This theory suggests that dividend plays a 
disciplinary role for the firm’s management. Distribution of free cash flows in the form of dividends 
decreases the conflict between managers and shareholders by making it less likely for managers to 
invest free cash flows in projects that have negative net present value. According to this argument, 
dividend announcements should result in increase in the stock prices. Therefore, like CFS theory, this 
theory also predicts positive correlation between dividend announcements and prices of stock.
 The empirical support for both the theories is mixed. Several studies including Aharony and 
Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976),  Gurgul et al. (2003), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Dasilas and 
Leventis (2011), and Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), have supported both these theories by reporting 
significant abnormal returns around announcement days. On other hand, other studies have reported 
evidence that does not support these theories (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 
2002; Vieira, 2005; Hossain et al., 2006; and Chen, et al., 2002). These studies have found no signifi-
cant abnormal returns around announcement dates. Further, some studies even have reported evidenc-
es of negative correlation between the dividend announcements and the subsequent reaction of stock 
market (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, et al., 1984; and Healy et al., 1997).
Moderating Role of Firm-Specific Factors
 Literature suggests that the mixed evidence as discussed above might be an outcome of 
different factors that moderates the stock market response to the dividend announcements. These 
factors include firm size, family ownership, leverage and dividend yield. We discuss these factors in 
details in the following paragraphs.
Family ownership
 Capulong et al. (2000) has stated that ownership composition and ownership concentration 
are the two key important dimensions of corporate ownership structures. Concentration of ownership 
deals with the distribution of power between the shareholders and the managers while on the other 
hand, composition of ownership deals with the identity of shareholders of a company and specifically 
the large shareholders. A large shareholder (also called block-holder) can be government, holding 
company, individual, bank, institutional investor or family. Thus, broadly speaking there are two 
categories of ownership composition: the family block-holder and non-family block-holder. Accord-
ing to Holderness and Sheehan (1988), and Gugler (2001), family block holder has different motiva-
tions and incentives to monitor the managers. Gorton and Kahl (1999) have argued that as compared 
to non-family block-holder, the family block-holders have greater incentive of monitoring the manag-
ers. Due to the better monitoring, the family block-holders affect the reaction of stock market to 
dividends announcements.  
 There are two leading theories that explain the relationship of family ownership with 
dividend announcements effects. These include the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory 
and Leland and Pyle’s (1977) general signaling theory. Under the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
agency cost model, it is argued that due to the better monitoring efforts of family owners, sharehold-
ers-managers interests are better aligned which reduces the agency conflicts and the agency costs. 
Therefore, if reducing agency conflicts is the motivation behind the announcement of dividend chang-
es, then the firms with family block-holder will experience weaker dividend announcement effects as 
compared to the firms with non-family block-holder. Under general Leland and Pyle’s (1977) theory 
of general signaling, it is argued that due to the better monitoring of managers by the family 
block-holders, the credibility of the manager’s decisions and the signals that they convey to the 
market increases. Therefore, due to higher credibility, the firms with family block-holders will experi-
ence stronger dividend announcement effects as compared to firms with non-family block-holder.
 Unlike the ownership concentration, only few researchers have empirically analyzed the 
dividend announcement effects in the context of family and non-family ownership. Therefore, this 
area is relatively unexplored and not enough evidences are available on this area. Recently, research-
ers have started exploring the relation between family ownership on dividend announcement effects. 
Setia-Atmaja, et al. (2004) are the first researchers who have analyzed the role of family ownership in 
mediating the dividend announcement effects in Australian environment. They reported positive 
relationship between family firms and dividend announcement effects. Contrary to Setia-Atmaja, et 
al. (2004), Vieira (2012) has reported no evidence from Portuguese Environment. 
 As discussed above, the agency cost theory predicts negative relationship while general 
signaling model predicts positive correlation between family ownership and dividend news effects. 
Hence, this study has formulated the following two competing hypothesis regarding relationship 
between family ownership and dividend announcement effects. 
H1a: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are negatively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are less than abnormal returns associ-
ated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
H1b: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are positively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are greater than abnormal returns 
associated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
Firm size
 The literature has identified the firm size as another potential variable that moderate the 
dividend announcement effects. The role of the size of the firm in determining the dividend announce-
ment effects can be described in the context of signaling or asymmetric information theory of John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). Under this theory, it is assert-
ed that as information asymmetry between equity holders and managers of firm is greater in case of 
the small size firms as compared to firms with large size; therefore, when small size firm tries to 
distribute more dividends, for the purpose of conveying signals to the outside investors about their 
future prospects, will experience greater dividend announcement effects. Therefore, in this context, 
negative relationship exists between the size of the firm and the dividend news effect.
 Empirical studies reports mixed results about the firm size relationship with the dividend 
announcement effects. Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Eddy and Seifert (1988) have reported negative 
association from the U.S. Amihud and Li (2006) and Yoon and Starks (1995). Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003) and Andres et al. (2011) have also supported signaling theory by reporting negative association 
from German environment. Vieira (2011), by utilizing the data of the UK, Portuguese and the French 
markets, have provided further evidence from the European market. She has reported interesting 
results. Her study found that dividend announcement effect is negatively correlated with the firm size 
only in the UK market while her study reported no evidence of significant association in the French 
and Portugal markets. Hussainey et al. (2011) and Zakaria et al. (2012) have also reported the same 
results from the U.K and the Malaysian Markets. 
 Based the on above literature and information asymmetric theory, this study has tested the 
following hypothesis:
H2: Reaction of stock market to the dividend news is negatively associated with the firm size. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of small-sized firms are greater than the abnormal 
returns associated with the dividend announcement of the large-sized firms.
Leverage
 Leverage is another firm specific variable that is identified by the literature as a potential 
determinant of the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Said (2012) and Vieira (2011) has 
defined leverage as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets. The role of leverage in determining 
the dividend announcement effects is explained both by Jensen’s (1986) version of FCF agency cost 
argument and signaling explanation of Ross (1977). Using Jensen’s (1986) argument, Borokhovich et 
al. (2005) have highlighted that the agency costs are lower in the firms that have higher debt ratios as 
managers in these firms are left with little cash flows under their discretions due to the payment of the 
debt and financial expenses. Therefore, dividends role in reducing agency costs is limited in these 
firms and hence a weaker dividend announcement effects will be experienced by the firm with higher 
leverage ratios. Under the second argument i.e. signaling theory of Ross (1977), it is argued that firms 
with good quality try to differentiate themselves from bad quality firms by using high leverage ratio. 
Therefore, investors interpret the dividend signals of the companies with higher leverage ratios as 
favorable as the investors anticipate that the managers of such good quality firm will be able to contin-
ue paying dividends in the future. 
 Empirical results regarding the association of the dividend news effects with leverage are 
mixed. Few studies have supported cash flow or agency theory by reporting negative association 
(Healy et al., 1997; and Alonso et al., 2005). Contrarily, Allen and Rachim (1996), Vieira (2011) and 
Zakaria et al. (2012) have supported signaling theory by reporting positive relation between the 
dividend announcement effects and leverage. 
 
 Literature suggests that the agency cost argument generally favors Pakistani environment 
more than the signaling theory regarding the role of leverage in determining different factors related 
to corporate finance and corporate performance (Nazir and Saita, 2013; Khan, Kaleem and Nazir, 
2012; and Satti, 2013). However, this study has tested two hypotheses based on the agency and the 
signaling theory in the light of empirical results reported from different countries. 
H3a: Negative association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are greater as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of the firms with high level of leverage.
H3b: Positive association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to the 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are lesser as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of firms with high level of leverage.
Dividend yield
 Dividend yield is one of the main factors that affect abnormal returns around dividend 
announcement days (Yoon and Starks, 1995; and Lee and Yan; 2003). The impact of dividend yield 
on share price reaction to dividend news can be explained in the context of agency cost and signaling 
theories. Both of the theories predict positive association between dividend announcement effects and 
dividend yield (Ariff and Finn, 1986; Lee, 1995; and Belde et al., 2005). Under the agency cost frame-
work, it is argued that high dividend yield helps in reducing agency conflicts in the firm. Hence, 
keeping other variables constant, the higher the dividend yield associated with the dividend announce-
ment, the stronger will be the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Contrarily, under the signal-
ing theory, it is argued that high dividend yield depicts that future prospects of a firm are good, there-
fore, dividend announcements that are accompanied by high dividend yield are perceived as a more 
favorable signal as compared to a dividend announcement with low dividend yield. Hence, a dividend 
announcement with high dividend yield induces stronger stock market reaction. 
 The earning response coefficient is dependent upon the earning retention rate, among other 
variables. Butler and Han (1994) argues that the share price reaction to the announcements is a 
function of earning surprise and earning response coefficient. They use dividend yield as a proxy for 
earning retention rate because actual earnings’ retention rate can go to unreasonable range if a firm has 
zero earnings or negative earnings. Dividend yield has been calculated as the per share dividend divid-
ed by the price of share five days before the announcement of dividend. Based on the above literature, 
this study has tested the following hypothesis:
H4: Positive association exists between the dividend yield and the dividend announcement effects. 
Hence, abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcements of the firms that are accompa-
nied by higher dividend yield will be greater as compared to the dividend announcement of the firms 
that are accompanied by lower dividend yield.
Growth opportunities
 Different studies have used growth opportunity as a control variable while examining 
relationship between different factors and stock market reaction to the dividend news (Vieira, 2005; 
Zakaria et al., 2012; Vieira, 2011; Neil and Robert, 2009; Vieira, 2012 and Andres et al., 2011). Past 
studies including Vieira (2011) and Andres et al. (2011) have used Tobin’s Q as a measure of inves-
tors’ expectation about the growth prospect of a firm and market to book value of equity (MV/BV) 
ratio as a proxy of Tobin’s Q. Thus, MV/BV has been used as a proxy of growth opportunity by this 
study also. According to Vieira (2011), high MV/BV shows that investors think that the firm has 
higher future growth prospects. Firms with lower MV/BV ratios are considered to have higher level 
of free cash flow and thus will be able to pay more dividends. Therefore, reaction of stock market is 
more strong to dividend news of firms that have lower MV/BV ratio, hence negative coefficient is 
expected for this variable. Among the past studies that have used MV/BV as control variable, Zakaria 
et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) have found no significant influence of this variable on the stock 
market reaction to the dividend news while Vieira (2011), Neil and Robert (2009) and Vieira (2005) 
have found negative relationship between  MV/BV and the dividend news effects. Apart from MV/BV 
ratio, this study also used price to earnings (P/E) ratio as proxy for investment opportunities by 
following Basu (1977) and Reinganum (1981). Both these studies reported negative association.
 
Methodology
Sample and Data Sources
 This section discusses the data sources, the data collection methods, the data analysis tools, 
and variables. For the purpose of the data collection, this study used simple random sampling 
technique. The sampling period ranges from year 2008 to 2012. During this sampling period, 136 
firms announced 206 annual dividends. Therefore, we analyze 206 annual dividend announcements of 
136 firms over the above-mentioned sampling period.
 The data of dividend announcements and the stock prices have been extracted from the KSE 
database. Data about the firm-specific variables and ownership structure were gathered from the 
annual reports of the firms.
Model Specification
 For testing the association of the above-mentioned variables with the dividend news effects, 
this study has utilized standard event study methodology. For generating abnormal returns market 
model has been utilized. Equation of the market model is specified as under:
Where,
Ritis return rate of security i at day t
Rmtis the rate of return of market at day t
αiis constant
βi isthe sensitivity of the expected asset return to the expected market return calculated as
 For the purpose of estimating the parameters of market model, 100 daily continuously 
compounded returns are used which ranged from approximately 145 days before the announcement 
date. KSE-100 Index is used as a market proxy. Ordinary least square method has been utilized for 
estimating the market model parameters. After estimating the parameters of market model, the follow-
ing equation has been used to calculate the expected returns:
Where,
E(Ri) is the expected return on stock iat day t
    is the estimated intercept of market model for stock i
    is the estimated beta of market model for stock i
For each dividend announcement, abnormal returns are calculated after estimating the market model 
parameters, by using the following equation:
Where,
ARit is the stock i abnormal return at day t
Rit is the actual stock i return at day t
 Abnormal returns, in case of each event (dividend announcement), are calculated for all 
event windows. After calculation of abnormal returns, average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumula-
tive abnormal returns (CAAR) are calculated for all event windows. After calculating AAR and 
CAAR, univariate and multivariate analysis has been performed. Before performing univariate and 
multivariate analyses to test the association between dividend news and aforementioned independent 
variables, the significance of the AAR and CAAR of the event windows mentioned before has been 
checked by using student t-test on overall sample.  
 For univariate analysis, independent samples t-test has been used while for multivariate 
analysis, regression analysis has been performed. In univariate analysis, independent sample t-test has 
been performed on AAR and CAAR of lower 50th and upper 50th percentile of each variable (exclud-
ing family ownership in case of which test has been conducted on AAR and CAAR of family and 
non-family groups). In multivariate analysis, regression has been run by using both AAR and CAAR 
as dependent variables. The following are the regression equations with a full set of explanatory 
variables:
ARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e ……(1)
CAARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e…(2)
Where,
AARt is average abnormal return of specific event window
CAARt is cumulative average abnormal return of specific event window
β1 is the co-efficient of family and indicates relationship between family ownership and AARt and 
CAARt
β2 is the co-efficient of LMV (firm size) and indicates relationship between firm size and AARt and 
CAARt
β3 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β4 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β5is the co-efficient of growth opportunity (MV/BV) and indicates relationship between MV/BV and 
AARt and CAARt
 Before performing these formal tests to determine the relationship between four aforemen-
tioned independent variables and stock market reaction to dividend news, a series of diagnostic tests 
were conducted to identify problems in the data. Details of these diagnostic tests and remedial actions 
are not reported for the sake of parsimony.
Results and Discussion
T-tests Results
 Table 1 below reports mean values of AAR and CAAR for the event windows ranging from 
five days prior to dividend announcement to five days after dividend announcements. All tables in this 
paper were constructed using asdoc program of Shah (2018).
 Table 1 shows that p-values of mean values of AAR and CAAR are statistically significant 
only in few event windows. For example, AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, CAARt0, AARt-2, 
AARt-5 and CAARt-2 are significant at five percent level while CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant 
only at the 10 percent level. Averages of all these significant AARs and CAARs are positive which 
shows that market reacts positively to the announcements of dividend. Moreover, significance of 
AARt-2, CAARt-2, and AART-1 indicates leakage of information about the dividend announcements 
prior to announcement of these dividends. 
 For further analysis, those event windows have been used analysis that have significant 
AARs and CAARs. Therefore, we use AARt-2, AARt-5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, and CAARt0 as depen-
dent variables in the regressions analysis to test their relationship with the previously mentioned four 
explanatory variables.
Table 1
Means and T-Tests of the Abnormal Returns in Different Event Windows
Univariate Analyses
 
This section presents and discusses results of the t-tests to find whether firm-specific variables 
moderate reaction of stock market to dividend news. The median values of each firm-specific variable 
is used to divide firms into two above 50th and below 50th percentiles, except for family ownership 
for which the groups have been made based on family vs. non-family status of firms. Then AAR and 
CAAR have been calculated for these groups of firms. Table 2 reports that mean differences of these 
abnormal returns under the heading of each firm-specific variable that have been used for making 
group of firms. For example, the column with heading ‘Size shows the mean abnormal returns of 
firms that are in the 50th top percentile of firm size minus mean abnormal returns of firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile of firm size.
 The results show that family firms have lower abnormal returns than non-family firms. The 
p-values show that the mean differences are significant only in case of AARt-5 at one percent level of 
significance and in case AARt-2 at five percent level of significance. Results also show that reaction 
of stock market to dividend news is stronger for smaller firms as compared to larger firms.  This is 
evident from the column with the heading ‘Size’, showing that mean differences of CAARt-2 and 
CAARt0 are negative and statistically significant. Results also depicts that firm’s leverage ratio 
significantly moderates the dividend news effects. For example, mean differences in abnormal returns 
are significantly higher for dividend announcements in firms with lower leverage ratios as compared 
to firms that have high leverage ratios. Finally, there is some evidence that firms with lower dividend 
yield experience more reaction to dividend announcements as compared to firms with higher 
dividend yield.
This section presents and discusses results of the t-test to find
Table 2
Mean Differences in Return
Regressions Results
 Regression analysis results are reported in Table 3. The coefficients of the dummy variables 
used to indicate family firms are negative in all the event windows, except CAARt-1 where it is 
positive. In line with the results reported in univariate analysis, coefficient of family dummy is signifi-
cant and negative in AARt-2 and AARt-5 while it is insignificant in case of the rest of the event 
windows. It shows that announcement effects of family firms are weaker as compared to announce-
ment effects of non-family firms. This finding supports the agency theory explanation that family 
ownership reduces conflict between principal and agent and hence dividends lose its importance as a 
tool to reduce agency costs.
 The results show that the firm size coefficient is negative and statistically significant in case 
of CAARt-2 and CAAR0 while coefficients of abnormal returns in other event windows are insignifi-
cant. Result of the regression analysis supports the findings of univariate analysis as reported in Table 
2. These findings show that abnormal returns due to dividend announcements are significantly lower 
for firms that are placed in the top 50th percentile of the firm size as compared to the firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile. These results are in line with information asymmetric theory of Miller and 
Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and Williams (1985) that predicts that small firms face 
more information asymmetry problems and hence dividends are an effective tool for them in reducing 
information asymmetry costs.
Table 3
Regression Results
 Leverage coefficient is negative and significant in case of AARt+5, CAARt-2 and CAARt-1. 
These results indicate that negative relationship exists between leverage and dividend news effects. 
Our results support the free cash flow argument of agency theory which suggests that agency costs are 
lower in firms that have high leverage ratio; hence dividend announcement effects are weaker in such 
firms. Positive and statistically significant dividend yield coefficient is reported in case of AARt+5 
and CAARt0 while it is insignificant in all other event windows. Generally, the results suggest that 
firms with higher dividend yield experience strong dividend announcement effects. 
 MV/BV and P/E ratio have been used as alternative proxies for firm’s investment opportuni-
ties. Results in Table 3 show that MV/BV has no significant influence on the dividend announcement 
effects. This finding is consistent with Zakaria et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) who found no 
significant influence of this variable on dividend announcement effects. However, the second proxy 
for investment opportunities, the P/E ratio, has statistically significant negative coefficient in case of 
AARt-5 and CAARt-1. These findings suggest that dividend announcement effects are weaker for 
firms with higher growth opportunities and stronger for firms that have less investment opportunities. 
Conclusion
 This study has empirically sought to determine the relation between the dividend announce-
ment effects and the firm-specific factors including family ownership, dividend yield, firm size and 
leverage ratio of firms.  Results of two-sample t-test indicate that only AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, 
CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant, therefore, cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal returns 
of these event windows were used as dependent variables in the regression analysis. Both multiple 
regression and univariate analyses have been employed to determine the moderating role of the 
firm-specific independent variables on the market reaction to the dividend news. The results of both 
univariate and regression analyses are consistent. Negative relation is reported between the abnormal 
returns and the family ownership. It affirms that the stock market gives lesser importance to the 
dividend announcement of family firms than the announcements of non-family firms. This might be 
because of lower level of agency problems in the family firms as suggested by the Jensen and Meck-
ling’s (1976) agency hypothesis. Further, this study discovered a negative association between the size 
of the firm and the dividend news effect. This negative relation is explained by the information asym-
metry theory of John and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). This 
finding is in line with the finding of other empirical studies such as Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Andres 
et al. (2011), Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Amihud and Li (2006). Next, a negative association is found 
between the abnormal returns and the leverage. This negative association is in line with Jensen’s (1986) 
agency theory. Further, a positive relation is found between the dividend yield and the dividend abnor-
mal returns. Among the control variables, this study found that investment opportunities measured by 
MV/BV have no effect on the share price reaction to the dividend announcement while P/E ratio has 
significant negative effect on abnormal returns. These findings show that the reaction of the stock 
market to the dividend announcement is heterogeneous. Firms with significant agency problems and 
information asymmetry problems experience positive abnormal stock returns when they announce 
dividends. 
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THE ROLE OF FIRM-SPECIFIC VARIABLES IN 
EXPLAINING HETEROGENEOUS STOCK 
MARKET REACTIONS TO DIVIDEND
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Abstract
The finance literature reports mixed results about the dividend announcements and stock market 
reaction to those announcements. This study posits that the heterogeneous reaction of stock market to 
dividend announcements might be a result of several firm-specific financial and non-financial factors. 
In this vein, this study has tried to analyze the role of family-ownership, firm-size, leverage, and 
dividend yield in defining the dividend announcement effects. Using a sample of 206 dividend 
announcements of 136 firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period of 2008 to 2012, 
the results of both the univariate tests and the regression analysis show that the reaction of stock 
market to dividend announcements varies significantly across different groups of firms. Specifically, 
our results show that family ownership, firm-size, dividend yield and leverage significantly mediate  
the reaction of stock market around dividend announcement days. 
Keywords: Heterogeneous Reaction, Abnormal Returns, Family Ownership, Pakistan Stock 
Exchange.
JEL Classification: G 230
Introduction
 The corporate dividend policy have been a widely-debated subject in the domain of corpo-
rate finance and a large number of studies has explored different angles of dividend policy. One such 
angle is the stock market reaction to dividend announcements. Miller and Modigliani (1961), argues 
that dividend policy does not impact the firm value in perfect capital markets. However, Jensen’s 
(1986) Free Cash Flow (FCF) theory and Cash Flow Signaling Theory presented by Ross (1977), John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985) have rejected the argument of 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) by supporting notion that firm value is affected by dividend policy. Both 
these theories suggest positive correlation between dividend announcements and the reaction of the 
market to the dividend announcements. However, the empirical studies report mixed results regarding 
dividend announcement effects. 
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 Some studies including Aharony and Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976), Asquith and Mullins 
(1983), Gurgul et al. (2003), Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), Dasilas and Leventis (2011) have supported 
both these hypothesis by reporting positive abnormal returns around dividend announcement days. On 
the other hand, there are some other studies which have rejected the idea of positive correlation 
between the announcements of dividend and the sub-sequent stock market price reaction (Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 2002; Chen, Firth and Gao, 2002; Vieira, 2005; and 
Hossain, Siddiquee and Rahman, 2006). These studies have found no significant evidence of associa-
tion between dividend announcements and reaction of stock market to these announcements. Further, 
some studies even have reported evidences of negative correlation between the announcements of 
dividend and the sub-sequent stock market share price reaction (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, 
Keown and Pinkerton, 1984; and Healy, Hathorn and Kirch, 1997).
 These mixed results of the past studies might be an outcome of different factors that mediates 
the dividend announcement effects. A number of factors are identified by literature that affects the 
dividend announcement effects. Baker, Powell and Veit (2002) and Baker and Powell (1999) have 
highlighted that firm specific factors may impact the association between the dividend announce-
ments and the sub-sequent reaction of stock market. Further, La Porta et al. (2000), and Ball et al. 
(2000) have argued that the ownership structure also plays a vital role in explaining the dividends 
information content and in turn the reaction of market to dividend announcements. 
 A number of studies, including Eddy and Seifert (1988), Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) Haw 
and Kim (1991), Healy et al. (1997), Said (2012), Vieira (2011), around the globe have tried to empiri-
cal test the association between different factors and dividend announcement effects. However, in 
Pakistan, no study until the date has tried to empirically figure out the variables that affect the 
dividend announcement effects of Pakistani firms. In this context, this study has made an attempt to 
determine the variables that explains the information content of dividends of Pakistani firms. Particu-
larly, this study has focused on the firm-specific factors and more specifically the firm size, ownership 
composition of a firm (whether a firm is family and non-family), leverage ratio and dividend yield.
Literature Review 
 This section presents the literature review of the past studies. First, the literature review of 
those studies has been discussed which focuses on association between the dividend announcements 
and the share price reaction. Later the focus is shifted to factors that moderate the above-mentioned 
relationship. 
 
Stock Market Reaction to Dividend Announcements
 A large number of researchers have analyzed the dividend policy and its impact on the value 
of thefirm since the seminal work of Miller and Modigliani (1961). They have used different theories 
to describe the link between the firm value and the dividend policy. Two prominent theories out of 
these are free cash flow (FCF) theory of Jensen (1986) and cash flow signaling (CFS) theory. CFS 
theory which is also called asymmetric information theory has been developed by a number of 
researchers including Ross (1977), Miller and Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and 
Williams (1985). This theory proposes that the firm’s managers, as compared to shareholders (inves-
tors), have more private information about the firm’s future prospects and they signal this private 
information to the market via dividend changes. Hence, when increase in dividends is announced by 
a firm, the stock market assumes that the future prospects of that particular firm are good and hence 
reacts positively. On the other hand, when a firm cuts dividend, the stock market assumes that the 
future prospects of that particular firm are not good and hence reacts negatively, which results in lower 
share prices of the firm. Therefore, in the context of CFS, it is expected that the stock market will react 
positively whenever dividends are announced by a firm. 
 The second theory i.e. FCF theory was developed by Jensen (1986) and is based on the 
agency relationship between managers and shareholders. This theory suggests that dividend plays a 
disciplinary role for the firm’s management. Distribution of free cash flows in the form of dividends 
decreases the conflict between managers and shareholders by making it less likely for managers to 
invest free cash flows in projects that have negative net present value. According to this argument, 
dividend announcements should result in increase in the stock prices. Therefore, like CFS theory, this 
theory also predicts positive correlation between dividend announcements and prices of stock.
 The empirical support for both the theories is mixed. Several studies including Aharony and 
Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976),  Gurgul et al. (2003), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Dasilas and 
Leventis (2011), and Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), have supported both these theories by reporting 
significant abnormal returns around announcement days. On other hand, other studies have reported 
evidence that does not support these theories (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 
2002; Vieira, 2005; Hossain et al., 2006; and Chen, et al., 2002). These studies have found no signifi-
cant abnormal returns around announcement dates. Further, some studies even have reported evidenc-
es of negative correlation between the dividend announcements and the subsequent reaction of stock 
market (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, et al., 1984; and Healy et al., 1997).
Moderating Role of Firm-Specific Factors
 Literature suggests that the mixed evidence as discussed above might be an outcome of 
different factors that moderates the stock market response to the dividend announcements. These 
factors include firm size, family ownership, leverage and dividend yield. We discuss these factors in 
details in the following paragraphs.
Family ownership
 Capulong et al. (2000) has stated that ownership composition and ownership concentration 
are the two key important dimensions of corporate ownership structures. Concentration of ownership 
deals with the distribution of power between the shareholders and the managers while on the other 
hand, composition of ownership deals with the identity of shareholders of a company and specifically 
the large shareholders. A large shareholder (also called block-holder) can be government, holding 
company, individual, bank, institutional investor or family. Thus, broadly speaking there are two 
categories of ownership composition: the family block-holder and non-family block-holder. Accord-
ing to Holderness and Sheehan (1988), and Gugler (2001), family block holder has different motiva-
tions and incentives to monitor the managers. Gorton and Kahl (1999) have argued that as compared 
to non-family block-holder, the family block-holders have greater incentive of monitoring the manag-
ers. Due to the better monitoring, the family block-holders affect the reaction of stock market to 
dividends announcements.  
 There are two leading theories that explain the relationship of family ownership with 
dividend announcements effects. These include the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory 
and Leland and Pyle’s (1977) general signaling theory. Under the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
agency cost model, it is argued that due to the better monitoring efforts of family owners, sharehold-
ers-managers interests are better aligned which reduces the agency conflicts and the agency costs. 
Therefore, if reducing agency conflicts is the motivation behind the announcement of dividend chang-
es, then the firms with family block-holder will experience weaker dividend announcement effects as 
compared to the firms with non-family block-holder. Under general Leland and Pyle’s (1977) theory 
of general signaling, it is argued that due to the better monitoring of managers by the family 
block-holders, the credibility of the manager’s decisions and the signals that they convey to the 
market increases. Therefore, due to higher credibility, the firms with family block-holders will experi-
ence stronger dividend announcement effects as compared to firms with non-family block-holder.
 Unlike the ownership concentration, only few researchers have empirically analyzed the 
dividend announcement effects in the context of family and non-family ownership. Therefore, this 
area is relatively unexplored and not enough evidences are available on this area. Recently, research-
ers have started exploring the relation between family ownership on dividend announcement effects. 
Setia-Atmaja, et al. (2004) are the first researchers who have analyzed the role of family ownership in 
mediating the dividend announcement effects in Australian environment. They reported positive 
relationship between family firms and dividend announcement effects. Contrary to Setia-Atmaja, et 
al. (2004), Vieira (2012) has reported no evidence from Portuguese Environment. 
 As discussed above, the agency cost theory predicts negative relationship while general 
signaling model predicts positive correlation between family ownership and dividend news effects. 
Hence, this study has formulated the following two competing hypothesis regarding relationship 
between family ownership and dividend announcement effects. 
H1a: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are negatively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are less than abnormal returns associ-
ated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
H1b: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are positively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are greater than abnormal returns 
associated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
Firm size
 The literature has identified the firm size as another potential variable that moderate the 
dividend announcement effects. The role of the size of the firm in determining the dividend announce-
ment effects can be described in the context of signaling or asymmetric information theory of John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). Under this theory, it is assert-
ed that as information asymmetry between equity holders and managers of firm is greater in case of 
the small size firms as compared to firms with large size; therefore, when small size firm tries to 
distribute more dividends, for the purpose of conveying signals to the outside investors about their 
future prospects, will experience greater dividend announcement effects. Therefore, in this context, 
negative relationship exists between the size of the firm and the dividend news effect.
 Empirical studies reports mixed results about the firm size relationship with the dividend 
announcement effects. Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Eddy and Seifert (1988) have reported negative 
association from the U.S. Amihud and Li (2006) and Yoon and Starks (1995). Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003) and Andres et al. (2011) have also supported signaling theory by reporting negative association 
from German environment. Vieira (2011), by utilizing the data of the UK, Portuguese and the French 
markets, have provided further evidence from the European market. She has reported interesting 
results. Her study found that dividend announcement effect is negatively correlated with the firm size 
only in the UK market while her study reported no evidence of significant association in the French 
and Portugal markets. Hussainey et al. (2011) and Zakaria et al. (2012) have also reported the same 
results from the U.K and the Malaysian Markets. 
 Based the on above literature and information asymmetric theory, this study has tested the 
following hypothesis:
H2: Reaction of stock market to the dividend news is negatively associated with the firm size. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of small-sized firms are greater than the abnormal 
returns associated with the dividend announcement of the large-sized firms.
Leverage
 Leverage is another firm specific variable that is identified by the literature as a potential 
determinant of the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Said (2012) and Vieira (2011) has 
defined leverage as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets. The role of leverage in determining 
the dividend announcement effects is explained both by Jensen’s (1986) version of FCF agency cost 
argument and signaling explanation of Ross (1977). Using Jensen’s (1986) argument, Borokhovich et 
al. (2005) have highlighted that the agency costs are lower in the firms that have higher debt ratios as 
managers in these firms are left with little cash flows under their discretions due to the payment of the 
debt and financial expenses. Therefore, dividends role in reducing agency costs is limited in these 
firms and hence a weaker dividend announcement effects will be experienced by the firm with higher 
leverage ratios. Under the second argument i.e. signaling theory of Ross (1977), it is argued that firms 
with good quality try to differentiate themselves from bad quality firms by using high leverage ratio. 
Therefore, investors interpret the dividend signals of the companies with higher leverage ratios as 
favorable as the investors anticipate that the managers of such good quality firm will be able to contin-
ue paying dividends in the future. 
 Empirical results regarding the association of the dividend news effects with leverage are 
mixed. Few studies have supported cash flow or agency theory by reporting negative association 
(Healy et al., 1997; and Alonso et al., 2005). Contrarily, Allen and Rachim (1996), Vieira (2011) and 
Zakaria et al. (2012) have supported signaling theory by reporting positive relation between the 
dividend announcement effects and leverage. 
 
 Literature suggests that the agency cost argument generally favors Pakistani environment 
more than the signaling theory regarding the role of leverage in determining different factors related 
to corporate finance and corporate performance (Nazir and Saita, 2013; Khan, Kaleem and Nazir, 
2012; and Satti, 2013). However, this study has tested two hypotheses based on the agency and the 
signaling theory in the light of empirical results reported from different countries. 
H3a: Negative association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are greater as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of the firms with high level of leverage.
H3b: Positive association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to the 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are lesser as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of firms with high level of leverage.
Dividend yield
 Dividend yield is one of the main factors that affect abnormal returns around dividend 
announcement days (Yoon and Starks, 1995; and Lee and Yan; 2003). The impact of dividend yield 
on share price reaction to dividend news can be explained in the context of agency cost and signaling 
theories. Both of the theories predict positive association between dividend announcement effects and 
dividend yield (Ariff and Finn, 1986; Lee, 1995; and Belde et al., 2005). Under the agency cost frame-
work, it is argued that high dividend yield helps in reducing agency conflicts in the firm. Hence, 
keeping other variables constant, the higher the dividend yield associated with the dividend announce-
ment, the stronger will be the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Contrarily, under the signal-
ing theory, it is argued that high dividend yield depicts that future prospects of a firm are good, there-
fore, dividend announcements that are accompanied by high dividend yield are perceived as a more 
favorable signal as compared to a dividend announcement with low dividend yield. Hence, a dividend 
announcement with high dividend yield induces stronger stock market reaction. 
 The earning response coefficient is dependent upon the earning retention rate, among other 
variables. Butler and Han (1994) argues that the share price reaction to the announcements is a 
function of earning surprise and earning response coefficient. They use dividend yield as a proxy for 
earning retention rate because actual earnings’ retention rate can go to unreasonable range if a firm has 
zero earnings or negative earnings. Dividend yield has been calculated as the per share dividend divid-
ed by the price of share five days before the announcement of dividend. Based on the above literature, 
this study has tested the following hypothesis:
H4: Positive association exists between the dividend yield and the dividend announcement effects. 
Hence, abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcements of the firms that are accompa-
nied by higher dividend yield will be greater as compared to the dividend announcement of the firms 
that are accompanied by lower dividend yield.
Growth opportunities
 Different studies have used growth opportunity as a control variable while examining 
relationship between different factors and stock market reaction to the dividend news (Vieira, 2005; 
Zakaria et al., 2012; Vieira, 2011; Neil and Robert, 2009; Vieira, 2012 and Andres et al., 2011). Past 
studies including Vieira (2011) and Andres et al. (2011) have used Tobin’s Q as a measure of inves-
tors’ expectation about the growth prospect of a firm and market to book value of equity (MV/BV) 
ratio as a proxy of Tobin’s Q. Thus, MV/BV has been used as a proxy of growth opportunity by this 
study also. According to Vieira (2011), high MV/BV shows that investors think that the firm has 
higher future growth prospects. Firms with lower MV/BV ratios are considered to have higher level 
of free cash flow and thus will be able to pay more dividends. Therefore, reaction of stock market is 
more strong to dividend news of firms that have lower MV/BV ratio, hence negative coefficient is 
expected for this variable. Among the past studies that have used MV/BV as control variable, Zakaria 
et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) have found no significant influence of this variable on the stock 
market reaction to the dividend news while Vieira (2011), Neil and Robert (2009) and Vieira (2005) 
have found negative relationship between  MV/BV and the dividend news effects. Apart from MV/BV 
ratio, this study also used price to earnings (P/E) ratio as proxy for investment opportunities by 
following Basu (1977) and Reinganum (1981). Both these studies reported negative association.
 
Methodology
Sample and Data Sources
 This section discusses the data sources, the data collection methods, the data analysis tools, 
and variables. For the purpose of the data collection, this study used simple random sampling 
technique. The sampling period ranges from year 2008 to 2012. During this sampling period, 136 
firms announced 206 annual dividends. Therefore, we analyze 206 annual dividend announcements of 
136 firms over the above-mentioned sampling period.
 The data of dividend announcements and the stock prices have been extracted from the KSE 
database. Data about the firm-specific variables and ownership structure were gathered from the 
annual reports of the firms.
Model Specification
 For testing the association of the above-mentioned variables with the dividend news effects, 
this study has utilized standard event study methodology. For generating abnormal returns market 
model has been utilized. Equation of the market model is specified as under:
Where,
Ritis return rate of security i at day t
Rmtis the rate of return of market at day t
αiis constant
βi isthe sensitivity of the expected asset return to the expected market return calculated as
 For the purpose of estimating the parameters of market model, 100 daily continuously 
compounded returns are used which ranged from approximately 145 days before the announcement 
date. KSE-100 Index is used as a market proxy. Ordinary least square method has been utilized for 
estimating the market model parameters. After estimating the parameters of market model, the follow-
ing equation has been used to calculate the expected returns:
Where,
E(Ri) is the expected return on stock iat day t
    is the estimated intercept of market model for stock i
    is the estimated beta of market model for stock i
For each dividend announcement, abnormal returns are calculated after estimating the market model 
parameters, by using the following equation:
Where,
ARit is the stock i abnormal return at day t
Rit is the actual stock i return at day t
 Abnormal returns, in case of each event (dividend announcement), are calculated for all 
event windows. After calculation of abnormal returns, average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumula-
tive abnormal returns (CAAR) are calculated for all event windows. After calculating AAR and 
CAAR, univariate and multivariate analysis has been performed. Before performing univariate and 
multivariate analyses to test the association between dividend news and aforementioned independent 
variables, the significance of the AAR and CAAR of the event windows mentioned before has been 
checked by using student t-test on overall sample.  
 For univariate analysis, independent samples t-test has been used while for multivariate 
analysis, regression analysis has been performed. In univariate analysis, independent sample t-test has 
been performed on AAR and CAAR of lower 50th and upper 50th percentile of each variable (exclud-
ing family ownership in case of which test has been conducted on AAR and CAAR of family and 
non-family groups). In multivariate analysis, regression has been run by using both AAR and CAAR 
as dependent variables. The following are the regression equations with a full set of explanatory 
variables:
ARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e ……(1)
CAARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e…(2)
Where,
AARt is average abnormal return of specific event window
CAARt is cumulative average abnormal return of specific event window
β1 is the co-efficient of family and indicates relationship between family ownership and AARt and 
CAARt
β2 is the co-efficient of LMV (firm size) and indicates relationship between firm size and AARt and 
CAARt
β3 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β4 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β5is the co-efficient of growth opportunity (MV/BV) and indicates relationship between MV/BV and 
AARt and CAARt
 Before performing these formal tests to determine the relationship between four aforemen-
tioned independent variables and stock market reaction to dividend news, a series of diagnostic tests 
were conducted to identify problems in the data. Details of these diagnostic tests and remedial actions 
are not reported for the sake of parsimony.
Results and Discussion
T-tests Results
 Table 1 below reports mean values of AAR and CAAR for the event windows ranging from 
five days prior to dividend announcement to five days after dividend announcements. All tables in this 
paper were constructed using asdoc program of Shah (2018).
 Table 1 shows that p-values of mean values of AAR and CAAR are statistically significant 
only in few event windows. For example, AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, CAARt0, AARt-2, 
AARt-5 and CAARt-2 are significant at five percent level while CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant 
only at the 10 percent level. Averages of all these significant AARs and CAARs are positive which 
shows that market reacts positively to the announcements of dividend. Moreover, significance of 
AARt-2, CAARt-2, and AART-1 indicates leakage of information about the dividend announcements 
prior to announcement of these dividends. 
 For further analysis, those event windows have been used analysis that have significant 
AARs and CAARs. Therefore, we use AARt-2, AARt-5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, and CAARt0 as depen-
dent variables in the regressions analysis to test their relationship with the previously mentioned four 
explanatory variables.
Table 1
Means and T-Tests of the Abnormal Returns in Different Event Windows
Univariate Analyses
 
This section presents and discusses results of the t-tests to find whether firm-specific variables 
moderate reaction of stock market to dividend news. The median values of each firm-specific variable 
is used to divide firms into two above 50th and below 50th percentiles, except for family ownership 
for which the groups have been made based on family vs. non-family status of firms. Then AAR and 
CAAR have been calculated for these groups of firms. Table 2 reports that mean differences of these 
abnormal returns under the heading of each firm-specific variable that have been used for making 
group of firms. For example, the column with heading ‘Size shows the mean abnormal returns of 
firms that are in the 50th top percentile of firm size minus mean abnormal returns of firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile of firm size.
 The results show that family firms have lower abnormal returns than non-family firms. The 
p-values show that the mean differences are significant only in case of AARt-5 at one percent level of 
significance and in case AARt-2 at five percent level of significance. Results also show that reaction 
of stock market to dividend news is stronger for smaller firms as compared to larger firms.  This is 
evident from the column with the heading ‘Size’, showing that mean differences of CAARt-2 and 
CAARt0 are negative and statistically significant. Results also depicts that firm’s leverage ratio 
significantly moderates the dividend news effects. For example, mean differences in abnormal returns 
are significantly higher for dividend announcements in firms with lower leverage ratios as compared 
to firms that have high leverage ratios. Finally, there is some evidence that firms with lower dividend 
yield experience more reaction to dividend announcements as compared to firms with higher 
dividend yield.
This section presents and discusses results of the t-test to find
Table 2
Mean Differences in Return
Regressions Results
 Regression analysis results are reported in Table 3. The coefficients of the dummy variables 
used to indicate family firms are negative in all the event windows, except CAARt-1 where it is 
positive. In line with the results reported in univariate analysis, coefficient of family dummy is signifi-
cant and negative in AARt-2 and AARt-5 while it is insignificant in case of the rest of the event 
windows. It shows that announcement effects of family firms are weaker as compared to announce-
ment effects of non-family firms. This finding supports the agency theory explanation that family 
ownership reduces conflict between principal and agent and hence dividends lose its importance as a 
tool to reduce agency costs.
 The results show that the firm size coefficient is negative and statistically significant in case 
of CAARt-2 and CAAR0 while coefficients of abnormal returns in other event windows are insignifi-
cant. Result of the regression analysis supports the findings of univariate analysis as reported in Table 
2. These findings show that abnormal returns due to dividend announcements are significantly lower 
for firms that are placed in the top 50th percentile of the firm size as compared to the firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile. These results are in line with information asymmetric theory of Miller and 
Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and Williams (1985) that predicts that small firms face 
more information asymmetry problems and hence dividends are an effective tool for them in reducing 
information asymmetry costs.
Table 3
Regression Results
 Leverage coefficient is negative and significant in case of AARt+5, CAARt-2 and CAARt-1. 
These results indicate that negative relationship exists between leverage and dividend news effects. 
Our results support the free cash flow argument of agency theory which suggests that agency costs are 
lower in firms that have high leverage ratio; hence dividend announcement effects are weaker in such 
firms. Positive and statistically significant dividend yield coefficient is reported in case of AARt+5 
and CAARt0 while it is insignificant in all other event windows. Generally, the results suggest that 
firms with higher dividend yield experience strong dividend announcement effects. 
 MV/BV and P/E ratio have been used as alternative proxies for firm’s investment opportuni-
ties. Results in Table 3 show that MV/BV has no significant influence on the dividend announcement 
effects. This finding is consistent with Zakaria et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) who found no 
significant influence of this variable on dividend announcement effects. However, the second proxy 
for investment opportunities, the P/E ratio, has statistically significant negative coefficient in case of 
AARt-5 and CAARt-1. These findings suggest that dividend announcement effects are weaker for 
firms with higher growth opportunities and stronger for firms that have less investment opportunities. 
Conclusion
 This study has empirically sought to determine the relation between the dividend announce-
ment effects and the firm-specific factors including family ownership, dividend yield, firm size and 
leverage ratio of firms.  Results of two-sample t-test indicate that only AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, 
CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant, therefore, cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal returns 
of these event windows were used as dependent variables in the regression analysis. Both multiple 
regression and univariate analyses have been employed to determine the moderating role of the 
firm-specific independent variables on the market reaction to the dividend news. The results of both 
univariate and regression analyses are consistent. Negative relation is reported between the abnormal 
returns and the family ownership. It affirms that the stock market gives lesser importance to the 
dividend announcement of family firms than the announcements of non-family firms. This might be 
because of lower level of agency problems in the family firms as suggested by the Jensen and Meck-
ling’s (1976) agency hypothesis. Further, this study discovered a negative association between the size 
of the firm and the dividend news effect. This negative relation is explained by the information asym-
metry theory of John and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). This 
finding is in line with the finding of other empirical studies such as Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Andres 
et al. (2011), Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Amihud and Li (2006). Next, a negative association is found 
between the abnormal returns and the leverage. This negative association is in line with Jensen’s (1986) 
agency theory. Further, a positive relation is found between the dividend yield and the dividend abnor-
mal returns. Among the control variables, this study found that investment opportunities measured by 
MV/BV have no effect on the share price reaction to the dividend announcement while P/E ratio has 
significant negative effect on abnormal returns. These findings show that the reaction of the stock 
market to the dividend announcement is heterogeneous. Firms with significant agency problems and 
information asymmetry problems experience positive abnormal stock returns when they announce 
dividends. 
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Abstract
The finance literature reports mixed results about the dividend announcements and stock market 
reaction to those announcements. This study posits that the heterogeneous reaction of stock market to 
dividend announcements might be a result of several firm-specific financial and non-financial factors. 
In this vein, this study has tried to analyze the role of family-ownership, firm-size, leverage, and 
dividend yield in defining the dividend announcement effects. Using a sample of 206 dividend 
announcements of 136 firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period of 2008 to 2012, 
the results of both the univariate tests and the regression analysis show that the reaction of stock 
market to dividend announcements varies significantly across different groups of firms. Specifically, 
our results show that family ownership, firm-size, dividend yield and leverage significantly mediate  
the reaction of stock market around dividend announcement days. 
Keywords: Heterogeneous Reaction, Abnormal Returns, Family Ownership, Pakistan Stock 
Exchange.
JEL Classification: G 230
Introduction
 The corporate dividend policy have been a widely-debated subject in the domain of corpo-
rate finance and a large number of studies has explored different angles of dividend policy. One such 
angle is the stock market reaction to dividend announcements. Miller and Modigliani (1961), argues 
that dividend policy does not impact the firm value in perfect capital markets. However, Jensen’s 
(1986) Free Cash Flow (FCF) theory and Cash Flow Signaling Theory presented by Ross (1977), John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985) have rejected the argument of 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) by supporting notion that firm value is affected by dividend policy. Both 
these theories suggest positive correlation between dividend announcements and the reaction of the 
market to the dividend announcements. However, the empirical studies report mixed results regarding 
dividend announcement effects. 
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 Some studies including Aharony and Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976), Asquith and Mullins 
(1983), Gurgul et al. (2003), Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), Dasilas and Leventis (2011) have supported 
both these hypothesis by reporting positive abnormal returns around dividend announcement days. On 
the other hand, there are some other studies which have rejected the idea of positive correlation 
between the announcements of dividend and the sub-sequent stock market price reaction (Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 2002; Chen, Firth and Gao, 2002; Vieira, 2005; and 
Hossain, Siddiquee and Rahman, 2006). These studies have found no significant evidence of associa-
tion between dividend announcements and reaction of stock market to these announcements. Further, 
some studies even have reported evidences of negative correlation between the announcements of 
dividend and the sub-sequent stock market share price reaction (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, 
Keown and Pinkerton, 1984; and Healy, Hathorn and Kirch, 1997).
 These mixed results of the past studies might be an outcome of different factors that mediates 
the dividend announcement effects. A number of factors are identified by literature that affects the 
dividend announcement effects. Baker, Powell and Veit (2002) and Baker and Powell (1999) have 
highlighted that firm specific factors may impact the association between the dividend announce-
ments and the sub-sequent reaction of stock market. Further, La Porta et al. (2000), and Ball et al. 
(2000) have argued that the ownership structure also plays a vital role in explaining the dividends 
information content and in turn the reaction of market to dividend announcements. 
 A number of studies, including Eddy and Seifert (1988), Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) Haw 
and Kim (1991), Healy et al. (1997), Said (2012), Vieira (2011), around the globe have tried to empiri-
cal test the association between different factors and dividend announcement effects. However, in 
Pakistan, no study until the date has tried to empirically figure out the variables that affect the 
dividend announcement effects of Pakistani firms. In this context, this study has made an attempt to 
determine the variables that explains the information content of dividends of Pakistani firms. Particu-
larly, this study has focused on the firm-specific factors and more specifically the firm size, ownership 
composition of a firm (whether a firm is family and non-family), leverage ratio and dividend yield.
Literature Review 
 This section presents the literature review of the past studies. First, the literature review of 
those studies has been discussed which focuses on association between the dividend announcements 
and the share price reaction. Later the focus is shifted to factors that moderate the above-mentioned 
relationship. 
 
Stock Market Reaction to Dividend Announcements
 A large number of researchers have analyzed the dividend policy and its impact on the value 
of thefirm since the seminal work of Miller and Modigliani (1961). They have used different theories 
to describe the link between the firm value and the dividend policy. Two prominent theories out of 
these are free cash flow (FCF) theory of Jensen (1986) and cash flow signaling (CFS) theory. CFS 
theory which is also called asymmetric information theory has been developed by a number of 
researchers including Ross (1977), Miller and Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and 
Williams (1985). This theory proposes that the firm’s managers, as compared to shareholders (inves-
tors), have more private information about the firm’s future prospects and they signal this private 
information to the market via dividend changes. Hence, when increase in dividends is announced by 
a firm, the stock market assumes that the future prospects of that particular firm are good and hence 
reacts positively. On the other hand, when a firm cuts dividend, the stock market assumes that the 
future prospects of that particular firm are not good and hence reacts negatively, which results in lower 
share prices of the firm. Therefore, in the context of CFS, it is expected that the stock market will react 
positively whenever dividends are announced by a firm. 
 The second theory i.e. FCF theory was developed by Jensen (1986) and is based on the 
agency relationship between managers and shareholders. This theory suggests that dividend plays a 
disciplinary role for the firm’s management. Distribution of free cash flows in the form of dividends 
decreases the conflict between managers and shareholders by making it less likely for managers to 
invest free cash flows in projects that have negative net present value. According to this argument, 
dividend announcements should result in increase in the stock prices. Therefore, like CFS theory, this 
theory also predicts positive correlation between dividend announcements and prices of stock.
 The empirical support for both the theories is mixed. Several studies including Aharony and 
Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976),  Gurgul et al. (2003), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Dasilas and 
Leventis (2011), and Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), have supported both these theories by reporting 
significant abnormal returns around announcement days. On other hand, other studies have reported 
evidence that does not support these theories (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 
2002; Vieira, 2005; Hossain et al., 2006; and Chen, et al., 2002). These studies have found no signifi-
cant abnormal returns around announcement dates. Further, some studies even have reported evidenc-
es of negative correlation between the dividend announcements and the subsequent reaction of stock 
market (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, et al., 1984; and Healy et al., 1997).
Moderating Role of Firm-Specific Factors
 Literature suggests that the mixed evidence as discussed above might be an outcome of 
different factors that moderates the stock market response to the dividend announcements. These 
factors include firm size, family ownership, leverage and dividend yield. We discuss these factors in 
details in the following paragraphs.
Family ownership
 Capulong et al. (2000) has stated that ownership composition and ownership concentration 
are the two key important dimensions of corporate ownership structures. Concentration of ownership 
deals with the distribution of power between the shareholders and the managers while on the other 
hand, composition of ownership deals with the identity of shareholders of a company and specifically 
the large shareholders. A large shareholder (also called block-holder) can be government, holding 
company, individual, bank, institutional investor or family. Thus, broadly speaking there are two 
categories of ownership composition: the family block-holder and non-family block-holder. Accord-
ing to Holderness and Sheehan (1988), and Gugler (2001), family block holder has different motiva-
tions and incentives to monitor the managers. Gorton and Kahl (1999) have argued that as compared 
to non-family block-holder, the family block-holders have greater incentive of monitoring the manag-
ers. Due to the better monitoring, the family block-holders affect the reaction of stock market to 
dividends announcements.  
 There are two leading theories that explain the relationship of family ownership with 
dividend announcements effects. These include the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory 
and Leland and Pyle’s (1977) general signaling theory. Under the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
agency cost model, it is argued that due to the better monitoring efforts of family owners, sharehold-
ers-managers interests are better aligned which reduces the agency conflicts and the agency costs. 
Therefore, if reducing agency conflicts is the motivation behind the announcement of dividend chang-
es, then the firms with family block-holder will experience weaker dividend announcement effects as 
compared to the firms with non-family block-holder. Under general Leland and Pyle’s (1977) theory 
of general signaling, it is argued that due to the better monitoring of managers by the family 
block-holders, the credibility of the manager’s decisions and the signals that they convey to the 
market increases. Therefore, due to higher credibility, the firms with family block-holders will experi-
ence stronger dividend announcement effects as compared to firms with non-family block-holder.
 Unlike the ownership concentration, only few researchers have empirically analyzed the 
dividend announcement effects in the context of family and non-family ownership. Therefore, this 
area is relatively unexplored and not enough evidences are available on this area. Recently, research-
ers have started exploring the relation between family ownership on dividend announcement effects. 
Setia-Atmaja, et al. (2004) are the first researchers who have analyzed the role of family ownership in 
mediating the dividend announcement effects in Australian environment. They reported positive 
relationship between family firms and dividend announcement effects. Contrary to Setia-Atmaja, et 
al. (2004), Vieira (2012) has reported no evidence from Portuguese Environment. 
 As discussed above, the agency cost theory predicts negative relationship while general 
signaling model predicts positive correlation between family ownership and dividend news effects. 
Hence, this study has formulated the following two competing hypothesis regarding relationship 
between family ownership and dividend announcement effects. 
H1a: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are negatively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are less than abnormal returns associ-
ated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
H1b: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are positively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are greater than abnormal returns 
associated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
Firm size
 The literature has identified the firm size as another potential variable that moderate the 
dividend announcement effects. The role of the size of the firm in determining the dividend announce-
ment effects can be described in the context of signaling or asymmetric information theory of John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). Under this theory, it is assert-
ed that as information asymmetry between equity holders and managers of firm is greater in case of 
the small size firms as compared to firms with large size; therefore, when small size firm tries to 
distribute more dividends, for the purpose of conveying signals to the outside investors about their 
future prospects, will experience greater dividend announcement effects. Therefore, in this context, 
negative relationship exists between the size of the firm and the dividend news effect.
 Empirical studies reports mixed results about the firm size relationship with the dividend 
announcement effects. Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Eddy and Seifert (1988) have reported negative 
association from the U.S. Amihud and Li (2006) and Yoon and Starks (1995). Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003) and Andres et al. (2011) have also supported signaling theory by reporting negative association 
from German environment. Vieira (2011), by utilizing the data of the UK, Portuguese and the French 
markets, have provided further evidence from the European market. She has reported interesting 
results. Her study found that dividend announcement effect is negatively correlated with the firm size 
only in the UK market while her study reported no evidence of significant association in the French 
and Portugal markets. Hussainey et al. (2011) and Zakaria et al. (2012) have also reported the same 
results from the U.K and the Malaysian Markets. 
 Based the on above literature and information asymmetric theory, this study has tested the 
following hypothesis:
H2: Reaction of stock market to the dividend news is negatively associated with the firm size. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of small-sized firms are greater than the abnormal 
returns associated with the dividend announcement of the large-sized firms.
Leverage
 Leverage is another firm specific variable that is identified by the literature as a potential 
determinant of the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Said (2012) and Vieira (2011) has 
defined leverage as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets. The role of leverage in determining 
the dividend announcement effects is explained both by Jensen’s (1986) version of FCF agency cost 
argument and signaling explanation of Ross (1977). Using Jensen’s (1986) argument, Borokhovich et 
al. (2005) have highlighted that the agency costs are lower in the firms that have higher debt ratios as 
managers in these firms are left with little cash flows under their discretions due to the payment of the 
debt and financial expenses. Therefore, dividends role in reducing agency costs is limited in these 
firms and hence a weaker dividend announcement effects will be experienced by the firm with higher 
leverage ratios. Under the second argument i.e. signaling theory of Ross (1977), it is argued that firms 
with good quality try to differentiate themselves from bad quality firms by using high leverage ratio. 
Therefore, investors interpret the dividend signals of the companies with higher leverage ratios as 
favorable as the investors anticipate that the managers of such good quality firm will be able to contin-
ue paying dividends in the future. 
 Empirical results regarding the association of the dividend news effects with leverage are 
mixed. Few studies have supported cash flow or agency theory by reporting negative association 
(Healy et al., 1997; and Alonso et al., 2005). Contrarily, Allen and Rachim (1996), Vieira (2011) and 
Zakaria et al. (2012) have supported signaling theory by reporting positive relation between the 
dividend announcement effects and leverage. 
 
 Literature suggests that the agency cost argument generally favors Pakistani environment 
more than the signaling theory regarding the role of leverage in determining different factors related 
to corporate finance and corporate performance (Nazir and Saita, 2013; Khan, Kaleem and Nazir, 
2012; and Satti, 2013). However, this study has tested two hypotheses based on the agency and the 
signaling theory in the light of empirical results reported from different countries. 
H3a: Negative association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are greater as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of the firms with high level of leverage.
H3b: Positive association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to the 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are lesser as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of firms with high level of leverage.
Dividend yield
 Dividend yield is one of the main factors that affect abnormal returns around dividend 
announcement days (Yoon and Starks, 1995; and Lee and Yan; 2003). The impact of dividend yield 
on share price reaction to dividend news can be explained in the context of agency cost and signaling 
theories. Both of the theories predict positive association between dividend announcement effects and 
dividend yield (Ariff and Finn, 1986; Lee, 1995; and Belde et al., 2005). Under the agency cost frame-
work, it is argued that high dividend yield helps in reducing agency conflicts in the firm. Hence, 
keeping other variables constant, the higher the dividend yield associated with the dividend announce-
ment, the stronger will be the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Contrarily, under the signal-
ing theory, it is argued that high dividend yield depicts that future prospects of a firm are good, there-
fore, dividend announcements that are accompanied by high dividend yield are perceived as a more 
favorable signal as compared to a dividend announcement with low dividend yield. Hence, a dividend 
announcement with high dividend yield induces stronger stock market reaction. 
 The earning response coefficient is dependent upon the earning retention rate, among other 
variables. Butler and Han (1994) argues that the share price reaction to the announcements is a 
function of earning surprise and earning response coefficient. They use dividend yield as a proxy for 
earning retention rate because actual earnings’ retention rate can go to unreasonable range if a firm has 
zero earnings or negative earnings. Dividend yield has been calculated as the per share dividend divid-
ed by the price of share five days before the announcement of dividend. Based on the above literature, 
this study has tested the following hypothesis:
H4: Positive association exists between the dividend yield and the dividend announcement effects. 
Hence, abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcements of the firms that are accompa-
nied by higher dividend yield will be greater as compared to the dividend announcement of the firms 
that are accompanied by lower dividend yield.
Growth opportunities
 Different studies have used growth opportunity as a control variable while examining 
relationship between different factors and stock market reaction to the dividend news (Vieira, 2005; 
Zakaria et al., 2012; Vieira, 2011; Neil and Robert, 2009; Vieira, 2012 and Andres et al., 2011). Past 
studies including Vieira (2011) and Andres et al. (2011) have used Tobin’s Q as a measure of inves-
tors’ expectation about the growth prospect of a firm and market to book value of equity (MV/BV) 
ratio as a proxy of Tobin’s Q. Thus, MV/BV has been used as a proxy of growth opportunity by this 
study also. According to Vieira (2011), high MV/BV shows that investors think that the firm has 
higher future growth prospects. Firms with lower MV/BV ratios are considered to have higher level 
of free cash flow and thus will be able to pay more dividends. Therefore, reaction of stock market is 
more strong to dividend news of firms that have lower MV/BV ratio, hence negative coefficient is 
expected for this variable. Among the past studies that have used MV/BV as control variable, Zakaria 
et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) have found no significant influence of this variable on the stock 
market reaction to the dividend news while Vieira (2011), Neil and Robert (2009) and Vieira (2005) 
have found negative relationship between  MV/BV and the dividend news effects. Apart from MV/BV 
ratio, this study also used price to earnings (P/E) ratio as proxy for investment opportunities by 
following Basu (1977) and Reinganum (1981). Both these studies reported negative association.
 
Methodology
Sample and Data Sources
 This section discusses the data sources, the data collection methods, the data analysis tools, 
and variables. For the purpose of the data collection, this study used simple random sampling 
technique. The sampling period ranges from year 2008 to 2012. During this sampling period, 136 
firms announced 206 annual dividends. Therefore, we analyze 206 annual dividend announcements of 
136 firms over the above-mentioned sampling period.
 The data of dividend announcements and the stock prices have been extracted from the KSE 
database. Data about the firm-specific variables and ownership structure were gathered from the 
annual reports of the firms.
Model Specification
 For testing the association of the above-mentioned variables with the dividend news effects, 
this study has utilized standard event study methodology. For generating abnormal returns market 
model has been utilized. Equation of the market model is specified as under:
Where,
Ritis return rate of security i at day t
Rmtis the rate of return of market at day t
αiis constant
βi isthe sensitivity of the expected asset return to the expected market return calculated as
 For the purpose of estimating the parameters of market model, 100 daily continuously 
compounded returns are used which ranged from approximately 145 days before the announcement 
date. KSE-100 Index is used as a market proxy. Ordinary least square method has been utilized for 
estimating the market model parameters. After estimating the parameters of market model, the follow-
ing equation has been used to calculate the expected returns:
Where,
E(Ri) is the expected return on stock iat day t
    is the estimated intercept of market model for stock i
    is the estimated beta of market model for stock i
For each dividend announcement, abnormal returns are calculated after estimating the market model 
parameters, by using the following equation:
Where,
ARit is the stock i abnormal return at day t
Rit is the actual stock i return at day t
 Abnormal returns, in case of each event (dividend announcement), are calculated for all 
event windows. After calculation of abnormal returns, average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumula-
tive abnormal returns (CAAR) are calculated for all event windows. After calculating AAR and 
CAAR, univariate and multivariate analysis has been performed. Before performing univariate and 
multivariate analyses to test the association between dividend news and aforementioned independent 
variables, the significance of the AAR and CAAR of the event windows mentioned before has been 
checked by using student t-test on overall sample.  
 For univariate analysis, independent samples t-test has been used while for multivariate 
analysis, regression analysis has been performed. In univariate analysis, independent sample t-test has 
been performed on AAR and CAAR of lower 50th and upper 50th percentile of each variable (exclud-
ing family ownership in case of which test has been conducted on AAR and CAAR of family and 
non-family groups). In multivariate analysis, regression has been run by using both AAR and CAAR 
as dependent variables. The following are the regression equations with a full set of explanatory 
variables:
ARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e ……(1)
CAARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e…(2)
Where,
AARt is average abnormal return of specific event window
CAARt is cumulative average abnormal return of specific event window
β1 is the co-efficient of family and indicates relationship between family ownership and AARt and 
CAARt
β2 is the co-efficient of LMV (firm size) and indicates relationship between firm size and AARt and 
CAARt
β3 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β4 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β5is the co-efficient of growth opportunity (MV/BV) and indicates relationship between MV/BV and 
AARt and CAARt
 Before performing these formal tests to determine the relationship between four aforemen-
tioned independent variables and stock market reaction to dividend news, a series of diagnostic tests 
were conducted to identify problems in the data. Details of these diagnostic tests and remedial actions 
are not reported for the sake of parsimony.
Results and Discussion
T-tests Results
 Table 1 below reports mean values of AAR and CAAR for the event windows ranging from 
five days prior to dividend announcement to five days after dividend announcements. All tables in this 
paper were constructed using asdoc program of Shah (2018).
 Table 1 shows that p-values of mean values of AAR and CAAR are statistically significant 
only in few event windows. For example, AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, CAARt0, AARt-2, 
AARt-5 and CAARt-2 are significant at five percent level while CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant 
only at the 10 percent level. Averages of all these significant AARs and CAARs are positive which 
shows that market reacts positively to the announcements of dividend. Moreover, significance of 
AARt-2, CAARt-2, and AART-1 indicates leakage of information about the dividend announcements 
prior to announcement of these dividends. 
 For further analysis, those event windows have been used analysis that have significant 
AARs and CAARs. Therefore, we use AARt-2, AARt-5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, and CAARt0 as depen-
dent variables in the regressions analysis to test their relationship with the previously mentioned four 
explanatory variables.
Table 1
Means and T-Tests of the Abnormal Returns in Different Event Windows
Univariate Analyses
 
This section presents and discusses results of the t-tests to find whether firm-specific variables 
moderate reaction of stock market to dividend news. The median values of each firm-specific variable 
is used to divide firms into two above 50th and below 50th percentiles, except for family ownership 
for which the groups have been made based on family vs. non-family status of firms. Then AAR and 
CAAR have been calculated for these groups of firms. Table 2 reports that mean differences of these 
abnormal returns under the heading of each firm-specific variable that have been used for making 
group of firms. For example, the column with heading ‘Size shows the mean abnormal returns of 
firms that are in the 50th top percentile of firm size minus mean abnormal returns of firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile of firm size.
 The results show that family firms have lower abnormal returns than non-family firms. The 
p-values show that the mean differences are significant only in case of AARt-5 at one percent level of 
significance and in case AARt-2 at five percent level of significance. Results also show that reaction 
of stock market to dividend news is stronger for smaller firms as compared to larger firms.  This is 
evident from the column with the heading ‘Size’, showing that mean differences of CAARt-2 and 
CAARt0 are negative and statistically significant. Results also depicts that firm’s leverage ratio 
significantly moderates the dividend news effects. For example, mean differences in abnormal returns 
are significantly higher for dividend announcements in firms with lower leverage ratios as compared 
to firms that have high leverage ratios. Finally, there is some evidence that firms with lower dividend 
yield experience more reaction to dividend announcements as compared to firms with higher 
dividend yield.
This section presents and discusses results of the t-test to find
Table 2
Mean Differences in Return
Regressions Results
 Regression analysis results are reported in Table 3. The coefficients of the dummy variables 
used to indicate family firms are negative in all the event windows, except CAARt-1 where it is 
positive. In line with the results reported in univariate analysis, coefficient of family dummy is signifi-
cant and negative in AARt-2 and AARt-5 while it is insignificant in case of the rest of the event 
windows. It shows that announcement effects of family firms are weaker as compared to announce-
ment effects of non-family firms. This finding supports the agency theory explanation that family 
ownership reduces conflict between principal and agent and hence dividends lose its importance as a 
tool to reduce agency costs.
 The results show that the firm size coefficient is negative and statistically significant in case 
of CAARt-2 and CAAR0 while coefficients of abnormal returns in other event windows are insignifi-
cant. Result of the regression analysis supports the findings of univariate analysis as reported in Table 
2. These findings show that abnormal returns due to dividend announcements are significantly lower 
for firms that are placed in the top 50th percentile of the firm size as compared to the firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile. These results are in line with information asymmetric theory of Miller and 
Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and Williams (1985) that predicts that small firms face 
more information asymmetry problems and hence dividends are an effective tool for them in reducing 
information asymmetry costs.
Table 3
Regression Results
 Leverage coefficient is negative and significant in case of AARt+5, CAARt-2 and CAARt-1. 
These results indicate that negative relationship exists between leverage and dividend news effects. 
Our results support the free cash flow argument of agency theory which suggests that agency costs are 
lower in firms that have high leverage ratio; hence dividend announcement effects are weaker in such 
firms. Positive and statistically significant dividend yield coefficient is reported in case of AARt+5 
and CAARt0 while it is insignificant in all other event windows. Generally, the results suggest that 
firms with higher dividend yield experience strong dividend announcement effects. 
 MV/BV and P/E ratio have been used as alternative proxies for firm’s investment opportuni-
ties. Results in Table 3 show that MV/BV has no significant influence on the dividend announcement 
effects. This finding is consistent with Zakaria et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) who found no 
significant influence of this variable on dividend announcement effects. However, the second proxy 
for investment opportunities, the P/E ratio, has statistically significant negative coefficient in case of 
AARt-5 and CAARt-1. These findings suggest that dividend announcement effects are weaker for 
firms with higher growth opportunities and stronger for firms that have less investment opportunities. 
Conclusion
 This study has empirically sought to determine the relation between the dividend announce-
ment effects and the firm-specific factors including family ownership, dividend yield, firm size and 
leverage ratio of firms.  Results of two-sample t-test indicate that only AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, 
CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant, therefore, cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal returns 
of these event windows were used as dependent variables in the regression analysis. Both multiple 
regression and univariate analyses have been employed to determine the moderating role of the 
firm-specific independent variables on the market reaction to the dividend news. The results of both 
univariate and regression analyses are consistent. Negative relation is reported between the abnormal 
returns and the family ownership. It affirms that the stock market gives lesser importance to the 
dividend announcement of family firms than the announcements of non-family firms. This might be 
because of lower level of agency problems in the family firms as suggested by the Jensen and Meck-
ling’s (1976) agency hypothesis. Further, this study discovered a negative association between the size 
of the firm and the dividend news effect. This negative relation is explained by the information asym-
metry theory of John and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). This 
finding is in line with the finding of other empirical studies such as Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Andres 
et al. (2011), Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Amihud and Li (2006). Next, a negative association is found 
between the abnormal returns and the leverage. This negative association is in line with Jensen’s (1986) 
agency theory. Further, a positive relation is found between the dividend yield and the dividend abnor-
mal returns. Among the control variables, this study found that investment opportunities measured by 
MV/BV have no effect on the share price reaction to the dividend announcement while P/E ratio has 
significant negative effect on abnormal returns. These findings show that the reaction of the stock 
market to the dividend announcement is heterogeneous. Firms with significant agency problems and 
information asymmetry problems experience positive abnormal stock returns when they announce 
dividends. 
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Abstract
The finance literature reports mixed results about the dividend announcements and stock market 
reaction to those announcements. This study posits that the heterogeneous reaction of stock market to 
dividend announcements might be a result of several firm-specific financial and non-financial factors. 
In this vein, this study has tried to analyze the role of family-ownership, firm-size, leverage, and 
dividend yield in defining the dividend announcement effects. Using a sample of 206 dividend 
announcements of 136 firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period of 2008 to 2012, 
the results of both the univariate tests and the regression analysis show that the reaction of stock 
market to dividend announcements varies significantly across different groups of firms. Specifically, 
our results show that family ownership, firm-size, dividend yield and leverage significantly mediate  
the reaction of stock market around dividend announcement days. 
Keywords: Heterogeneous Reaction, Abnormal Returns, Family Ownership, Pakistan Stock 
Exchange.
JEL Classification: G 230
Introduction
 The corporate dividend policy have been a widely-debated subject in the domain of corpo-
rate finance and a large number of studies has explored different angles of dividend policy. One such 
angle is the stock market reaction to dividend announcements. Miller and Modigliani (1961), argues 
that dividend policy does not impact the firm value in perfect capital markets. However, Jensen’s 
(1986) Free Cash Flow (FCF) theory and Cash Flow Signaling Theory presented by Ross (1977), John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985) have rejected the argument of 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) by supporting notion that firm value is affected by dividend policy. Both 
these theories suggest positive correlation between dividend announcements and the reaction of the 
market to the dividend announcements. However, the empirical studies report mixed results regarding 
dividend announcement effects. 
1 Research Scholar at the Institute of Management Sciences, Peshawar, Pakistan
2 Associate Professor at Institute of Management Sciences, Peshawar, Pakistan.  Email: attaul-
lah.shah@imsciences.edu.pk
 Some studies including Aharony and Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976), Asquith and Mullins 
(1983), Gurgul et al. (2003), Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), Dasilas and Leventis (2011) have supported 
both these hypothesis by reporting positive abnormal returns around dividend announcement days. On 
the other hand, there are some other studies which have rejected the idea of positive correlation 
between the announcements of dividend and the sub-sequent stock market price reaction (Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 2002; Chen, Firth and Gao, 2002; Vieira, 2005; and 
Hossain, Siddiquee and Rahman, 2006). These studies have found no significant evidence of associa-
tion between dividend announcements and reaction of stock market to these announcements. Further, 
some studies even have reported evidences of negative correlation between the announcements of 
dividend and the sub-sequent stock market share price reaction (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, 
Keown and Pinkerton, 1984; and Healy, Hathorn and Kirch, 1997).
 These mixed results of the past studies might be an outcome of different factors that mediates 
the dividend announcement effects. A number of factors are identified by literature that affects the 
dividend announcement effects. Baker, Powell and Veit (2002) and Baker and Powell (1999) have 
highlighted that firm specific factors may impact the association between the dividend announce-
ments and the sub-sequent reaction of stock market. Further, La Porta et al. (2000), and Ball et al. 
(2000) have argued that the ownership structure also plays a vital role in explaining the dividends 
information content and in turn the reaction of market to dividend announcements. 
 A number of studies, including Eddy and Seifert (1988), Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) Haw 
and Kim (1991), Healy et al. (1997), Said (2012), Vieira (2011), around the globe have tried to empiri-
cal test the association between different factors and dividend announcement effects. However, in 
Pakistan, no study until the date has tried to empirically figure out the variables that affect the 
dividend announcement effects of Pakistani firms. In this context, this study has made an attempt to 
determine the variables that explains the information content of dividends of Pakistani firms. Particu-
larly, this study has focused on the firm-specific factors and more specifically the firm size, ownership 
composition of a firm (whether a firm is family and non-family), leverage ratio and dividend yield.
Literature Review 
 This section presents the literature review of the past studies. First, the literature review of 
those studies has been discussed which focuses on association between the dividend announcements 
and the share price reaction. Later the focus is shifted to factors that moderate the above-mentioned 
relationship. 
 
Stock Market Reaction to Dividend Announcements
 A large number of researchers have analyzed the dividend policy and its impact on the value 
of thefirm since the seminal work of Miller and Modigliani (1961). They have used different theories 
to describe the link between the firm value and the dividend policy. Two prominent theories out of 
these are free cash flow (FCF) theory of Jensen (1986) and cash flow signaling (CFS) theory. CFS 
theory which is also called asymmetric information theory has been developed by a number of 
researchers including Ross (1977), Miller and Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and 
Williams (1985). This theory proposes that the firm’s managers, as compared to shareholders (inves-
tors), have more private information about the firm’s future prospects and they signal this private 
information to the market via dividend changes. Hence, when increase in dividends is announced by 
a firm, the stock market assumes that the future prospects of that particular firm are good and hence 
reacts positively. On the other hand, when a firm cuts dividend, the stock market assumes that the 
future prospects of that particular firm are not good and hence reacts negatively, which results in lower 
share prices of the firm. Therefore, in the context of CFS, it is expected that the stock market will react 
positively whenever dividends are announced by a firm. 
 The second theory i.e. FCF theory was developed by Jensen (1986) and is based on the 
agency relationship between managers and shareholders. This theory suggests that dividend plays a 
disciplinary role for the firm’s management. Distribution of free cash flows in the form of dividends 
decreases the conflict between managers and shareholders by making it less likely for managers to 
invest free cash flows in projects that have negative net present value. According to this argument, 
dividend announcements should result in increase in the stock prices. Therefore, like CFS theory, this 
theory also predicts positive correlation between dividend announcements and prices of stock.
 The empirical support for both the theories is mixed. Several studies including Aharony and 
Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976),  Gurgul et al. (2003), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Dasilas and 
Leventis (2011), and Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), have supported both these theories by reporting 
significant abnormal returns around announcement days. On other hand, other studies have reported 
evidence that does not support these theories (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 
2002; Vieira, 2005; Hossain et al., 2006; and Chen, et al., 2002). These studies have found no signifi-
cant abnormal returns around announcement dates. Further, some studies even have reported evidenc-
es of negative correlation between the dividend announcements and the subsequent reaction of stock 
market (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, et al., 1984; and Healy et al., 1997).
Moderating Role of Firm-Specific Factors
 Literature suggests that the mixed evidence as discussed above might be an outcome of 
different factors that moderates the stock market response to the dividend announcements. These 
factors include firm size, family ownership, leverage and dividend yield. We discuss these factors in 
details in the following paragraphs.
Family ownership
 Capulong et al. (2000) has stated that ownership composition and ownership concentration 
are the two key important dimensions of corporate ownership structures. Concentration of ownership 
deals with the distribution of power between the shareholders and the managers while on the other 
hand, composition of ownership deals with the identity of shareholders of a company and specifically 
the large shareholders. A large shareholder (also called block-holder) can be government, holding 
company, individual, bank, institutional investor or family. Thus, broadly speaking there are two 
categories of ownership composition: the family block-holder and non-family block-holder. Accord-
ing to Holderness and Sheehan (1988), and Gugler (2001), family block holder has different motiva-
tions and incentives to monitor the managers. Gorton and Kahl (1999) have argued that as compared 
to non-family block-holder, the family block-holders have greater incentive of monitoring the manag-
ers. Due to the better monitoring, the family block-holders affect the reaction of stock market to 
dividends announcements.  
 There are two leading theories that explain the relationship of family ownership with 
dividend announcements effects. These include the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory 
and Leland and Pyle’s (1977) general signaling theory. Under the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
agency cost model, it is argued that due to the better monitoring efforts of family owners, sharehold-
ers-managers interests are better aligned which reduces the agency conflicts and the agency costs. 
Therefore, if reducing agency conflicts is the motivation behind the announcement of dividend chang-
es, then the firms with family block-holder will experience weaker dividend announcement effects as 
compared to the firms with non-family block-holder. Under general Leland and Pyle’s (1977) theory 
of general signaling, it is argued that due to the better monitoring of managers by the family 
block-holders, the credibility of the manager’s decisions and the signals that they convey to the 
market increases. Therefore, due to higher credibility, the firms with family block-holders will experi-
ence stronger dividend announcement effects as compared to firms with non-family block-holder.
 Unlike the ownership concentration, only few researchers have empirically analyzed the 
dividend announcement effects in the context of family and non-family ownership. Therefore, this 
area is relatively unexplored and not enough evidences are available on this area. Recently, research-
ers have started exploring the relation between family ownership on dividend announcement effects. 
Setia-Atmaja, et al. (2004) are the first researchers who have analyzed the role of family ownership in 
mediating the dividend announcement effects in Australian environment. They reported positive 
relationship between family firms and dividend announcement effects. Contrary to Setia-Atmaja, et 
al. (2004), Vieira (2012) has reported no evidence from Portuguese Environment. 
 As discussed above, the agency cost theory predicts negative relationship while general 
signaling model predicts positive correlation between family ownership and dividend news effects. 
Hence, this study has formulated the following two competing hypothesis regarding relationship 
between family ownership and dividend announcement effects. 
H1a: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are negatively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are less than abnormal returns associ-
ated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
H1b: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are positively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are greater than abnormal returns 
associated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
Firm size
 The literature has identified the firm size as another potential variable that moderate the 
dividend announcement effects. The role of the size of the firm in determining the dividend announce-
ment effects can be described in the context of signaling or asymmetric information theory of John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). Under this theory, it is assert-
ed that as information asymmetry between equity holders and managers of firm is greater in case of 
the small size firms as compared to firms with large size; therefore, when small size firm tries to 
distribute more dividends, for the purpose of conveying signals to the outside investors about their 
future prospects, will experience greater dividend announcement effects. Therefore, in this context, 
negative relationship exists between the size of the firm and the dividend news effect.
 Empirical studies reports mixed results about the firm size relationship with the dividend 
announcement effects. Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Eddy and Seifert (1988) have reported negative 
association from the U.S. Amihud and Li (2006) and Yoon and Starks (1995). Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003) and Andres et al. (2011) have also supported signaling theory by reporting negative association 
from German environment. Vieira (2011), by utilizing the data of the UK, Portuguese and the French 
markets, have provided further evidence from the European market. She has reported interesting 
results. Her study found that dividend announcement effect is negatively correlated with the firm size 
only in the UK market while her study reported no evidence of significant association in the French 
and Portugal markets. Hussainey et al. (2011) and Zakaria et al. (2012) have also reported the same 
results from the U.K and the Malaysian Markets. 
 Based the on above literature and information asymmetric theory, this study has tested the 
following hypothesis:
H2: Reaction of stock market to the dividend news is negatively associated with the firm size. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of small-sized firms are greater than the abnormal 
returns associated with the dividend announcement of the large-sized firms.
Leverage
 Leverage is another firm specific variable that is identified by the literature as a potential 
determinant of the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Said (2012) and Vieira (2011) has 
defined leverage as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets. The role of leverage in determining 
the dividend announcement effects is explained both by Jensen’s (1986) version of FCF agency cost 
argument and signaling explanation of Ross (1977). Using Jensen’s (1986) argument, Borokhovich et 
al. (2005) have highlighted that the agency costs are lower in the firms that have higher debt ratios as 
managers in these firms are left with little cash flows under their discretions due to the payment of the 
debt and financial expenses. Therefore, dividends role in reducing agency costs is limited in these 
firms and hence a weaker dividend announcement effects will be experienced by the firm with higher 
leverage ratios. Under the second argument i.e. signaling theory of Ross (1977), it is argued that firms 
with good quality try to differentiate themselves from bad quality firms by using high leverage ratio. 
Therefore, investors interpret the dividend signals of the companies with higher leverage ratios as 
favorable as the investors anticipate that the managers of such good quality firm will be able to contin-
ue paying dividends in the future. 
 Empirical results regarding the association of the dividend news effects with leverage are 
mixed. Few studies have supported cash flow or agency theory by reporting negative association 
(Healy et al., 1997; and Alonso et al., 2005). Contrarily, Allen and Rachim (1996), Vieira (2011) and 
Zakaria et al. (2012) have supported signaling theory by reporting positive relation between the 
dividend announcement effects and leverage. 
 
 Literature suggests that the agency cost argument generally favors Pakistani environment 
more than the signaling theory regarding the role of leverage in determining different factors related 
to corporate finance and corporate performance (Nazir and Saita, 2013; Khan, Kaleem and Nazir, 
2012; and Satti, 2013). However, this study has tested two hypotheses based on the agency and the 
signaling theory in the light of empirical results reported from different countries. 
H3a: Negative association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are greater as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of the firms with high level of leverage.
H3b: Positive association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to the 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are lesser as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of firms with high level of leverage.
Dividend yield
 Dividend yield is one of the main factors that affect abnormal returns around dividend 
announcement days (Yoon and Starks, 1995; and Lee and Yan; 2003). The impact of dividend yield 
on share price reaction to dividend news can be explained in the context of agency cost and signaling 
theories. Both of the theories predict positive association between dividend announcement effects and 
dividend yield (Ariff and Finn, 1986; Lee, 1995; and Belde et al., 2005). Under the agency cost frame-
work, it is argued that high dividend yield helps in reducing agency conflicts in the firm. Hence, 
keeping other variables constant, the higher the dividend yield associated with the dividend announce-
ment, the stronger will be the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Contrarily, under the signal-
ing theory, it is argued that high dividend yield depicts that future prospects of a firm are good, there-
fore, dividend announcements that are accompanied by high dividend yield are perceived as a more 
favorable signal as compared to a dividend announcement with low dividend yield. Hence, a dividend 
announcement with high dividend yield induces stronger stock market reaction. 
 The earning response coefficient is dependent upon the earning retention rate, among other 
variables. Butler and Han (1994) argues that the share price reaction to the announcements is a 
function of earning surprise and earning response coefficient. They use dividend yield as a proxy for 
earning retention rate because actual earnings’ retention rate can go to unreasonable range if a firm has 
zero earnings or negative earnings. Dividend yield has been calculated as the per share dividend divid-
ed by the price of share five days before the announcement of dividend. Based on the above literature, 
this study has tested the following hypothesis:
H4: Positive association exists between the dividend yield and the dividend announcement effects. 
Hence, abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcements of the firms that are accompa-
nied by higher dividend yield will be greater as compared to the dividend announcement of the firms 
that are accompanied by lower dividend yield.
Growth opportunities
 Different studies have used growth opportunity as a control variable while examining 
relationship between different factors and stock market reaction to the dividend news (Vieira, 2005; 
Zakaria et al., 2012; Vieira, 2011; Neil and Robert, 2009; Vieira, 2012 and Andres et al., 2011). Past 
studies including Vieira (2011) and Andres et al. (2011) have used Tobin’s Q as a measure of inves-
tors’ expectation about the growth prospect of a firm and market to book value of equity (MV/BV) 
ratio as a proxy of Tobin’s Q. Thus, MV/BV has been used as a proxy of growth opportunity by this 
study also. According to Vieira (2011), high MV/BV shows that investors think that the firm has 
higher future growth prospects. Firms with lower MV/BV ratios are considered to have higher level 
of free cash flow and thus will be able to pay more dividends. Therefore, reaction of stock market is 
more strong to dividend news of firms that have lower MV/BV ratio, hence negative coefficient is 
expected for this variable. Among the past studies that have used MV/BV as control variable, Zakaria 
et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) have found no significant influence of this variable on the stock 
market reaction to the dividend news while Vieira (2011), Neil and Robert (2009) and Vieira (2005) 
have found negative relationship between  MV/BV and the dividend news effects. Apart from MV/BV 
ratio, this study also used price to earnings (P/E) ratio as proxy for investment opportunities by 
following Basu (1977) and Reinganum (1981). Both these studies reported negative association.
 
Methodology
Sample and Data Sources
 This section discusses the data sources, the data collection methods, the data analysis tools, 
and variables. For the purpose of the data collection, this study used simple random sampling 
technique. The sampling period ranges from year 2008 to 2012. During this sampling period, 136 
firms announced 206 annual dividends. Therefore, we analyze 206 annual dividend announcements of 
136 firms over the above-mentioned sampling period.
 The data of dividend announcements and the stock prices have been extracted from the KSE 
database. Data about the firm-specific variables and ownership structure were gathered from the 
annual reports of the firms.
Model Specification
 For testing the association of the above-mentioned variables with the dividend news effects, 
this study has utilized standard event study methodology. For generating abnormal returns market 
model has been utilized. Equation of the market model is specified as under:
Where,
Ritis return rate of security i at day t
Rmtis the rate of return of market at day t
αiis constant
βi isthe sensitivity of the expected asset return to the expected market return calculated as
 For the purpose of estimating the parameters of market model, 100 daily continuously 
compounded returns are used which ranged from approximately 145 days before the announcement 
date. KSE-100 Index is used as a market proxy. Ordinary least square method has been utilized for 
estimating the market model parameters. After estimating the parameters of market model, the follow-
ing equation has been used to calculate the expected returns:
Where,
E(Ri) is the expected return on stock iat day t
    is the estimated intercept of market model for stock i
    is the estimated beta of market model for stock i
For each dividend announcement, abnormal returns are calculated after estimating the market model 
parameters, by using the following equation:
Where,
ARit is the stock i abnormal return at day t
Rit is the actual stock i return at day t
 Abnormal returns, in case of each event (dividend announcement), are calculated for all 
event windows. After calculation of abnormal returns, average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumula-
tive abnormal returns (CAAR) are calculated for all event windows. After calculating AAR and 
CAAR, univariate and multivariate analysis has been performed. Before performing univariate and 
multivariate analyses to test the association between dividend news and aforementioned independent 
variables, the significance of the AAR and CAAR of the event windows mentioned before has been 
checked by using student t-test on overall sample.  
 For univariate analysis, independent samples t-test has been used while for multivariate 
analysis, regression analysis has been performed. In univariate analysis, independent sample t-test has 
been performed on AAR and CAAR of lower 50th and upper 50th percentile of each variable (exclud-
ing family ownership in case of which test has been conducted on AAR and CAAR of family and 
non-family groups). In multivariate analysis, regression has been run by using both AAR and CAAR 
as dependent variables. The following are the regression equations with a full set of explanatory 
variables:
ARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e ……(1)
CAARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e…(2)
Where,
AARt is average abnormal return of specific event window
CAARt is cumulative average abnormal return of specific event window
β1 is the co-efficient of family and indicates relationship between family ownership and AARt and 
CAARt
β2 is the co-efficient of LMV (firm size) and indicates relationship between firm size and AARt and 
CAARt
β3 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β4 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β5is the co-efficient of growth opportunity (MV/BV) and indicates relationship between MV/BV and 
AARt and CAARt
 Before performing these formal tests to determine the relationship between four aforemen-
tioned independent variables and stock market reaction to dividend news, a series of diagnostic tests 
were conducted to identify problems in the data. Details of these diagnostic tests and remedial actions 
are not reported for the sake of parsimony.
Results and Discussion
T-tests Results
 Table 1 below reports mean values of AAR and CAAR for the event windows ranging from 
five days prior to dividend announcement to five days after dividend announcements. All tables in this 
paper were constructed using asdoc program of Shah (2018).
 Table 1 shows that p-values of mean values of AAR and CAAR are statistically significant 
only in few event windows. For example, AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, CAARt0, AARt-2, 
AARt-5 and CAARt-2 are significant at five percent level while CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant 
only at the 10 percent level. Averages of all these significant AARs and CAARs are positive which 
shows that market reacts positively to the announcements of dividend. Moreover, significance of 
AARt-2, CAARt-2, and AART-1 indicates leakage of information about the dividend announcements 
prior to announcement of these dividends. 
 For further analysis, those event windows have been used analysis that have significant 
AARs and CAARs. Therefore, we use AARt-2, AARt-5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, and CAARt0 as depen-
dent variables in the regressions analysis to test their relationship with the previously mentioned four 
explanatory variables.
Table 1
Means and T-Tests of the Abnormal Returns in Different Event Windows
Univariate Analyses
 
This section presents and discusses results of the t-tests to find whether firm-specific variables 
moderate reaction of stock market to dividend news. The median values of each firm-specific variable 
is used to divide firms into two above 50th and below 50th percentiles, except for family ownership 
for which the groups have been made based on family vs. non-family status of firms. Then AAR and 
CAAR have been calculated for these groups of firms. Table 2 reports that mean differences of these 
abnormal returns under the heading of each firm-specific variable that have been used for making 
group of firms. For example, the column with heading ‘Size shows the mean abnormal returns of 
firms that are in the 50th top percentile of firm size minus mean abnormal returns of firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile of firm size.
 The results show that family firms have lower abnormal returns than non-family firms. The 
p-values show that the mean differences are significant only in case of AARt-5 at one percent level of 
significance and in case AARt-2 at five percent level of significance. Results also show that reaction 
of stock market to dividend news is stronger for smaller firms as compared to larger firms.  This is 
evident from the column with the heading ‘Size’, showing that mean differences of CAARt-2 and 
CAARt0 are negative and statistically significant. Results also depicts that firm’s leverage ratio 
significantly moderates the dividend news effects. For example, mean differences in abnormal returns 
are significantly higher for dividend announcements in firms with lower leverage ratios as compared 
to firms that have high leverage ratios. Finally, there is some evidence that firms with lower dividend 
yield experience more reaction to dividend announcements as compared to firms with higher 
dividend yield.
This section presents and discusses results of the t-test to find
Table 2
Mean Differences in Return
Regressions Results
 Regression analysis results are reported in Table 3. The coefficients of the dummy variables 
used to indicate family firms are negative in all the event windows, except CAARt-1 where it is 
positive. In line with the results reported in univariate analysis, coefficient of family dummy is signifi-
cant and negative in AARt-2 and AARt-5 while it is insignificant in case of the rest of the event 
windows. It shows that announcement effects of family firms are weaker as compared to announce-
ment effects of non-family firms. This finding supports the agency theory explanation that family 
ownership reduces conflict between principal and agent and hence dividends lose its importance as a 
tool to reduce agency costs.
 The results show that the firm size coefficient is negative and statistically significant in case 
of CAARt-2 and CAAR0 while coefficients of abnormal returns in other event windows are insignifi-
cant. Result of the regression analysis supports the findings of univariate analysis as reported in Table 
2. These findings show that abnormal returns due to dividend announcements are significantly lower 
for firms that are placed in the top 50th percentile of the firm size as compared to the firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile. These results are in line with information asymmetric theory of Miller and 
Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and Williams (1985) that predicts that small firms face 
more information asymmetry problems and hence dividends are an effective tool for them in reducing 
information asymmetry costs.
Table 3
Regression Results
 Leverage coefficient is negative and significant in case of AARt+5, CAARt-2 and CAARt-1. 
These results indicate that negative relationship exists between leverage and dividend news effects. 
Our results support the free cash flow argument of agency theory which suggests that agency costs are 
lower in firms that have high leverage ratio; hence dividend announcement effects are weaker in such 
firms. Positive and statistically significant dividend yield coefficient is reported in case of AARt+5 
and CAARt0 while it is insignificant in all other event windows. Generally, the results suggest that 
firms with higher dividend yield experience strong dividend announcement effects. 
 MV/BV and P/E ratio have been used as alternative proxies for firm’s investment opportuni-
ties. Results in Table 3 show that MV/BV has no significant influence on the dividend announcement 
effects. This finding is consistent with Zakaria et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) who found no 
significant influence of this variable on dividend announcement effects. However, the second proxy 
for investment opportunities, the P/E ratio, has statistically significant negative coefficient in case of 
AARt-5 and CAARt-1. These findings suggest that dividend announcement effects are weaker for 
firms with higher growth opportunities and stronger for firms that have less investment opportunities. 
Conclusion
 This study has empirically sought to determine the relation between the dividend announce-
ment effects and the firm-specific factors including family ownership, dividend yield, firm size and 
leverage ratio of firms.  Results of two-sample t-test indicate that only AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, 
CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant, therefore, cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal returns 
of these event windows were used as dependent variables in the regression analysis. Both multiple 
regression and univariate analyses have been employed to determine the moderating role of the 
firm-specific independent variables on the market reaction to the dividend news. The results of both 
univariate and regression analyses are consistent. Negative relation is reported between the abnormal 
returns and the family ownership. It affirms that the stock market gives lesser importance to the 
dividend announcement of family firms than the announcements of non-family firms. This might be 
because of lower level of agency problems in the family firms as suggested by the Jensen and Meck-
ling’s (1976) agency hypothesis. Further, this study discovered a negative association between the size 
of the firm and the dividend news effect. This negative relation is explained by the information asym-
metry theory of John and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). This 
finding is in line with the finding of other empirical studies such as Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Andres 
et al. (2011), Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Amihud and Li (2006). Next, a negative association is found 
between the abnormal returns and the leverage. This negative association is in line with Jensen’s (1986) 
agency theory. Further, a positive relation is found between the dividend yield and the dividend abnor-
mal returns. Among the control variables, this study found that investment opportunities measured by 
MV/BV have no effect on the share price reaction to the dividend announcement while P/E ratio has 
significant negative effect on abnormal returns. These findings show that the reaction of the stock 
market to the dividend announcement is heterogeneous. Firms with significant agency problems and 
information asymmetry problems experience positive abnormal stock returns when they announce 
dividends. 
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THE ROLE OF FIRM-SPECIFIC VARIABLES IN 
EXPLAINING HETEROGENEOUS STOCK 
MARKET REACTIONS TO DIVIDEND
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Abstract
The finance literature reports mixed results about the dividend announcements and stock market 
reaction to those announcements. This study posits that the heterogeneous reaction of stock market to 
dividend announcements might be a result of several firm-specific financial and non-financial factors. 
In this vein, this study has tried to analyze the role of family-ownership, firm-size, leverage, and 
dividend yield in defining the dividend announcement effects. Using a sample of 206 dividend 
announcements of 136 firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period of 2008 to 2012, 
the results of both the univariate tests and the regression analysis show that the reaction of stock 
market to dividend announcements varies significantly across different groups of firms. Specifically, 
our results show that family ownership, firm-size, dividend yield and leverage significantly mediate  
the reaction of stock market around dividend announcement days. 
Keywords: Heterogeneous Reaction, Abnormal Returns, Family Ownership, Pakistan Stock 
Exchange.
JEL Classification: G 230
Introduction
 The corporate dividend policy have been a widely-debated subject in the domain of corpo-
rate finance and a large number of studies has explored different angles of dividend policy. One such 
angle is the stock market reaction to dividend announcements. Miller and Modigliani (1961), argues 
that dividend policy does not impact the firm value in perfect capital markets. However, Jensen’s 
(1986) Free Cash Flow (FCF) theory and Cash Flow Signaling Theory presented by Ross (1977), John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985) have rejected the argument of 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) by supporting notion that firm value is affected by dividend policy. Both 
these theories suggest positive correlation between dividend announcements and the reaction of the 
market to the dividend announcements. However, the empirical studies report mixed results regarding 
dividend announcement effects. 
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 Some studies including Aharony and Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976), Asquith and Mullins 
(1983), Gurgul et al. (2003), Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), Dasilas and Leventis (2011) have supported 
both these hypothesis by reporting positive abnormal returns around dividend announcement days. On 
the other hand, there are some other studies which have rejected the idea of positive correlation 
between the announcements of dividend and the sub-sequent stock market price reaction (Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 2002; Chen, Firth and Gao, 2002; Vieira, 2005; and 
Hossain, Siddiquee and Rahman, 2006). These studies have found no significant evidence of associa-
tion between dividend announcements and reaction of stock market to these announcements. Further, 
some studies even have reported evidences of negative correlation between the announcements of 
dividend and the sub-sequent stock market share price reaction (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, 
Keown and Pinkerton, 1984; and Healy, Hathorn and Kirch, 1997).
 These mixed results of the past studies might be an outcome of different factors that mediates 
the dividend announcement effects. A number of factors are identified by literature that affects the 
dividend announcement effects. Baker, Powell and Veit (2002) and Baker and Powell (1999) have 
highlighted that firm specific factors may impact the association between the dividend announce-
ments and the sub-sequent reaction of stock market. Further, La Porta et al. (2000), and Ball et al. 
(2000) have argued that the ownership structure also plays a vital role in explaining the dividends 
information content and in turn the reaction of market to dividend announcements. 
 A number of studies, including Eddy and Seifert (1988), Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) Haw 
and Kim (1991), Healy et al. (1997), Said (2012), Vieira (2011), around the globe have tried to empiri-
cal test the association between different factors and dividend announcement effects. However, in 
Pakistan, no study until the date has tried to empirically figure out the variables that affect the 
dividend announcement effects of Pakistani firms. In this context, this study has made an attempt to 
determine the variables that explains the information content of dividends of Pakistani firms. Particu-
larly, this study has focused on the firm-specific factors and more specifically the firm size, ownership 
composition of a firm (whether a firm is family and non-family), leverage ratio and dividend yield.
Literature Review 
 This section presents the literature review of the past studies. First, the literature review of 
those studies has been discussed which focuses on association between the dividend announcements 
and the share price reaction. Later the focus is shifted to factors that moderate the above-mentioned 
relationship. 
 
Stock Market Reaction to Dividend Announcements
 A large number of researchers have analyzed the dividend policy and its impact on the value 
of thefirm since the seminal work of Miller and Modigliani (1961). They have used different theories 
to describe the link between the firm value and the dividend policy. Two prominent theories out of 
these are free cash flow (FCF) theory of Jensen (1986) and cash flow signaling (CFS) theory. CFS 
theory which is also called asymmetric information theory has been developed by a number of 
researchers including Ross (1977), Miller and Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and 
Williams (1985). This theory proposes that the firm’s managers, as compared to shareholders (inves-
tors), have more private information about the firm’s future prospects and they signal this private 
information to the market via dividend changes. Hence, when increase in dividends is announced by 
a firm, the stock market assumes that the future prospects of that particular firm are good and hence 
reacts positively. On the other hand, when a firm cuts dividend, the stock market assumes that the 
future prospects of that particular firm are not good and hence reacts negatively, which results in lower 
share prices of the firm. Therefore, in the context of CFS, it is expected that the stock market will react 
positively whenever dividends are announced by a firm. 
 The second theory i.e. FCF theory was developed by Jensen (1986) and is based on the 
agency relationship between managers and shareholders. This theory suggests that dividend plays a 
disciplinary role for the firm’s management. Distribution of free cash flows in the form of dividends 
decreases the conflict between managers and shareholders by making it less likely for managers to 
invest free cash flows in projects that have negative net present value. According to this argument, 
dividend announcements should result in increase in the stock prices. Therefore, like CFS theory, this 
theory also predicts positive correlation between dividend announcements and prices of stock.
 The empirical support for both the theories is mixed. Several studies including Aharony and 
Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976),  Gurgul et al. (2003), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Dasilas and 
Leventis (2011), and Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), have supported both these theories by reporting 
significant abnormal returns around announcement days. On other hand, other studies have reported 
evidence that does not support these theories (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 
2002; Vieira, 2005; Hossain et al., 2006; and Chen, et al., 2002). These studies have found no signifi-
cant abnormal returns around announcement dates. Further, some studies even have reported evidenc-
es of negative correlation between the dividend announcements and the subsequent reaction of stock 
market (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, et al., 1984; and Healy et al., 1997).
Moderating Role of Firm-Specific Factors
 Literature suggests that the mixed evidence as discussed above might be an outcome of 
different factors that moderates the stock market response to the dividend announcements. These 
factors include firm size, family ownership, leverage and dividend yield. We discuss these factors in 
details in the following paragraphs.
Family ownership
 Capulong et al. (2000) has stated that ownership composition and ownership concentration 
are the two key important dimensions of corporate ownership structures. Concentration of ownership 
deals with the distribution of power between the shareholders and the managers while on the other 
hand, composition of ownership deals with the identity of shareholders of a company and specifically 
the large shareholders. A large shareholder (also called block-holder) can be government, holding 
company, individual, bank, institutional investor or family. Thus, broadly speaking there are two 
categories of ownership composition: the family block-holder and non-family block-holder. Accord-
ing to Holderness and Sheehan (1988), and Gugler (2001), family block holder has different motiva-
tions and incentives to monitor the managers. Gorton and Kahl (1999) have argued that as compared 
to non-family block-holder, the family block-holders have greater incentive of monitoring the manag-
ers. Due to the better monitoring, the family block-holders affect the reaction of stock market to 
dividends announcements.  
 There are two leading theories that explain the relationship of family ownership with 
dividend announcements effects. These include the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory 
and Leland and Pyle’s (1977) general signaling theory. Under the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
agency cost model, it is argued that due to the better monitoring efforts of family owners, sharehold-
ers-managers interests are better aligned which reduces the agency conflicts and the agency costs. 
Therefore, if reducing agency conflicts is the motivation behind the announcement of dividend chang-
es, then the firms with family block-holder will experience weaker dividend announcement effects as 
compared to the firms with non-family block-holder. Under general Leland and Pyle’s (1977) theory 
of general signaling, it is argued that due to the better monitoring of managers by the family 
block-holders, the credibility of the manager’s decisions and the signals that they convey to the 
market increases. Therefore, due to higher credibility, the firms with family block-holders will experi-
ence stronger dividend announcement effects as compared to firms with non-family block-holder.
 Unlike the ownership concentration, only few researchers have empirically analyzed the 
dividend announcement effects in the context of family and non-family ownership. Therefore, this 
area is relatively unexplored and not enough evidences are available on this area. Recently, research-
ers have started exploring the relation between family ownership on dividend announcement effects. 
Setia-Atmaja, et al. (2004) are the first researchers who have analyzed the role of family ownership in 
mediating the dividend announcement effects in Australian environment. They reported positive 
relationship between family firms and dividend announcement effects. Contrary to Setia-Atmaja, et 
al. (2004), Vieira (2012) has reported no evidence from Portuguese Environment. 
 As discussed above, the agency cost theory predicts negative relationship while general 
signaling model predicts positive correlation between family ownership and dividend news effects. 
Hence, this study has formulated the following two competing hypothesis regarding relationship 
between family ownership and dividend announcement effects. 
H1a: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are negatively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are less than abnormal returns associ-
ated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
H1b: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are positively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are greater than abnormal returns 
associated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
Firm size
 The literature has identified the firm size as another potential variable that moderate the 
dividend announcement effects. The role of the size of the firm in determining the dividend announce-
ment effects can be described in the context of signaling or asymmetric information theory of John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). Under this theory, it is assert-
ed that as information asymmetry between equity holders and managers of firm is greater in case of 
the small size firms as compared to firms with large size; therefore, when small size firm tries to 
distribute more dividends, for the purpose of conveying signals to the outside investors about their 
future prospects, will experience greater dividend announcement effects. Therefore, in this context, 
negative relationship exists between the size of the firm and the dividend news effect.
 Empirical studies reports mixed results about the firm size relationship with the dividend 
announcement effects. Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Eddy and Seifert (1988) have reported negative 
association from the U.S. Amihud and Li (2006) and Yoon and Starks (1995). Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003) and Andres et al. (2011) have also supported signaling theory by reporting negative association 
from German environment. Vieira (2011), by utilizing the data of the UK, Portuguese and the French 
markets, have provided further evidence from the European market. She has reported interesting 
results. Her study found that dividend announcement effect is negatively correlated with the firm size 
only in the UK market while her study reported no evidence of significant association in the French 
and Portugal markets. Hussainey et al. (2011) and Zakaria et al. (2012) have also reported the same 
results from the U.K and the Malaysian Markets. 
 Based the on above literature and information asymmetric theory, this study has tested the 
following hypothesis:
H2: Reaction of stock market to the dividend news is negatively associated with the firm size. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of small-sized firms are greater than the abnormal 
returns associated with the dividend announcement of the large-sized firms.
Leverage
 Leverage is another firm specific variable that is identified by the literature as a potential 
determinant of the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Said (2012) and Vieira (2011) has 
defined leverage as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets. The role of leverage in determining 
the dividend announcement effects is explained both by Jensen’s (1986) version of FCF agency cost 
argument and signaling explanation of Ross (1977). Using Jensen’s (1986) argument, Borokhovich et 
al. (2005) have highlighted that the agency costs are lower in the firms that have higher debt ratios as 
managers in these firms are left with little cash flows under their discretions due to the payment of the 
debt and financial expenses. Therefore, dividends role in reducing agency costs is limited in these 
firms and hence a weaker dividend announcement effects will be experienced by the firm with higher 
leverage ratios. Under the second argument i.e. signaling theory of Ross (1977), it is argued that firms 
with good quality try to differentiate themselves from bad quality firms by using high leverage ratio. 
Therefore, investors interpret the dividend signals of the companies with higher leverage ratios as 
favorable as the investors anticipate that the managers of such good quality firm will be able to contin-
ue paying dividends in the future. 
 Empirical results regarding the association of the dividend news effects with leverage are 
mixed. Few studies have supported cash flow or agency theory by reporting negative association 
(Healy et al., 1997; and Alonso et al., 2005). Contrarily, Allen and Rachim (1996), Vieira (2011) and 
Zakaria et al. (2012) have supported signaling theory by reporting positive relation between the 
dividend announcement effects and leverage. 
 
 Literature suggests that the agency cost argument generally favors Pakistani environment 
more than the signaling theory regarding the role of leverage in determining different factors related 
to corporate finance and corporate performance (Nazir and Saita, 2013; Khan, Kaleem and Nazir, 
2012; and Satti, 2013). However, this study has tested two hypotheses based on the agency and the 
signaling theory in the light of empirical results reported from different countries. 
H3a: Negative association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are greater as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of the firms with high level of leverage.
H3b: Positive association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to the 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are lesser as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of firms with high level of leverage.
Dividend yield
 Dividend yield is one of the main factors that affect abnormal returns around dividend 
announcement days (Yoon and Starks, 1995; and Lee and Yan; 2003). The impact of dividend yield 
on share price reaction to dividend news can be explained in the context of agency cost and signaling 
theories. Both of the theories predict positive association between dividend announcement effects and 
dividend yield (Ariff and Finn, 1986; Lee, 1995; and Belde et al., 2005). Under the agency cost frame-
work, it is argued that high dividend yield helps in reducing agency conflicts in the firm. Hence, 
keeping other variables constant, the higher the dividend yield associated with the dividend announce-
ment, the stronger will be the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Contrarily, under the signal-
ing theory, it is argued that high dividend yield depicts that future prospects of a firm are good, there-
fore, dividend announcements that are accompanied by high dividend yield are perceived as a more 
favorable signal as compared to a dividend announcement with low dividend yield. Hence, a dividend 
announcement with high dividend yield induces stronger stock market reaction. 
 The earning response coefficient is dependent upon the earning retention rate, among other 
variables. Butler and Han (1994) argues that the share price reaction to the announcements is a 
function of earning surprise and earning response coefficient. They use dividend yield as a proxy for 
earning retention rate because actual earnings’ retention rate can go to unreasonable range if a firm has 
zero earnings or negative earnings. Dividend yield has been calculated as the per share dividend divid-
ed by the price of share five days before the announcement of dividend. Based on the above literature, 
this study has tested the following hypothesis:
H4: Positive association exists between the dividend yield and the dividend announcement effects. 
Hence, abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcements of the firms that are accompa-
nied by higher dividend yield will be greater as compared to the dividend announcement of the firms 
that are accompanied by lower dividend yield.
Growth opportunities
 Different studies have used growth opportunity as a control variable while examining 
relationship between different factors and stock market reaction to the dividend news (Vieira, 2005; 
Zakaria et al., 2012; Vieira, 2011; Neil and Robert, 2009; Vieira, 2012 and Andres et al., 2011). Past 
studies including Vieira (2011) and Andres et al. (2011) have used Tobin’s Q as a measure of inves-
tors’ expectation about the growth prospect of a firm and market to book value of equity (MV/BV) 
ratio as a proxy of Tobin’s Q. Thus, MV/BV has been used as a proxy of growth opportunity by this 
study also. According to Vieira (2011), high MV/BV shows that investors think that the firm has 
higher future growth prospects. Firms with lower MV/BV ratios are considered to have higher level 
of free cash flow and thus will be able to pay more dividends. Therefore, reaction of stock market is 
more strong to dividend news of firms that have lower MV/BV ratio, hence negative coefficient is 
expected for this variable. Among the past studies that have used MV/BV as control variable, Zakaria 
et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) have found no significant influence of this variable on the stock 
market reaction to the dividend news while Vieira (2011), Neil and Robert (2009) and Vieira (2005) 
have found negative relationship between  MV/BV and the dividend news effects. Apart from MV/BV 
ratio, this study also used price to earnings (P/E) ratio as proxy for investment opportunities by 
following Basu (1977) and Reinganum (1981). Both these studies reported negative association.
 
Methodology
Sample and Data Sources
 This section discusses the data sources, the data collection methods, the data analysis tools, 
and variables. For the purpose of the data collection, this study used simple random sampling 
technique. The sampling period ranges from year 2008 to 2012. During this sampling period, 136 
firms announced 206 annual dividends. Therefore, we analyze 206 annual dividend announcements of 
136 firms over the above-mentioned sampling period.
 The data of dividend announcements and the stock prices have been extracted from the KSE 
database. Data about the firm-specific variables and ownership structure were gathered from the 
annual reports of the firms.
Model Specification
 For testing the association of the above-mentioned variables with the dividend news effects, 
this study has utilized standard event study methodology. For generating abnormal returns market 
model has been utilized. Equation of the market model is specified as under:
Where,
Ritis return rate of security i at day t
Rmtis the rate of return of market at day t
αiis constant
βi isthe sensitivity of the expected asset return to the expected market return calculated as
 For the purpose of estimating the parameters of market model, 100 daily continuously 
compounded returns are used which ranged from approximately 145 days before the announcement 
date. KSE-100 Index is used as a market proxy. Ordinary least square method has been utilized for 
estimating the market model parameters. After estimating the parameters of market model, the follow-
ing equation has been used to calculate the expected returns:
Where,
E(Ri) is the expected return on stock iat day t
    is the estimated intercept of market model for stock i
    is the estimated beta of market model for stock i
For each dividend announcement, abnormal returns are calculated after estimating the market model 
parameters, by using the following equation:
Where,
ARit is the stock i abnormal return at day t
Rit is the actual stock i return at day t
 Abnormal returns, in case of each event (dividend announcement), are calculated for all 
event windows. After calculation of abnormal returns, average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumula-
tive abnormal returns (CAAR) are calculated for all event windows. After calculating AAR and 
CAAR, univariate and multivariate analysis has been performed. Before performing univariate and 
multivariate analyses to test the association between dividend news and aforementioned independent 
variables, the significance of the AAR and CAAR of the event windows mentioned before has been 
checked by using student t-test on overall sample.  
 For univariate analysis, independent samples t-test has been used while for multivariate 
analysis, regression analysis has been performed. In univariate analysis, independent sample t-test has 
been performed on AAR and CAAR of lower 50th and upper 50th percentile of each variable (exclud-
ing family ownership in case of which test has been conducted on AAR and CAAR of family and 
non-family groups). In multivariate analysis, regression has been run by using both AAR and CAAR 
as dependent variables. The following are the regression equations with a full set of explanatory 
variables:
ARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e ……(1)
CAARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e…(2)
Where,
AARt is average abnormal return of specific event window
CAARt is cumulative average abnormal return of specific event window
β1 is the co-efficient of family and indicates relationship between family ownership and AARt and 
CAARt
β2 is the co-efficient of LMV (firm size) and indicates relationship between firm size and AARt and 
CAARt
β3 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β4 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β5is the co-efficient of growth opportunity (MV/BV) and indicates relationship between MV/BV and 
AARt and CAARt
 Before performing these formal tests to determine the relationship between four aforemen-
tioned independent variables and stock market reaction to dividend news, a series of diagnostic tests 
were conducted to identify problems in the data. Details of these diagnostic tests and remedial actions 
are not reported for the sake of parsimony.
Results and Discussion
T-tests Results
 Table 1 below reports mean values of AAR and CAAR for the event windows ranging from 
five days prior to dividend announcement to five days after dividend announcements. All tables in this 
paper were constructed using asdoc program of Shah (2018).
 Table 1 shows that p-values of mean values of AAR and CAAR are statistically significant 
only in few event windows. For example, AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, CAARt0, AARt-2, 
AARt-5 and CAARt-2 are significant at five percent level while CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant 
only at the 10 percent level. Averages of all these significant AARs and CAARs are positive which 
shows that market reacts positively to the announcements of dividend. Moreover, significance of 
AARt-2, CAARt-2, and AART-1 indicates leakage of information about the dividend announcements 
prior to announcement of these dividends. 
 For further analysis, those event windows have been used analysis that have significant 
AARs and CAARs. Therefore, we use AARt-2, AARt-5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, and CAARt0 as depen-
dent variables in the regressions analysis to test their relationship with the previously mentioned four 
explanatory variables.
Table 1
Means and T-Tests of the Abnormal Returns in Different Event Windows
Univariate Analyses
 
This section presents and discusses results of the t-tests to find whether firm-specific variables 
moderate reaction of stock market to dividend news. The median values of each firm-specific variable 
is used to divide firms into two above 50th and below 50th percentiles, except for family ownership 
for which the groups have been made based on family vs. non-family status of firms. Then AAR and 
CAAR have been calculated for these groups of firms. Table 2 reports that mean differences of these 
abnormal returns under the heading of each firm-specific variable that have been used for making 
group of firms. For example, the column with heading ‘Size shows the mean abnormal returns of 
firms that are in the 50th top percentile of firm size minus mean abnormal returns of firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile of firm size.
 The results show that family firms have lower abnormal returns than non-family firms. The 
p-values show that the mean differences are significant only in case of AARt-5 at one percent level of 
significance and in case AARt-2 at five percent level of significance. Results also show that reaction 
of stock market to dividend news is stronger for smaller firms as compared to larger firms.  This is 
evident from the column with the heading ‘Size’, showing that mean differences of CAARt-2 and 
CAARt0 are negative and statistically significant. Results also depicts that firm’s leverage ratio 
significantly moderates the dividend news effects. For example, mean differences in abnormal returns 
are significantly higher for dividend announcements in firms with lower leverage ratios as compared 
to firms that have high leverage ratios. Finally, there is some evidence that firms with lower dividend 
yield experience more reaction to dividend announcements as compared to firms with higher 
dividend yield.
This section presents and discusses results of the t-test to find
Table 2
Mean Differences in Return
Regressions Results
 Regression analysis results are reported in Table 3. The coefficients of the dummy variables 
used to indicate family firms are negative in all the event windows, except CAARt-1 where it is 
positive. In line with the results reported in univariate analysis, coefficient of family dummy is signifi-
cant and negative in AARt-2 and AARt-5 while it is insignificant in case of the rest of the event 
windows. It shows that announcement effects of family firms are weaker as compared to announce-
ment effects of non-family firms. This finding supports the agency theory explanation that family 
ownership reduces conflict between principal and agent and hence dividends lose its importance as a 
tool to reduce agency costs.
 The results show that the firm size coefficient is negative and statistically significant in case 
of CAARt-2 and CAAR0 while coefficients of abnormal returns in other event windows are insignifi-
cant. Result of the regression analysis supports the findings of univariate analysis as reported in Table 
2. These findings show that abnormal returns due to dividend announcements are significantly lower 
for firms that are placed in the top 50th percentile of the firm size as compared to the firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile. These results are in line with information asymmetric theory of Miller and 
Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and Williams (1985) that predicts that small firms face 
more information asymmetry problems and hence dividends are an effective tool for them in reducing 
information asymmetry costs.
Table 3
Regression Results
 Leverage coefficient is negative and significant in case of AARt+5, CAARt-2 and CAARt-1. 
These results indicate that negative relationship exists between leverage and dividend news effects. 
Our results support the free cash flow argument of agency theory which suggests that agency costs are 
lower in firms that have high leverage ratio; hence dividend announcement effects are weaker in such 
firms. Positive and statistically significant dividend yield coefficient is reported in case of AARt+5 
and CAARt0 while it is insignificant in all other event windows. Generally, the results suggest that 
firms with higher dividend yield experience strong dividend announcement effects. 
 MV/BV and P/E ratio have been used as alternative proxies for firm’s investment opportuni-
ties. Results in Table 3 show that MV/BV has no significant influence on the dividend announcement 
effects. This finding is consistent with Zakaria et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) who found no 
significant influence of this variable on dividend announcement effects. However, the second proxy 
for investment opportunities, the P/E ratio, has statistically significant negative coefficient in case of 
AARt-5 and CAARt-1. These findings suggest that dividend announcement effects are weaker for 
firms with higher growth opportunities and stronger for firms that have less investment opportunities. 
Conclusion
 This study has empirically sought to determine the relation between the dividend announce-
ment effects and the firm-specific factors including family ownership, dividend yield, firm size and 
leverage ratio of firms.  Results of two-sample t-test indicate that only AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, 
CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant, therefore, cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal returns 
of these event windows were used as dependent variables in the regression analysis. Both multiple 
regression and univariate analyses have been employed to determine the moderating role of the 
firm-specific independent variables on the market reaction to the dividend news. The results of both 
univariate and regression analyses are consistent. Negative relation is reported between the abnormal 
returns and the family ownership. It affirms that the stock market gives lesser importance to the 
dividend announcement of family firms than the announcements of non-family firms. This might be 
because of lower level of agency problems in the family firms as suggested by the Jensen and Meck-
ling’s (1976) agency hypothesis. Further, this study discovered a negative association between the size 
of the firm and the dividend news effect. This negative relation is explained by the information asym-
metry theory of John and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). This 
finding is in line with the finding of other empirical studies such as Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Andres 
et al. (2011), Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Amihud and Li (2006). Next, a negative association is found 
between the abnormal returns and the leverage. This negative association is in line with Jensen’s (1986) 
agency theory. Further, a positive relation is found between the dividend yield and the dividend abnor-
mal returns. Among the control variables, this study found that investment opportunities measured by 
MV/BV have no effect on the share price reaction to the dividend announcement while P/E ratio has 
significant negative effect on abnormal returns. These findings show that the reaction of the stock 
market to the dividend announcement is heterogeneous. Firms with significant agency problems and 
information asymmetry problems experience positive abnormal stock returns when they announce 
dividends. 
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THE ROLE OF FIRM-SPECIFIC VARIABLES IN 
EXPLAINING HETEROGENEOUS STOCK 
MARKET REACTIONS TO DIVIDEND
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Abstract
The finance literature reports mixed results about the dividend announcements and stock market 
reaction to those announcements. This study posits that the heterogeneous reaction of stock market to 
dividend announcements might be a result of several firm-specific financial and non-financial factors. 
In this vein, this study has tried to analyze the role of family-ownership, firm-size, leverage, and 
dividend yield in defining the dividend announcement effects. Using a sample of 206 dividend 
announcements of 136 firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period of 2008 to 2012, 
the results of both the univariate tests and the regression analysis show that the reaction of stock 
market to dividend announcements varies significantly across different groups of firms. Specifically, 
our results show that family ownership, firm-size, dividend yield and leverage significantly mediate  
the reaction of stock market around dividend announcement days. 
Keywords: Heterogeneous Reaction, Abnormal Returns, Family Ownership, Pakistan Stock 
Exchange.
JEL Classification: G 230
Introduction
 The corporate dividend policy have been a widely-debated subject in the domain of corpo-
rate finance and a large number of studies has explored different angles of dividend policy. One such 
angle is the stock market reaction to dividend announcements. Miller and Modigliani (1961), argues 
that dividend policy does not impact the firm value in perfect capital markets. However, Jensen’s 
(1986) Free Cash Flow (FCF) theory and Cash Flow Signaling Theory presented by Ross (1977), John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985) have rejected the argument of 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) by supporting notion that firm value is affected by dividend policy. Both 
these theories suggest positive correlation between dividend announcements and the reaction of the 
market to the dividend announcements. However, the empirical studies report mixed results regarding 
dividend announcement effects. 
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 Some studies including Aharony and Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976), Asquith and Mullins 
(1983), Gurgul et al. (2003), Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), Dasilas and Leventis (2011) have supported 
both these hypothesis by reporting positive abnormal returns around dividend announcement days. On 
the other hand, there are some other studies which have rejected the idea of positive correlation 
between the announcements of dividend and the sub-sequent stock market price reaction (Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 2002; Chen, Firth and Gao, 2002; Vieira, 2005; and 
Hossain, Siddiquee and Rahman, 2006). These studies have found no significant evidence of associa-
tion between dividend announcements and reaction of stock market to these announcements. Further, 
some studies even have reported evidences of negative correlation between the announcements of 
dividend and the sub-sequent stock market share price reaction (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, 
Keown and Pinkerton, 1984; and Healy, Hathorn and Kirch, 1997).
 These mixed results of the past studies might be an outcome of different factors that mediates 
the dividend announcement effects. A number of factors are identified by literature that affects the 
dividend announcement effects. Baker, Powell and Veit (2002) and Baker and Powell (1999) have 
highlighted that firm specific factors may impact the association between the dividend announce-
ments and the sub-sequent reaction of stock market. Further, La Porta et al. (2000), and Ball et al. 
(2000) have argued that the ownership structure also plays a vital role in explaining the dividends 
information content and in turn the reaction of market to dividend announcements. 
 A number of studies, including Eddy and Seifert (1988), Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) Haw 
and Kim (1991), Healy et al. (1997), Said (2012), Vieira (2011), around the globe have tried to empiri-
cal test the association between different factors and dividend announcement effects. However, in 
Pakistan, no study until the date has tried to empirically figure out the variables that affect the 
dividend announcement effects of Pakistani firms. In this context, this study has made an attempt to 
determine the variables that explains the information content of dividends of Pakistani firms. Particu-
larly, this study has focused on the firm-specific factors and more specifically the firm size, ownership 
composition of a firm (whether a firm is family and non-family), leverage ratio and dividend yield.
Literature Review 
 This section presents the literature review of the past studies. First, the literature review of 
those studies has been discussed which focuses on association between the dividend announcements 
and the share price reaction. Later the focus is shifted to factors that moderate the above-mentioned 
relationship. 
 
Stock Market Reaction to Dividend Announcements
 A large number of researchers have analyzed the dividend policy and its impact on the value 
of thefirm since the seminal work of Miller and Modigliani (1961). They have used different theories 
to describe the link between the firm value and the dividend policy. Two prominent theories out of 
these are free cash flow (FCF) theory of Jensen (1986) and cash flow signaling (CFS) theory. CFS 
theory which is also called asymmetric information theory has been developed by a number of 
researchers including Ross (1977), Miller and Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and 
Williams (1985). This theory proposes that the firm’s managers, as compared to shareholders (inves-
tors), have more private information about the firm’s future prospects and they signal this private 
information to the market via dividend changes. Hence, when increase in dividends is announced by 
a firm, the stock market assumes that the future prospects of that particular firm are good and hence 
reacts positively. On the other hand, when a firm cuts dividend, the stock market assumes that the 
future prospects of that particular firm are not good and hence reacts negatively, which results in lower 
share prices of the firm. Therefore, in the context of CFS, it is expected that the stock market will react 
positively whenever dividends are announced by a firm. 
 The second theory i.e. FCF theory was developed by Jensen (1986) and is based on the 
agency relationship between managers and shareholders. This theory suggests that dividend plays a 
disciplinary role for the firm’s management. Distribution of free cash flows in the form of dividends 
decreases the conflict between managers and shareholders by making it less likely for managers to 
invest free cash flows in projects that have negative net present value. According to this argument, 
dividend announcements should result in increase in the stock prices. Therefore, like CFS theory, this 
theory also predicts positive correlation between dividend announcements and prices of stock.
 The empirical support for both the theories is mixed. Several studies including Aharony and 
Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976),  Gurgul et al. (2003), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Dasilas and 
Leventis (2011), and Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), have supported both these theories by reporting 
significant abnormal returns around announcement days. On other hand, other studies have reported 
evidence that does not support these theories (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 
2002; Vieira, 2005; Hossain et al., 2006; and Chen, et al., 2002). These studies have found no signifi-
cant abnormal returns around announcement dates. Further, some studies even have reported evidenc-
es of negative correlation between the dividend announcements and the subsequent reaction of stock 
market (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, et al., 1984; and Healy et al., 1997).
Moderating Role of Firm-Specific Factors
 Literature suggests that the mixed evidence as discussed above might be an outcome of 
different factors that moderates the stock market response to the dividend announcements. These 
factors include firm size, family ownership, leverage and dividend yield. We discuss these factors in 
details in the following paragraphs.
Family ownership
 Capulong et al. (2000) has stated that ownership composition and ownership concentration 
are the two key important dimensions of corporate ownership structures. Concentration of ownership 
deals with the distribution of power between the shareholders and the managers while on the other 
hand, composition of ownership deals with the identity of shareholders of a company and specifically 
the large shareholders. A large shareholder (also called block-holder) can be government, holding 
company, individual, bank, institutional investor or family. Thus, broadly speaking there are two 
categories of ownership composition: the family block-holder and non-family block-holder. Accord-
ing to Holderness and Sheehan (1988), and Gugler (2001), family block holder has different motiva-
tions and incentives to monitor the managers. Gorton and Kahl (1999) have argued that as compared 
to non-family block-holder, the family block-holders have greater incentive of monitoring the manag-
ers. Due to the better monitoring, the family block-holders affect the reaction of stock market to 
dividends announcements.  
 There are two leading theories that explain the relationship of family ownership with 
dividend announcements effects. These include the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory 
and Leland and Pyle’s (1977) general signaling theory. Under the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
agency cost model, it is argued that due to the better monitoring efforts of family owners, sharehold-
ers-managers interests are better aligned which reduces the agency conflicts and the agency costs. 
Therefore, if reducing agency conflicts is the motivation behind the announcement of dividend chang-
es, then the firms with family block-holder will experience weaker dividend announcement effects as 
compared to the firms with non-family block-holder. Under general Leland and Pyle’s (1977) theory 
of general signaling, it is argued that due to the better monitoring of managers by the family 
block-holders, the credibility of the manager’s decisions and the signals that they convey to the 
market increases. Therefore, due to higher credibility, the firms with family block-holders will experi-
ence stronger dividend announcement effects as compared to firms with non-family block-holder.
 Unlike the ownership concentration, only few researchers have empirically analyzed the 
dividend announcement effects in the context of family and non-family ownership. Therefore, this 
area is relatively unexplored and not enough evidences are available on this area. Recently, research-
ers have started exploring the relation between family ownership on dividend announcement effects. 
Setia-Atmaja, et al. (2004) are the first researchers who have analyzed the role of family ownership in 
mediating the dividend announcement effects in Australian environment. They reported positive 
relationship between family firms and dividend announcement effects. Contrary to Setia-Atmaja, et 
al. (2004), Vieira (2012) has reported no evidence from Portuguese Environment. 
 As discussed above, the agency cost theory predicts negative relationship while general 
signaling model predicts positive correlation between family ownership and dividend news effects. 
Hence, this study has formulated the following two competing hypothesis regarding relationship 
between family ownership and dividend announcement effects. 
H1a: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are negatively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are less than abnormal returns associ-
ated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
H1b: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are positively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are greater than abnormal returns 
associated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
Firm size
 The literature has identified the firm size as another potential variable that moderate the 
dividend announcement effects. The role of the size of the firm in determining the dividend announce-
ment effects can be described in the context of signaling or asymmetric information theory of John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). Under this theory, it is assert-
ed that as information asymmetry between equity holders and managers of firm is greater in case of 
the small size firms as compared to firms with large size; therefore, when small size firm tries to 
distribute more dividends, for the purpose of conveying signals to the outside investors about their 
future prospects, will experience greater dividend announcement effects. Therefore, in this context, 
negative relationship exists between the size of the firm and the dividend news effect.
 Empirical studies reports mixed results about the firm size relationship with the dividend 
announcement effects. Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Eddy and Seifert (1988) have reported negative 
association from the U.S. Amihud and Li (2006) and Yoon and Starks (1995). Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003) and Andres et al. (2011) have also supported signaling theory by reporting negative association 
from German environment. Vieira (2011), by utilizing the data of the UK, Portuguese and the French 
markets, have provided further evidence from the European market. She has reported interesting 
results. Her study found that dividend announcement effect is negatively correlated with the firm size 
only in the UK market while her study reported no evidence of significant association in the French 
and Portugal markets. Hussainey et al. (2011) and Zakaria et al. (2012) have also reported the same 
results from the U.K and the Malaysian Markets. 
 Based the on above literature and information asymmetric theory, this study has tested the 
following hypothesis:
H2: Reaction of stock market to the dividend news is negatively associated with the firm size. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of small-sized firms are greater than the abnormal 
returns associated with the dividend announcement of the large-sized firms.
Leverage
 Leverage is another firm specific variable that is identified by the literature as a potential 
determinant of the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Said (2012) and Vieira (2011) has 
defined leverage as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets. The role of leverage in determining 
the dividend announcement effects is explained both by Jensen’s (1986) version of FCF agency cost 
argument and signaling explanation of Ross (1977). Using Jensen’s (1986) argument, Borokhovich et 
al. (2005) have highlighted that the agency costs are lower in the firms that have higher debt ratios as 
managers in these firms are left with little cash flows under their discretions due to the payment of the 
debt and financial expenses. Therefore, dividends role in reducing agency costs is limited in these 
firms and hence a weaker dividend announcement effects will be experienced by the firm with higher 
leverage ratios. Under the second argument i.e. signaling theory of Ross (1977), it is argued that firms 
with good quality try to differentiate themselves from bad quality firms by using high leverage ratio. 
Therefore, investors interpret the dividend signals of the companies with higher leverage ratios as 
favorable as the investors anticipate that the managers of such good quality firm will be able to contin-
ue paying dividends in the future. 
 Empirical results regarding the association of the dividend news effects with leverage are 
mixed. Few studies have supported cash flow or agency theory by reporting negative association 
(Healy et al., 1997; and Alonso et al., 2005). Contrarily, Allen and Rachim (1996), Vieira (2011) and 
Zakaria et al. (2012) have supported signaling theory by reporting positive relation between the 
dividend announcement effects and leverage. 
 
 Literature suggests that the agency cost argument generally favors Pakistani environment 
more than the signaling theory regarding the role of leverage in determining different factors related 
to corporate finance and corporate performance (Nazir and Saita, 2013; Khan, Kaleem and Nazir, 
2012; and Satti, 2013). However, this study has tested two hypotheses based on the agency and the 
signaling theory in the light of empirical results reported from different countries. 
H3a: Negative association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are greater as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of the firms with high level of leverage.
H3b: Positive association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to the 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are lesser as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of firms with high level of leverage.
Dividend yield
 Dividend yield is one of the main factors that affect abnormal returns around dividend 
announcement days (Yoon and Starks, 1995; and Lee and Yan; 2003). The impact of dividend yield 
on share price reaction to dividend news can be explained in the context of agency cost and signaling 
theories. Both of the theories predict positive association between dividend announcement effects and 
dividend yield (Ariff and Finn, 1986; Lee, 1995; and Belde et al., 2005). Under the agency cost frame-
work, it is argued that high dividend yield helps in reducing agency conflicts in the firm. Hence, 
keeping other variables constant, the higher the dividend yield associated with the dividend announce-
ment, the stronger will be the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Contrarily, under the signal-
ing theory, it is argued that high dividend yield depicts that future prospects of a firm are good, there-
fore, dividend announcements that are accompanied by high dividend yield are perceived as a more 
favorable signal as compared to a dividend announcement with low dividend yield. Hence, a dividend 
announcement with high dividend yield induces stronger stock market reaction. 
 The earning response coefficient is dependent upon the earning retention rate, among other 
variables. Butler and Han (1994) argues that the share price reaction to the announcements is a 
function of earning surprise and earning response coefficient. They use dividend yield as a proxy for 
earning retention rate because actual earnings’ retention rate can go to unreasonable range if a firm has 
zero earnings or negative earnings. Dividend yield has been calculated as the per share dividend divid-
ed by the price of share five days before the announcement of dividend. Based on the above literature, 
this study has tested the following hypothesis:
H4: Positive association exists between the dividend yield and the dividend announcement effects. 
Hence, abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcements of the firms that are accompa-
nied by higher dividend yield will be greater as compared to the dividend announcement of the firms 
that are accompanied by lower dividend yield.
Growth opportunities
 Different studies have used growth opportunity as a control variable while examining 
relationship between different factors and stock market reaction to the dividend news (Vieira, 2005; 
Zakaria et al., 2012; Vieira, 2011; Neil and Robert, 2009; Vieira, 2012 and Andres et al., 2011). Past 
studies including Vieira (2011) and Andres et al. (2011) have used Tobin’s Q as a measure of inves-
tors’ expectation about the growth prospect of a firm and market to book value of equity (MV/BV) 
ratio as a proxy of Tobin’s Q. Thus, MV/BV has been used as a proxy of growth opportunity by this 
study also. According to Vieira (2011), high MV/BV shows that investors think that the firm has 
higher future growth prospects. Firms with lower MV/BV ratios are considered to have higher level 
of free cash flow and thus will be able to pay more dividends. Therefore, reaction of stock market is 
more strong to dividend news of firms that have lower MV/BV ratio, hence negative coefficient is 
expected for this variable. Among the past studies that have used MV/BV as control variable, Zakaria 
et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) have found no significant influence of this variable on the stock 
market reaction to the dividend news while Vieira (2011), Neil and Robert (2009) and Vieira (2005) 
have found negative relationship between  MV/BV and the dividend news effects. Apart from MV/BV 
ratio, this study also used price to earnings (P/E) ratio as proxy for investment opportunities by 
following Basu (1977) and Reinganum (1981). Both these studies reported negative association.
 
Methodology
Sample and Data Sources
 This section discusses the data sources, the data collection methods, the data analysis tools, 
and variables. For the purpose of the data collection, this study used simple random sampling 
technique. The sampling period ranges from year 2008 to 2012. During this sampling period, 136 
firms announced 206 annual dividends. Therefore, we analyze 206 annual dividend announcements of 
136 firms over the above-mentioned sampling period.
 The data of dividend announcements and the stock prices have been extracted from the KSE 
database. Data about the firm-specific variables and ownership structure were gathered from the 
annual reports of the firms.
Model Specification
 For testing the association of the above-mentioned variables with the dividend news effects, 
this study has utilized standard event study methodology. For generating abnormal returns market 
model has been utilized. Equation of the market model is specified as under:
Where,
Ritis return rate of security i at day t
Rmtis the rate of return of market at day t
αiis constant
βi isthe sensitivity of the expected asset return to the expected market return calculated as
 For the purpose of estimating the parameters of market model, 100 daily continuously 
compounded returns are used which ranged from approximately 145 days before the announcement 
date. KSE-100 Index is used as a market proxy. Ordinary least square method has been utilized for 
estimating the market model parameters. After estimating the parameters of market model, the follow-
ing equation has been used to calculate the expected returns:
Where,
E(Ri) is the expected return on stock iat day t
    is the estimated intercept of market model for stock i
    is the estimated beta of market model for stock i
For each dividend announcement, abnormal returns are calculated after estimating the market model 
parameters, by using the following equation:
Where,
ARit is the stock i abnormal return at day t
Rit is the actual stock i return at day t
 Abnormal returns, in case of each event (dividend announcement), are calculated for all 
event windows. After calculation of abnormal returns, average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumula-
tive abnormal returns (CAAR) are calculated for all event windows. After calculating AAR and 
CAAR, univariate and multivariate analysis has been performed. Before performing univariate and 
multivariate analyses to test the association between dividend news and aforementioned independent 
variables, the significance of the AAR and CAAR of the event windows mentioned before has been 
checked by using student t-test on overall sample.  
 For univariate analysis, independent samples t-test has been used while for multivariate 
analysis, regression analysis has been performed. In univariate analysis, independent sample t-test has 
been performed on AAR and CAAR of lower 50th and upper 50th percentile of each variable (exclud-
ing family ownership in case of which test has been conducted on AAR and CAAR of family and 
non-family groups). In multivariate analysis, regression has been run by using both AAR and CAAR 
as dependent variables. The following are the regression equations with a full set of explanatory 
variables:
ARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e ……(1)
CAARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e…(2)
Where,
AARt is average abnormal return of specific event window
CAARt is cumulative average abnormal return of specific event window
β1 is the co-efficient of family and indicates relationship between family ownership and AARt and 
CAARt
β2 is the co-efficient of LMV (firm size) and indicates relationship between firm size and AARt and 
CAARt
β3 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β4 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β5is the co-efficient of growth opportunity (MV/BV) and indicates relationship between MV/BV and 
AARt and CAARt
 Before performing these formal tests to determine the relationship between four aforemen-
tioned independent variables and stock market reaction to dividend news, a series of diagnostic tests 
were conducted to identify problems in the data. Details of these diagnostic tests and remedial actions 
are not reported for the sake of parsimony.
Results and Discussion
T-tests Results
 Table 1 below reports mean values of AAR and CAAR for the event windows ranging from 
five days prior to dividend announcement to five days after dividend announcements. All tables in this 
paper were constructed using asdoc program of Shah (2018).
 Table 1 shows that p-values of mean values of AAR and CAAR are statistically significant 
only in few event windows. For example, AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, CAARt0, AARt-2, 
AARt-5 and CAARt-2 are significant at five percent level while CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant 
only at the 10 percent level. Averages of all these significant AARs and CAARs are positive which 
shows that market reacts positively to the announcements of dividend. Moreover, significance of 
AARt-2, CAARt-2, and AART-1 indicates leakage of information about the dividend announcements 
prior to announcement of these dividends. 
 For further analysis, those event windows have been used analysis that have significant 
AARs and CAARs. Therefore, we use AARt-2, AARt-5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, and CAARt0 as depen-
dent variables in the regressions analysis to test their relationship with the previously mentioned four 
explanatory variables.
Table 1
Means and T-Tests of the Abnormal Returns in Different Event Windows
Univariate Analyses
 
This section presents and discusses results of the t-tests to find whether firm-specific variables 
moderate reaction of stock market to dividend news. The median values of each firm-specific variable 
is used to divide firms into two above 50th and below 50th percentiles, except for family ownership 
for which the groups have been made based on family vs. non-family status of firms. Then AAR and 
CAAR have been calculated for these groups of firms. Table 2 reports that mean differences of these 
abnormal returns under the heading of each firm-specific variable that have been used for making 
group of firms. For example, the column with heading ‘Size shows the mean abnormal returns of 
firms that are in the 50th top percentile of firm size minus mean abnormal returns of firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile of firm size.
 The results show that family firms have lower abnormal returns than non-family firms. The 
p-values show that the mean differences are significant only in case of AARt-5 at one percent level of 
significance and in case AARt-2 at five percent level of significance. Results also show that reaction 
of stock market to dividend news is stronger for smaller firms as compared to larger firms.  This is 
evident from the column with the heading ‘Size’, showing that mean differences of CAARt-2 and 
CAARt0 are negative and statistically significant. Results also depicts that firm’s leverage ratio 
significantly moderates the dividend news effects. For example, mean differences in abnormal returns 
are significantly higher for dividend announcements in firms with lower leverage ratios as compared 
to firms that have high leverage ratios. Finally, there is some evidence that firms with lower dividend 
yield experience more reaction to dividend announcements as compared to firms with higher 
dividend yield.
This section presents and discusses results of the t-test to find
Table 2
Mean Differences in Return
Regressions Results
 Regression analysis results are reported in Table 3. The coefficients of the dummy variables 
used to indicate family firms are negative in all the event windows, except CAARt-1 where it is 
positive. In line with the results reported in univariate analysis, coefficient of family dummy is signifi-
cant and negative in AARt-2 and AARt-5 while it is insignificant in case of the rest of the event 
windows. It shows that announcement effects of family firms are weaker as compared to announce-
ment effects of non-family firms. This finding supports the agency theory explanation that family 
ownership reduces conflict between principal and agent and hence dividends lose its importance as a 
tool to reduce agency costs.
 The results show that the firm size coefficient is negative and statistically significant in case 
of CAARt-2 and CAAR0 while coefficients of abnormal returns in other event windows are insignifi-
cant. Result of the regression analysis supports the findings of univariate analysis as reported in Table 
2. These findings show that abnormal returns due to dividend announcements are significantly lower 
for firms that are placed in the top 50th percentile of the firm size as compared to the firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile. These results are in line with information asymmetric theory of Miller and 
Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and Williams (1985) that predicts that small firms face 
more information asymmetry problems and hence dividends are an effective tool for them in reducing 
information asymmetry costs.
Table 3
Regression Results
 Leverage coefficient is negative and significant in case of AARt+5, CAARt-2 and CAARt-1. 
These results indicate that negative relationship exists between leverage and dividend news effects. 
Our results support the free cash flow argument of agency theory which suggests that agency costs are 
lower in firms that have high leverage ratio; hence dividend announcement effects are weaker in such 
firms. Positive and statistically significant dividend yield coefficient is reported in case of AARt+5 
and CAARt0 while it is insignificant in all other event windows. Generally, the results suggest that 
firms with higher dividend yield experience strong dividend announcement effects. 
 MV/BV and P/E ratio have been used as alternative proxies for firm’s investment opportuni-
ties. Results in Table 3 show that MV/BV has no significant influence on the dividend announcement 
effects. This finding is consistent with Zakaria et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) who found no 
significant influence of this variable on dividend announcement effects. However, the second proxy 
for investment opportunities, the P/E ratio, has statistically significant negative coefficient in case of 
AARt-5 and CAARt-1. These findings suggest that dividend announcement effects are weaker for 
firms with higher growth opportunities and stronger for firms that have less investment opportunities. 
Conclusion
 This study has empirically sought to determine the relation between the dividend announce-
ment effects and the firm-specific factors including family ownership, dividend yield, firm size and 
leverage ratio of firms.  Results of two-sample t-test indicate that only AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, 
CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant, therefore, cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal returns 
of these event windows were used as dependent variables in the regression analysis. Both multiple 
regression and univariate analyses have been employed to determine the moderating role of the 
firm-specific independent variables on the market reaction to the dividend news. The results of both 
univariate and regression analyses are consistent. Negative relation is reported between the abnormal 
returns and the family ownership. It affirms that the stock market gives lesser importance to the 
dividend announcement of family firms than the announcements of non-family firms. This might be 
because of lower level of agency problems in the family firms as suggested by the Jensen and Meck-
ling’s (1976) agency hypothesis. Further, this study discovered a negative association between the size 
of the firm and the dividend news effect. This negative relation is explained by the information asym-
metry theory of John and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). This 
finding is in line with the finding of other empirical studies such as Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Andres 
et al. (2011), Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Amihud and Li (2006). Next, a negative association is found 
between the abnormal returns and the leverage. This negative association is in line with Jensen’s (1986) 
agency theory. Further, a positive relation is found between the dividend yield and the dividend abnor-
mal returns. Among the control variables, this study found that investment opportunities measured by 
MV/BV have no effect on the share price reaction to the dividend announcement while P/E ratio has 
significant negative effect on abnormal returns. These findings show that the reaction of the stock 
market to the dividend announcement is heterogeneous. Firms with significant agency problems and 
information asymmetry problems experience positive abnormal stock returns when they announce 
dividends. 
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Abstract
The finance literature reports mixed results about the dividend announcements and stock market 
reaction to those announcements. This study posits that the heterogeneous reaction of stock market to 
dividend announcements might be a result of several firm-specific financial and non-financial factors. 
In this vein, this study has tried to analyze the role of family-ownership, firm-size, leverage, and 
dividend yield in defining the dividend announcement effects. Using a sample of 206 dividend 
announcements of 136 firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period of 2008 to 2012, 
the results of both the univariate tests and the regression analysis show that the reaction of stock 
market to dividend announcements varies significantly across different groups of firms. Specifically, 
our results show that family ownership, firm-size, dividend yield and leverage significantly mediate  
the reaction of stock market around dividend announcement days. 
Keywords: Heterogeneous Reaction, Abnormal Returns, Family Ownership, Pakistan Stock 
Exchange.
JEL Classification: G 230
Introduction
 The corporate dividend policy have been a widely-debated subject in the domain of corpo-
rate finance and a large number of studies has explored different angles of dividend policy. One such 
angle is the stock market reaction to dividend announcements. Miller and Modigliani (1961), argues 
that dividend policy does not impact the firm value in perfect capital markets. However, Jensen’s 
(1986) Free Cash Flow (FCF) theory and Cash Flow Signaling Theory presented by Ross (1977), John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985) have rejected the argument of 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) by supporting notion that firm value is affected by dividend policy. Both 
these theories suggest positive correlation between dividend announcements and the reaction of the 
market to the dividend announcements. However, the empirical studies report mixed results regarding 
dividend announcement effects. 
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 Some studies including Aharony and Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976), Asquith and Mullins 
(1983), Gurgul et al. (2003), Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), Dasilas and Leventis (2011) have supported 
both these hypothesis by reporting positive abnormal returns around dividend announcement days. On 
the other hand, there are some other studies which have rejected the idea of positive correlation 
between the announcements of dividend and the sub-sequent stock market price reaction (Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 2002; Chen, Firth and Gao, 2002; Vieira, 2005; and 
Hossain, Siddiquee and Rahman, 2006). These studies have found no significant evidence of associa-
tion between dividend announcements and reaction of stock market to these announcements. Further, 
some studies even have reported evidences of negative correlation between the announcements of 
dividend and the sub-sequent stock market share price reaction (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, 
Keown and Pinkerton, 1984; and Healy, Hathorn and Kirch, 1997).
 These mixed results of the past studies might be an outcome of different factors that mediates 
the dividend announcement effects. A number of factors are identified by literature that affects the 
dividend announcement effects. Baker, Powell and Veit (2002) and Baker and Powell (1999) have 
highlighted that firm specific factors may impact the association between the dividend announce-
ments and the sub-sequent reaction of stock market. Further, La Porta et al. (2000), and Ball et al. 
(2000) have argued that the ownership structure also plays a vital role in explaining the dividends 
information content and in turn the reaction of market to dividend announcements. 
 A number of studies, including Eddy and Seifert (1988), Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) Haw 
and Kim (1991), Healy et al. (1997), Said (2012), Vieira (2011), around the globe have tried to empiri-
cal test the association between different factors and dividend announcement effects. However, in 
Pakistan, no study until the date has tried to empirically figure out the variables that affect the 
dividend announcement effects of Pakistani firms. In this context, this study has made an attempt to 
determine the variables that explains the information content of dividends of Pakistani firms. Particu-
larly, this study has focused on the firm-specific factors and more specifically the firm size, ownership 
composition of a firm (whether a firm is family and non-family), leverage ratio and dividend yield.
Literature Review 
 This section presents the literature review of the past studies. First, the literature review of 
those studies has been discussed which focuses on association between the dividend announcements 
and the share price reaction. Later the focus is shifted to factors that moderate the above-mentioned 
relationship. 
 
Stock Market Reaction to Dividend Announcements
 A large number of researchers have analyzed the dividend policy and its impact on the value 
of thefirm since the seminal work of Miller and Modigliani (1961). They have used different theories 
to describe the link between the firm value and the dividend policy. Two prominent theories out of 
these are free cash flow (FCF) theory of Jensen (1986) and cash flow signaling (CFS) theory. CFS 
theory which is also called asymmetric information theory has been developed by a number of 
researchers including Ross (1977), Miller and Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and 
Williams (1985). This theory proposes that the firm’s managers, as compared to shareholders (inves-
tors), have more private information about the firm’s future prospects and they signal this private 
information to the market via dividend changes. Hence, when increase in dividends is announced by 
a firm, the stock market assumes that the future prospects of that particular firm are good and hence 
reacts positively. On the other hand, when a firm cuts dividend, the stock market assumes that the 
future prospects of that particular firm are not good and hence reacts negatively, which results in lower 
share prices of the firm. Therefore, in the context of CFS, it is expected that the stock market will react 
positively whenever dividends are announced by a firm. 
 The second theory i.e. FCF theory was developed by Jensen (1986) and is based on the 
agency relationship between managers and shareholders. This theory suggests that dividend plays a 
disciplinary role for the firm’s management. Distribution of free cash flows in the form of dividends 
decreases the conflict between managers and shareholders by making it less likely for managers to 
invest free cash flows in projects that have negative net present value. According to this argument, 
dividend announcements should result in increase in the stock prices. Therefore, like CFS theory, this 
theory also predicts positive correlation between dividend announcements and prices of stock.
 The empirical support for both the theories is mixed. Several studies including Aharony and 
Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976),  Gurgul et al. (2003), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Dasilas and 
Leventis (2011), and Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), have supported both these theories by reporting 
significant abnormal returns around announcement days. On other hand, other studies have reported 
evidence that does not support these theories (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 
2002; Vieira, 2005; Hossain et al., 2006; and Chen, et al., 2002). These studies have found no signifi-
cant abnormal returns around announcement dates. Further, some studies even have reported evidenc-
es of negative correlation between the dividend announcements and the subsequent reaction of stock 
market (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, et al., 1984; and Healy et al., 1997).
Moderating Role of Firm-Specific Factors
 Literature suggests that the mixed evidence as discussed above might be an outcome of 
different factors that moderates the stock market response to the dividend announcements. These 
factors include firm size, family ownership, leverage and dividend yield. We discuss these factors in 
details in the following paragraphs.
Family ownership
 Capulong et al. (2000) has stated that ownership composition and ownership concentration 
are the two key important dimensions of corporate ownership structures. Concentration of ownership 
deals with the distribution of power between the shareholders and the managers while on the other 
hand, composition of ownership deals with the identity of shareholders of a company and specifically 
the large shareholders. A large shareholder (also called block-holder) can be government, holding 
company, individual, bank, institutional investor or family. Thus, broadly speaking there are two 
categories of ownership composition: the family block-holder and non-family block-holder. Accord-
ing to Holderness and Sheehan (1988), and Gugler (2001), family block holder has different motiva-
tions and incentives to monitor the managers. Gorton and Kahl (1999) have argued that as compared 
to non-family block-holder, the family block-holders have greater incentive of monitoring the manag-
ers. Due to the better monitoring, the family block-holders affect the reaction of stock market to 
dividends announcements.  
 There are two leading theories that explain the relationship of family ownership with 
dividend announcements effects. These include the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory 
and Leland and Pyle’s (1977) general signaling theory. Under the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
agency cost model, it is argued that due to the better monitoring efforts of family owners, sharehold-
ers-managers interests are better aligned which reduces the agency conflicts and the agency costs. 
Therefore, if reducing agency conflicts is the motivation behind the announcement of dividend chang-
es, then the firms with family block-holder will experience weaker dividend announcement effects as 
compared to the firms with non-family block-holder. Under general Leland and Pyle’s (1977) theory 
of general signaling, it is argued that due to the better monitoring of managers by the family 
block-holders, the credibility of the manager’s decisions and the signals that they convey to the 
market increases. Therefore, due to higher credibility, the firms with family block-holders will experi-
ence stronger dividend announcement effects as compared to firms with non-family block-holder.
 Unlike the ownership concentration, only few researchers have empirically analyzed the 
dividend announcement effects in the context of family and non-family ownership. Therefore, this 
area is relatively unexplored and not enough evidences are available on this area. Recently, research-
ers have started exploring the relation between family ownership on dividend announcement effects. 
Setia-Atmaja, et al. (2004) are the first researchers who have analyzed the role of family ownership in 
mediating the dividend announcement effects in Australian environment. They reported positive 
relationship between family firms and dividend announcement effects. Contrary to Setia-Atmaja, et 
al. (2004), Vieira (2012) has reported no evidence from Portuguese Environment. 
 As discussed above, the agency cost theory predicts negative relationship while general 
signaling model predicts positive correlation between family ownership and dividend news effects. 
Hence, this study has formulated the following two competing hypothesis regarding relationship 
between family ownership and dividend announcement effects. 
H1a: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are negatively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are less than abnormal returns associ-
ated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
H1b: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are positively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are greater than abnormal returns 
associated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
Firm size
 The literature has identified the firm size as another potential variable that moderate the 
dividend announcement effects. The role of the size of the firm in determining the dividend announce-
ment effects can be described in the context of signaling or asymmetric information theory of John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). Under this theory, it is assert-
ed that as information asymmetry between equity holders and managers of firm is greater in case of 
the small size firms as compared to firms with large size; therefore, when small size firm tries to 
distribute more dividends, for the purpose of conveying signals to the outside investors about their 
future prospects, will experience greater dividend announcement effects. Therefore, in this context, 
negative relationship exists between the size of the firm and the dividend news effect.
 Empirical studies reports mixed results about the firm size relationship with the dividend 
announcement effects. Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Eddy and Seifert (1988) have reported negative 
association from the U.S. Amihud and Li (2006) and Yoon and Starks (1995). Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003) and Andres et al. (2011) have also supported signaling theory by reporting negative association 
from German environment. Vieira (2011), by utilizing the data of the UK, Portuguese and the French 
markets, have provided further evidence from the European market. She has reported interesting 
results. Her study found that dividend announcement effect is negatively correlated with the firm size 
only in the UK market while her study reported no evidence of significant association in the French 
and Portugal markets. Hussainey et al. (2011) and Zakaria et al. (2012) have also reported the same 
results from the U.K and the Malaysian Markets. 
 Based the on above literature and information asymmetric theory, this study has tested the 
following hypothesis:
H2: Reaction of stock market to the dividend news is negatively associated with the firm size. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of small-sized firms are greater than the abnormal 
returns associated with the dividend announcement of the large-sized firms.
Leverage
 Leverage is another firm specific variable that is identified by the literature as a potential 
determinant of the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Said (2012) and Vieira (2011) has 
defined leverage as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets. The role of leverage in determining 
the dividend announcement effects is explained both by Jensen’s (1986) version of FCF agency cost 
argument and signaling explanation of Ross (1977). Using Jensen’s (1986) argument, Borokhovich et 
al. (2005) have highlighted that the agency costs are lower in the firms that have higher debt ratios as 
managers in these firms are left with little cash flows under their discretions due to the payment of the 
debt and financial expenses. Therefore, dividends role in reducing agency costs is limited in these 
firms and hence a weaker dividend announcement effects will be experienced by the firm with higher 
leverage ratios. Under the second argument i.e. signaling theory of Ross (1977), it is argued that firms 
with good quality try to differentiate themselves from bad quality firms by using high leverage ratio. 
Therefore, investors interpret the dividend signals of the companies with higher leverage ratios as 
favorable as the investors anticipate that the managers of such good quality firm will be able to contin-
ue paying dividends in the future. 
 Empirical results regarding the association of the dividend news effects with leverage are 
mixed. Few studies have supported cash flow or agency theory by reporting negative association 
(Healy et al., 1997; and Alonso et al., 2005). Contrarily, Allen and Rachim (1996), Vieira (2011) and 
Zakaria et al. (2012) have supported signaling theory by reporting positive relation between the 
dividend announcement effects and leverage. 
 
 Literature suggests that the agency cost argument generally favors Pakistani environment 
more than the signaling theory regarding the role of leverage in determining different factors related 
to corporate finance and corporate performance (Nazir and Saita, 2013; Khan, Kaleem and Nazir, 
2012; and Satti, 2013). However, this study has tested two hypotheses based on the agency and the 
signaling theory in the light of empirical results reported from different countries. 
H3a: Negative association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are greater as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of the firms with high level of leverage.
H3b: Positive association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to the 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are lesser as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of firms with high level of leverage.
Dividend yield
 Dividend yield is one of the main factors that affect abnormal returns around dividend 
announcement days (Yoon and Starks, 1995; and Lee and Yan; 2003). The impact of dividend yield 
on share price reaction to dividend news can be explained in the context of agency cost and signaling 
theories. Both of the theories predict positive association between dividend announcement effects and 
dividend yield (Ariff and Finn, 1986; Lee, 1995; and Belde et al., 2005). Under the agency cost frame-
work, it is argued that high dividend yield helps in reducing agency conflicts in the firm. Hence, 
keeping other variables constant, the higher the dividend yield associated with the dividend announce-
ment, the stronger will be the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Contrarily, under the signal-
ing theory, it is argued that high dividend yield depicts that future prospects of a firm are good, there-
fore, dividend announcements that are accompanied by high dividend yield are perceived as a more 
favorable signal as compared to a dividend announcement with low dividend yield. Hence, a dividend 
announcement with high dividend yield induces stronger stock market reaction. 
 The earning response coefficient is dependent upon the earning retention rate, among other 
variables. Butler and Han (1994) argues that the share price reaction to the announcements is a 
function of earning surprise and earning response coefficient. They use dividend yield as a proxy for 
earning retention rate because actual earnings’ retention rate can go to unreasonable range if a firm has 
zero earnings or negative earnings. Dividend yield has been calculated as the per share dividend divid-
ed by the price of share five days before the announcement of dividend. Based on the above literature, 
this study has tested the following hypothesis:
H4: Positive association exists between the dividend yield and the dividend announcement effects. 
Hence, abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcements of the firms that are accompa-
nied by higher dividend yield will be greater as compared to the dividend announcement of the firms 
that are accompanied by lower dividend yield.
Growth opportunities
 Different studies have used growth opportunity as a control variable while examining 
relationship between different factors and stock market reaction to the dividend news (Vieira, 2005; 
Zakaria et al., 2012; Vieira, 2011; Neil and Robert, 2009; Vieira, 2012 and Andres et al., 2011). Past 
studies including Vieira (2011) and Andres et al. (2011) have used Tobin’s Q as a measure of inves-
tors’ expectation about the growth prospect of a firm and market to book value of equity (MV/BV) 
ratio as a proxy of Tobin’s Q. Thus, MV/BV has been used as a proxy of growth opportunity by this 
study also. According to Vieira (2011), high MV/BV shows that investors think that the firm has 
higher future growth prospects. Firms with lower MV/BV ratios are considered to have higher level 
of free cash flow and thus will be able to pay more dividends. Therefore, reaction of stock market is 
more strong to dividend news of firms that have lower MV/BV ratio, hence negative coefficient is 
expected for this variable. Among the past studies that have used MV/BV as control variable, Zakaria 
et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) have found no significant influence of this variable on the stock 
market reaction to the dividend news while Vieira (2011), Neil and Robert (2009) and Vieira (2005) 
have found negative relationship between  MV/BV and the dividend news effects. Apart from MV/BV 
ratio, this study also used price to earnings (P/E) ratio as proxy for investment opportunities by 
following Basu (1977) and Reinganum (1981). Both these studies reported negative association.
 
Methodology
Sample and Data Sources
 This section discusses the data sources, the data collection methods, the data analysis tools, 
and variables. For the purpose of the data collection, this study used simple random sampling 
technique. The sampling period ranges from year 2008 to 2012. During this sampling period, 136 
firms announced 206 annual dividends. Therefore, we analyze 206 annual dividend announcements of 
136 firms over the above-mentioned sampling period.
 The data of dividend announcements and the stock prices have been extracted from the KSE 
database. Data about the firm-specific variables and ownership structure were gathered from the 
annual reports of the firms.
Model Specification
 For testing the association of the above-mentioned variables with the dividend news effects, 
this study has utilized standard event study methodology. For generating abnormal returns market 
model has been utilized. Equation of the market model is specified as under:
Where,
Ritis return rate of security i at day t
Rmtis the rate of return of market at day t
αiis constant
βi isthe sensitivity of the expected asset return to the expected market return calculated as
 For the purpose of estimating the parameters of market model, 100 daily continuously 
compounded returns are used which ranged from approximately 145 days before the announcement 
date. KSE-100 Index is used as a market proxy. Ordinary least square method has been utilized for 
estimating the market model parameters. After estimating the parameters of market model, the follow-
ing equation has been used to calculate the expected returns:
Where,
E(Ri) is the expected return on stock iat day t
    is the estimated intercept of market model for stock i
    is the estimated beta of market model for stock i
For each dividend announcement, abnormal returns are calculated after estimating the market model 
parameters, by using the following equation:
Where,
ARit is the stock i abnormal return at day t
Rit is the actual stock i return at day t
 Abnormal returns, in case of each event (dividend announcement), are calculated for all 
event windows. After calculation of abnormal returns, average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumula-
tive abnormal returns (CAAR) are calculated for all event windows. After calculating AAR and 
CAAR, univariate and multivariate analysis has been performed. Before performing univariate and 
multivariate analyses to test the association between dividend news and aforementioned independent 
variables, the significance of the AAR and CAAR of the event windows mentioned before has been 
checked by using student t-test on overall sample.  
 For univariate analysis, independent samples t-test has been used while for multivariate 
analysis, regression analysis has been performed. In univariate analysis, independent sample t-test has 
been performed on AAR and CAAR of lower 50th and upper 50th percentile of each variable (exclud-
ing family ownership in case of which test has been conducted on AAR and CAAR of family and 
non-family groups). In multivariate analysis, regression has been run by using both AAR and CAAR 
as dependent variables. The following are the regression equations with a full set of explanatory 
variables:
ARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e ……(1)
CAARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e…(2)
Where,
AARt is average abnormal return of specific event window
CAARt is cumulative average abnormal return of specific event window
β1 is the co-efficient of family and indicates relationship between family ownership and AARt and 
CAARt
β2 is the co-efficient of LMV (firm size) and indicates relationship between firm size and AARt and 
CAARt
β3 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β4 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β5is the co-efficient of growth opportunity (MV/BV) and indicates relationship between MV/BV and 
AARt and CAARt
 Before performing these formal tests to determine the relationship between four aforemen-
tioned independent variables and stock market reaction to dividend news, a series of diagnostic tests 
were conducted to identify problems in the data. Details of these diagnostic tests and remedial actions 
are not reported for the sake of parsimony.
Results and Discussion
T-tests Results
 Table 1 below reports mean values of AAR and CAAR for the event windows ranging from 
five days prior to dividend announcement to five days after dividend announcements. All tables in this 
paper were constructed using asdoc program of Shah (2018).
 Table 1 shows that p-values of mean values of AAR and CAAR are statistically significant 
only in few event windows. For example, AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, CAARt0, AARt-2, 
AARt-5 and CAARt-2 are significant at five percent level while CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant 
only at the 10 percent level. Averages of all these significant AARs and CAARs are positive which 
shows that market reacts positively to the announcements of dividend. Moreover, significance of 
AARt-2, CAARt-2, and AART-1 indicates leakage of information about the dividend announcements 
prior to announcement of these dividends. 
 For further analysis, those event windows have been used analysis that have significant 
AARs and CAARs. Therefore, we use AARt-2, AARt-5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, and CAARt0 as depen-
dent variables in the regressions analysis to test their relationship with the previously mentioned four 
explanatory variables.
Table 1
Means and T-Tests of the Abnormal Returns in Different Event Windows
Univariate Analyses
 
This section presents and discusses results of the t-tests to find whether firm-specific variables 
moderate reaction of stock market to dividend news. The median values of each firm-specific variable 
is used to divide firms into two above 50th and below 50th percentiles, except for family ownership 
for which the groups have been made based on family vs. non-family status of firms. Then AAR and 
CAAR have been calculated for these groups of firms. Table 2 reports that mean differences of these 
abnormal returns under the heading of each firm-specific variable that have been used for making 
group of firms. For example, the column with heading ‘Size shows the mean abnormal returns of 
firms that are in the 50th top percentile of firm size minus mean abnormal returns of firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile of firm size.
 The results show that family firms have lower abnormal returns than non-family firms. The 
p-values show that the mean differences are significant only in case of AARt-5 at one percent level of 
significance and in case AARt-2 at five percent level of significance. Results also show that reaction 
of stock market to dividend news is stronger for smaller firms as compared to larger firms.  This is 
evident from the column with the heading ‘Size’, showing that mean differences of CAARt-2 and 
CAARt0 are negative and statistically significant. Results also depicts that firm’s leverage ratio 
significantly moderates the dividend news effects. For example, mean differences in abnormal returns 
are significantly higher for dividend announcements in firms with lower leverage ratios as compared 
to firms that have high leverage ratios. Finally, there is some evidence that firms with lower dividend 
yield experience more reaction to dividend announcements as compared to firms with higher 
dividend yield.
This section presents and discusses results of the t-test to find
Table 2
Mean Differences in Return
Regressions Results
 Regression analysis results are reported in Table 3. The coefficients of the dummy variables 
used to indicate family firms are negative in all the event windows, except CAARt-1 where it is 
positive. In line with the results reported in univariate analysis, coefficient of family dummy is signifi-
cant and negative in AARt-2 and AARt-5 while it is insignificant in case of the rest of the event 
windows. It shows that announcement effects of family firms are weaker as compared to announce-
ment effects of non-family firms. This finding supports the agency theory explanation that family 
ownership reduces conflict between principal and agent and hence dividends lose its importance as a 
tool to reduce agency costs.
 The results show that the firm size coefficient is negative and statistically significant in case 
of CAARt-2 and CAAR0 while coefficients of abnormal returns in other event windows are insignifi-
cant. Result of the regression analysis supports the findings of univariate analysis as reported in Table 
2. These findings show that abnormal returns due to dividend announcements are significantly lower 
for firms that are placed in the top 50th percentile of the firm size as compared to the firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile. These results are in line with information asymmetric theory of Miller and 
Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and Williams (1985) that predicts that small firms face 
more information asymmetry problems and hence dividends are an effective tool for them in reducing 
information asymmetry costs.
Table 3
Regression Results
 Leverage coefficient is negative and significant in case of AARt+5, CAARt-2 and CAARt-1. 
These results indicate that negative relationship exists between leverage and dividend news effects. 
Our results support the free cash flow argument of agency theory which suggests that agency costs are 
lower in firms that have high leverage ratio; hence dividend announcement effects are weaker in such 
firms. Positive and statistically significant dividend yield coefficient is reported in case of AARt+5 
and CAARt0 while it is insignificant in all other event windows. Generally, the results suggest that 
firms with higher dividend yield experience strong dividend announcement effects. 
 MV/BV and P/E ratio have been used as alternative proxies for firm’s investment opportuni-
ties. Results in Table 3 show that MV/BV has no significant influence on the dividend announcement 
effects. This finding is consistent with Zakaria et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) who found no 
significant influence of this variable on dividend announcement effects. However, the second proxy 
for investment opportunities, the P/E ratio, has statistically significant negative coefficient in case of 
AARt-5 and CAARt-1. These findings suggest that dividend announcement effects are weaker for 
firms with higher growth opportunities and stronger for firms that have less investment opportunities. 
Conclusion
 This study has empirically sought to determine the relation between the dividend announce-
ment effects and the firm-specific factors including family ownership, dividend yield, firm size and 
leverage ratio of firms.  Results of two-sample t-test indicate that only AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, 
CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant, therefore, cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal returns 
of these event windows were used as dependent variables in the regression analysis. Both multiple 
regression and univariate analyses have been employed to determine the moderating role of the 
firm-specific independent variables on the market reaction to the dividend news. The results of both 
univariate and regression analyses are consistent. Negative relation is reported between the abnormal 
returns and the family ownership. It affirms that the stock market gives lesser importance to the 
dividend announcement of family firms than the announcements of non-family firms. This might be 
because of lower level of agency problems in the family firms as suggested by the Jensen and Meck-
ling’s (1976) agency hypothesis. Further, this study discovered a negative association between the size 
of the firm and the dividend news effect. This negative relation is explained by the information asym-
metry theory of John and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). This 
finding is in line with the finding of other empirical studies such as Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Andres 
et al. (2011), Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Amihud and Li (2006). Next, a negative association is found 
between the abnormal returns and the leverage. This negative association is in line with Jensen’s (1986) 
agency theory. Further, a positive relation is found between the dividend yield and the dividend abnor-
mal returns. Among the control variables, this study found that investment opportunities measured by 
MV/BV have no effect on the share price reaction to the dividend announcement while P/E ratio has 
significant negative effect on abnormal returns. These findings show that the reaction of the stock 
market to the dividend announcement is heterogeneous. Firms with significant agency problems and 
information asymmetry problems experience positive abnormal stock returns when they announce 
dividends. 
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THE ROLE OF FIRM-SPECIFIC VARIABLES IN 
EXPLAINING HETEROGENEOUS STOCK 
MARKET REACTIONS TO DIVIDEND
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Abstract
The finance literature reports mixed results about the dividend announcements and stock market 
reaction to those announcements. This study posits that the heterogeneous reaction of stock market to 
dividend announcements might be a result of several firm-specific financial and non-financial factors. 
In this vein, this study has tried to analyze the role of family-ownership, firm-size, leverage, and 
dividend yield in defining the dividend announcement effects. Using a sample of 206 dividend 
announcements of 136 firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period of 2008 to 2012, 
the results of both the univariate tests and the regression analysis show that the reaction of stock 
market to dividend announcements varies significantly across different groups of firms. Specifically, 
our results show that family ownership, firm-size, dividend yield and leverage significantly mediate  
the reaction of stock market around dividend announcement days. 
Keywords: Heterogeneous Reaction, Abnormal Returns, Family Ownership, Pakistan Stock 
Exchange.
JEL Classification: G 230
Introduction
 The corporate dividend policy have been a widely-debated subject in the domain of corpo-
rate finance and a large number of studies has explored different angles of dividend policy. One such 
angle is the stock market reaction to dividend announcements. Miller and Modigliani (1961), argues 
that dividend policy does not impact the firm value in perfect capital markets. However, Jensen’s 
(1986) Free Cash Flow (FCF) theory and Cash Flow Signaling Theory presented by Ross (1977), John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985) have rejected the argument of 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) by supporting notion that firm value is affected by dividend policy. Both 
these theories suggest positive correlation between dividend announcements and the reaction of the 
market to the dividend announcements. However, the empirical studies report mixed results regarding 
dividend announcement effects. 
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 Some studies including Aharony and Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976), Asquith and Mullins 
(1983), Gurgul et al. (2003), Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), Dasilas and Leventis (2011) have supported 
both these hypothesis by reporting positive abnormal returns around dividend announcement days. On 
the other hand, there are some other studies which have rejected the idea of positive correlation 
between the announcements of dividend and the sub-sequent stock market price reaction (Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 2002; Chen, Firth and Gao, 2002; Vieira, 2005; and 
Hossain, Siddiquee and Rahman, 2006). These studies have found no significant evidence of associa-
tion between dividend announcements and reaction of stock market to these announcements. Further, 
some studies even have reported evidences of negative correlation between the announcements of 
dividend and the sub-sequent stock market share price reaction (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, 
Keown and Pinkerton, 1984; and Healy, Hathorn and Kirch, 1997).
 These mixed results of the past studies might be an outcome of different factors that mediates 
the dividend announcement effects. A number of factors are identified by literature that affects the 
dividend announcement effects. Baker, Powell and Veit (2002) and Baker and Powell (1999) have 
highlighted that firm specific factors may impact the association between the dividend announce-
ments and the sub-sequent reaction of stock market. Further, La Porta et al. (2000), and Ball et al. 
(2000) have argued that the ownership structure also plays a vital role in explaining the dividends 
information content and in turn the reaction of market to dividend announcements. 
 A number of studies, including Eddy and Seifert (1988), Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) Haw 
and Kim (1991), Healy et al. (1997), Said (2012), Vieira (2011), around the globe have tried to empiri-
cal test the association between different factors and dividend announcement effects. However, in 
Pakistan, no study until the date has tried to empirically figure out the variables that affect the 
dividend announcement effects of Pakistani firms. In this context, this study has made an attempt to 
determine the variables that explains the information content of dividends of Pakistani firms. Particu-
larly, this study has focused on the firm-specific factors and more specifically the firm size, ownership 
composition of a firm (whether a firm is family and non-family), leverage ratio and dividend yield.
Literature Review 
 This section presents the literature review of the past studies. First, the literature review of 
those studies has been discussed which focuses on association between the dividend announcements 
and the share price reaction. Later the focus is shifted to factors that moderate the above-mentioned 
relationship. 
 
Stock Market Reaction to Dividend Announcements
 A large number of researchers have analyzed the dividend policy and its impact on the value 
of thefirm since the seminal work of Miller and Modigliani (1961). They have used different theories 
to describe the link between the firm value and the dividend policy. Two prominent theories out of 
these are free cash flow (FCF) theory of Jensen (1986) and cash flow signaling (CFS) theory. CFS 
theory which is also called asymmetric information theory has been developed by a number of 
researchers including Ross (1977), Miller and Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and 
Williams (1985). This theory proposes that the firm’s managers, as compared to shareholders (inves-
tors), have more private information about the firm’s future prospects and they signal this private 
information to the market via dividend changes. Hence, when increase in dividends is announced by 
a firm, the stock market assumes that the future prospects of that particular firm are good and hence 
reacts positively. On the other hand, when a firm cuts dividend, the stock market assumes that the 
future prospects of that particular firm are not good and hence reacts negatively, which results in lower 
share prices of the firm. Therefore, in the context of CFS, it is expected that the stock market will react 
positively whenever dividends are announced by a firm. 
 The second theory i.e. FCF theory was developed by Jensen (1986) and is based on the 
agency relationship between managers and shareholders. This theory suggests that dividend plays a 
disciplinary role for the firm’s management. Distribution of free cash flows in the form of dividends 
decreases the conflict between managers and shareholders by making it less likely for managers to 
invest free cash flows in projects that have negative net present value. According to this argument, 
dividend announcements should result in increase in the stock prices. Therefore, like CFS theory, this 
theory also predicts positive correlation between dividend announcements and prices of stock.
 The empirical support for both the theories is mixed. Several studies including Aharony and 
Swary (1980), Pettit (1972, 1976),  Gurgul et al. (2003), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Dasilas and 
Leventis (2011), and Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), have supported both these theories by reporting 
significant abnormal returns around announcement days. On other hand, other studies have reported 
evidence that does not support these theories (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Abeyratna and Power, 
2002; Vieira, 2005; Hossain et al., 2006; and Chen, et al., 2002). These studies have found no signifi-
cant abnormal returns around announcement dates. Further, some studies even have reported evidenc-
es of negative correlation between the dividend announcements and the subsequent reaction of stock 
market (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Benesh, et al., 1984; and Healy et al., 1997).
Moderating Role of Firm-Specific Factors
 Literature suggests that the mixed evidence as discussed above might be an outcome of 
different factors that moderates the stock market response to the dividend announcements. These 
factors include firm size, family ownership, leverage and dividend yield. We discuss these factors in 
details in the following paragraphs.
Family ownership
 Capulong et al. (2000) has stated that ownership composition and ownership concentration 
are the two key important dimensions of corporate ownership structures. Concentration of ownership 
deals with the distribution of power between the shareholders and the managers while on the other 
hand, composition of ownership deals with the identity of shareholders of a company and specifically 
the large shareholders. A large shareholder (also called block-holder) can be government, holding 
company, individual, bank, institutional investor or family. Thus, broadly speaking there are two 
categories of ownership composition: the family block-holder and non-family block-holder. Accord-
ing to Holderness and Sheehan (1988), and Gugler (2001), family block holder has different motiva-
tions and incentives to monitor the managers. Gorton and Kahl (1999) have argued that as compared 
to non-family block-holder, the family block-holders have greater incentive of monitoring the manag-
ers. Due to the better monitoring, the family block-holders affect the reaction of stock market to 
dividends announcements.  
 There are two leading theories that explain the relationship of family ownership with 
dividend announcements effects. These include the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory 
and Leland and Pyle’s (1977) general signaling theory. Under the Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
agency cost model, it is argued that due to the better monitoring efforts of family owners, sharehold-
ers-managers interests are better aligned which reduces the agency conflicts and the agency costs. 
Therefore, if reducing agency conflicts is the motivation behind the announcement of dividend chang-
es, then the firms with family block-holder will experience weaker dividend announcement effects as 
compared to the firms with non-family block-holder. Under general Leland and Pyle’s (1977) theory 
of general signaling, it is argued that due to the better monitoring of managers by the family 
block-holders, the credibility of the manager’s decisions and the signals that they convey to the 
market increases. Therefore, due to higher credibility, the firms with family block-holders will experi-
ence stronger dividend announcement effects as compared to firms with non-family block-holder.
 Unlike the ownership concentration, only few researchers have empirically analyzed the 
dividend announcement effects in the context of family and non-family ownership. Therefore, this 
area is relatively unexplored and not enough evidences are available on this area. Recently, research-
ers have started exploring the relation between family ownership on dividend announcement effects. 
Setia-Atmaja, et al. (2004) are the first researchers who have analyzed the role of family ownership in 
mediating the dividend announcement effects in Australian environment. They reported positive 
relationship between family firms and dividend announcement effects. Contrary to Setia-Atmaja, et 
al. (2004), Vieira (2012) has reported no evidence from Portuguese Environment. 
 As discussed above, the agency cost theory predicts negative relationship while general 
signaling model predicts positive correlation between family ownership and dividend news effects. 
Hence, this study has formulated the following two competing hypothesis regarding relationship 
between family ownership and dividend announcement effects. 
H1a: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are negatively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are less than abnormal returns associ-
ated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
H1b: Family ownership and stock market reaction to dividend news are positively associated. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of family firms are greater than abnormal returns 
associated with dividend announcement of non-family firms.
Firm size
 The literature has identified the firm size as another potential variable that moderate the 
dividend announcement effects. The role of the size of the firm in determining the dividend announce-
ment effects can be described in the context of signaling or asymmetric information theory of John 
and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). Under this theory, it is assert-
ed that as information asymmetry between equity holders and managers of firm is greater in case of 
the small size firms as compared to firms with large size; therefore, when small size firm tries to 
distribute more dividends, for the purpose of conveying signals to the outside investors about their 
future prospects, will experience greater dividend announcement effects. Therefore, in this context, 
negative relationship exists between the size of the firm and the dividend news effect.
 Empirical studies reports mixed results about the firm size relationship with the dividend 
announcement effects. Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Eddy and Seifert (1988) have reported negative 
association from the U.S. Amihud and Li (2006) and Yoon and Starks (1995). Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003) and Andres et al. (2011) have also supported signaling theory by reporting negative association 
from German environment. Vieira (2011), by utilizing the data of the UK, Portuguese and the French 
markets, have provided further evidence from the European market. She has reported interesting 
results. Her study found that dividend announcement effect is negatively correlated with the firm size 
only in the UK market while her study reported no evidence of significant association in the French 
and Portugal markets. Hussainey et al. (2011) and Zakaria et al. (2012) have also reported the same 
results from the U.K and the Malaysian Markets. 
 Based the on above literature and information asymmetric theory, this study has tested the 
following hypothesis:
H2: Reaction of stock market to the dividend news is negatively associated with the firm size. Hence, 
abnormal returns associated with dividend news of small-sized firms are greater than the abnormal 
returns associated with the dividend announcement of the large-sized firms.
Leverage
 Leverage is another firm specific variable that is identified by the literature as a potential 
determinant of the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Said (2012) and Vieira (2011) has 
defined leverage as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets. The role of leverage in determining 
the dividend announcement effects is explained both by Jensen’s (1986) version of FCF agency cost 
argument and signaling explanation of Ross (1977). Using Jensen’s (1986) argument, Borokhovich et 
al. (2005) have highlighted that the agency costs are lower in the firms that have higher debt ratios as 
managers in these firms are left with little cash flows under their discretions due to the payment of the 
debt and financial expenses. Therefore, dividends role in reducing agency costs is limited in these 
firms and hence a weaker dividend announcement effects will be experienced by the firm with higher 
leverage ratios. Under the second argument i.e. signaling theory of Ross (1977), it is argued that firms 
with good quality try to differentiate themselves from bad quality firms by using high leverage ratio. 
Therefore, investors interpret the dividend signals of the companies with higher leverage ratios as 
favorable as the investors anticipate that the managers of such good quality firm will be able to contin-
ue paying dividends in the future. 
 Empirical results regarding the association of the dividend news effects with leverage are 
mixed. Few studies have supported cash flow or agency theory by reporting negative association 
(Healy et al., 1997; and Alonso et al., 2005). Contrarily, Allen and Rachim (1996), Vieira (2011) and 
Zakaria et al. (2012) have supported signaling theory by reporting positive relation between the 
dividend announcement effects and leverage. 
 
 Literature suggests that the agency cost argument generally favors Pakistani environment 
more than the signaling theory regarding the role of leverage in determining different factors related 
to corporate finance and corporate performance (Nazir and Saita, 2013; Khan, Kaleem and Nazir, 
2012; and Satti, 2013). However, this study has tested two hypotheses based on the agency and the 
signaling theory in the light of empirical results reported from different countries. 
H3a: Negative association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are greater as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of the firms with high level of leverage.
H3b: Positive association exists between the leverage of the firm and the stock market reaction to the 
dividend news. Hence, abnormal returns associated with dividend news of firms with low level of 
leverage are lesser as compared to the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcement 
of firms with high level of leverage.
Dividend yield
 Dividend yield is one of the main factors that affect abnormal returns around dividend 
announcement days (Yoon and Starks, 1995; and Lee and Yan; 2003). The impact of dividend yield 
on share price reaction to dividend news can be explained in the context of agency cost and signaling 
theories. Both of the theories predict positive association between dividend announcement effects and 
dividend yield (Ariff and Finn, 1986; Lee, 1995; and Belde et al., 2005). Under the agency cost frame-
work, it is argued that high dividend yield helps in reducing agency conflicts in the firm. Hence, 
keeping other variables constant, the higher the dividend yield associated with the dividend announce-
ment, the stronger will be the stock market reaction to the dividend news. Contrarily, under the signal-
ing theory, it is argued that high dividend yield depicts that future prospects of a firm are good, there-
fore, dividend announcements that are accompanied by high dividend yield are perceived as a more 
favorable signal as compared to a dividend announcement with low dividend yield. Hence, a dividend 
announcement with high dividend yield induces stronger stock market reaction. 
 The earning response coefficient is dependent upon the earning retention rate, among other 
variables. Butler and Han (1994) argues that the share price reaction to the announcements is a 
function of earning surprise and earning response coefficient. They use dividend yield as a proxy for 
earning retention rate because actual earnings’ retention rate can go to unreasonable range if a firm has 
zero earnings or negative earnings. Dividend yield has been calculated as the per share dividend divid-
ed by the price of share five days before the announcement of dividend. Based on the above literature, 
this study has tested the following hypothesis:
H4: Positive association exists between the dividend yield and the dividend announcement effects. 
Hence, abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcements of the firms that are accompa-
nied by higher dividend yield will be greater as compared to the dividend announcement of the firms 
that are accompanied by lower dividend yield.
Growth opportunities
 Different studies have used growth opportunity as a control variable while examining 
relationship between different factors and stock market reaction to the dividend news (Vieira, 2005; 
Zakaria et al., 2012; Vieira, 2011; Neil and Robert, 2009; Vieira, 2012 and Andres et al., 2011). Past 
studies including Vieira (2011) and Andres et al. (2011) have used Tobin’s Q as a measure of inves-
tors’ expectation about the growth prospect of a firm and market to book value of equity (MV/BV) 
ratio as a proxy of Tobin’s Q. Thus, MV/BV has been used as a proxy of growth opportunity by this 
study also. According to Vieira (2011), high MV/BV shows that investors think that the firm has 
higher future growth prospects. Firms with lower MV/BV ratios are considered to have higher level 
of free cash flow and thus will be able to pay more dividends. Therefore, reaction of stock market is 
more strong to dividend news of firms that have lower MV/BV ratio, hence negative coefficient is 
expected for this variable. Among the past studies that have used MV/BV as control variable, Zakaria 
et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) have found no significant influence of this variable on the stock 
market reaction to the dividend news while Vieira (2011), Neil and Robert (2009) and Vieira (2005) 
have found negative relationship between  MV/BV and the dividend news effects. Apart from MV/BV 
ratio, this study also used price to earnings (P/E) ratio as proxy for investment opportunities by 
following Basu (1977) and Reinganum (1981). Both these studies reported negative association.
 
Methodology
Sample and Data Sources
 This section discusses the data sources, the data collection methods, the data analysis tools, 
and variables. For the purpose of the data collection, this study used simple random sampling 
technique. The sampling period ranges from year 2008 to 2012. During this sampling period, 136 
firms announced 206 annual dividends. Therefore, we analyze 206 annual dividend announcements of 
136 firms over the above-mentioned sampling period.
 The data of dividend announcements and the stock prices have been extracted from the KSE 
database. Data about the firm-specific variables and ownership structure were gathered from the 
annual reports of the firms.
Model Specification
 For testing the association of the above-mentioned variables with the dividend news effects, 
this study has utilized standard event study methodology. For generating abnormal returns market 
model has been utilized. Equation of the market model is specified as under:
Where,
Ritis return rate of security i at day t
Rmtis the rate of return of market at day t
αiis constant
βi isthe sensitivity of the expected asset return to the expected market return calculated as
 For the purpose of estimating the parameters of market model, 100 daily continuously 
compounded returns are used which ranged from approximately 145 days before the announcement 
date. KSE-100 Index is used as a market proxy. Ordinary least square method has been utilized for 
estimating the market model parameters. After estimating the parameters of market model, the follow-
ing equation has been used to calculate the expected returns:
Where,
E(Ri) is the expected return on stock iat day t
    is the estimated intercept of market model for stock i
    is the estimated beta of market model for stock i
For each dividend announcement, abnormal returns are calculated after estimating the market model 
parameters, by using the following equation:
Where,
ARit is the stock i abnormal return at day t
Rit is the actual stock i return at day t
 Abnormal returns, in case of each event (dividend announcement), are calculated for all 
event windows. After calculation of abnormal returns, average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumula-
tive abnormal returns (CAAR) are calculated for all event windows. After calculating AAR and 
CAAR, univariate and multivariate analysis has been performed. Before performing univariate and 
multivariate analyses to test the association between dividend news and aforementioned independent 
variables, the significance of the AAR and CAAR of the event windows mentioned before has been 
checked by using student t-test on overall sample.  
 For univariate analysis, independent samples t-test has been used while for multivariate 
analysis, regression analysis has been performed. In univariate analysis, independent sample t-test has 
been performed on AAR and CAAR of lower 50th and upper 50th percentile of each variable (exclud-
ing family ownership in case of which test has been conducted on AAR and CAAR of family and 
non-family groups). In multivariate analysis, regression has been run by using both AAR and CAAR 
as dependent variables. The following are the regression equations with a full set of explanatory 
variables:
ARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e ……(1)
CAARt = α+β1 Family+ β2 LMV+ β3 Leverage+ β4 DY+ β5  MV/BV+e…(2)
Where,
AARt is average abnormal return of specific event window
CAARt is cumulative average abnormal return of specific event window
β1 is the co-efficient of family and indicates relationship between family ownership and AARt and 
CAARt
β2 is the co-efficient of LMV (firm size) and indicates relationship between firm size and AARt and 
CAARt
β3 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β4 is the co-efficient of leverage and indicates relationship between leverage and AARt and CAARt
β5is the co-efficient of growth opportunity (MV/BV) and indicates relationship between MV/BV and 
AARt and CAARt
 Before performing these formal tests to determine the relationship between four aforemen-
tioned independent variables and stock market reaction to dividend news, a series of diagnostic tests 
were conducted to identify problems in the data. Details of these diagnostic tests and remedial actions 
are not reported for the sake of parsimony.
Results and Discussion
T-tests Results
 Table 1 below reports mean values of AAR and CAAR for the event windows ranging from 
five days prior to dividend announcement to five days after dividend announcements. All tables in this 
paper were constructed using asdoc program of Shah (2018).
 Table 1 shows that p-values of mean values of AAR and CAAR are statistically significant 
only in few event windows. For example, AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, CAARt0, AARt-2, 
AARt-5 and CAARt-2 are significant at five percent level while CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant 
only at the 10 percent level. Averages of all these significant AARs and CAARs are positive which 
shows that market reacts positively to the announcements of dividend. Moreover, significance of 
AARt-2, CAARt-2, and AART-1 indicates leakage of information about the dividend announcements 
prior to announcement of these dividends. 
 For further analysis, those event windows have been used analysis that have significant 
AARs and CAARs. Therefore, we use AARt-2, AARt-5, CAARt-2, CAARt-1, and CAARt0 as depen-
dent variables in the regressions analysis to test their relationship with the previously mentioned four 
explanatory variables.
Table 1
Means and T-Tests of the Abnormal Returns in Different Event Windows
Univariate Analyses
 
This section presents and discusses results of the t-tests to find whether firm-specific variables 
moderate reaction of stock market to dividend news. The median values of each firm-specific variable 
is used to divide firms into two above 50th and below 50th percentiles, except for family ownership 
for which the groups have been made based on family vs. non-family status of firms. Then AAR and 
CAAR have been calculated for these groups of firms. Table 2 reports that mean differences of these 
abnormal returns under the heading of each firm-specific variable that have been used for making 
group of firms. For example, the column with heading ‘Size shows the mean abnormal returns of 
firms that are in the 50th top percentile of firm size minus mean abnormal returns of firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile of firm size.
 The results show that family firms have lower abnormal returns than non-family firms. The 
p-values show that the mean differences are significant only in case of AARt-5 at one percent level of 
significance and in case AARt-2 at five percent level of significance. Results also show that reaction 
of stock market to dividend news is stronger for smaller firms as compared to larger firms.  This is 
evident from the column with the heading ‘Size’, showing that mean differences of CAARt-2 and 
CAARt0 are negative and statistically significant. Results also depicts that firm’s leverage ratio 
significantly moderates the dividend news effects. For example, mean differences in abnormal returns 
are significantly higher for dividend announcements in firms with lower leverage ratios as compared 
to firms that have high leverage ratios. Finally, there is some evidence that firms with lower dividend 
yield experience more reaction to dividend announcements as compared to firms with higher 
dividend yield.
This section presents and discusses results of the t-test to find
Table 2
Mean Differences in Return
Regressions Results
 Regression analysis results are reported in Table 3. The coefficients of the dummy variables 
used to indicate family firms are negative in all the event windows, except CAARt-1 where it is 
positive. In line with the results reported in univariate analysis, coefficient of family dummy is signifi-
cant and negative in AARt-2 and AARt-5 while it is insignificant in case of the rest of the event 
windows. It shows that announcement effects of family firms are weaker as compared to announce-
ment effects of non-family firms. This finding supports the agency theory explanation that family 
ownership reduces conflict between principal and agent and hence dividends lose its importance as a 
tool to reduce agency costs.
 The results show that the firm size coefficient is negative and statistically significant in case 
of CAARt-2 and CAAR0 while coefficients of abnormal returns in other event windows are insignifi-
cant. Result of the regression analysis supports the findings of univariate analysis as reported in Table 
2. These findings show that abnormal returns due to dividend announcements are significantly lower 
for firms that are placed in the top 50th percentile of the firm size as compared to the firms that are in 
the bottom 50th percentile. These results are in line with information asymmetric theory of Miller and 
Rock (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and John and Williams (1985) that predicts that small firms face 
more information asymmetry problems and hence dividends are an effective tool for them in reducing 
information asymmetry costs.
Table 3
Regression Results
 Leverage coefficient is negative and significant in case of AARt+5, CAARt-2 and CAARt-1. 
These results indicate that negative relationship exists between leverage and dividend news effects. 
Our results support the free cash flow argument of agency theory which suggests that agency costs are 
lower in firms that have high leverage ratio; hence dividend announcement effects are weaker in such 
firms. Positive and statistically significant dividend yield coefficient is reported in case of AARt+5 
and CAARt0 while it is insignificant in all other event windows. Generally, the results suggest that 
firms with higher dividend yield experience strong dividend announcement effects. 
 MV/BV and P/E ratio have been used as alternative proxies for firm’s investment opportuni-
ties. Results in Table 3 show that MV/BV has no significant influence on the dividend announcement 
effects. This finding is consistent with Zakaria et al. (2012) and Andres et al. (2011) who found no 
significant influence of this variable on dividend announcement effects. However, the second proxy 
for investment opportunities, the P/E ratio, has statistically significant negative coefficient in case of 
AARt-5 and CAARt-1. These findings suggest that dividend announcement effects are weaker for 
firms with higher growth opportunities and stronger for firms that have less investment opportunities. 
Conclusion
 This study has empirically sought to determine the relation between the dividend announce-
ment effects and the firm-specific factors including family ownership, dividend yield, firm size and 
leverage ratio of firms.  Results of two-sample t-test indicate that only AARt-2, AARt+5, CAARt-2, 
CAARt-1 and CAARt0 are significant, therefore, cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal returns 
of these event windows were used as dependent variables in the regression analysis. Both multiple 
regression and univariate analyses have been employed to determine the moderating role of the 
firm-specific independent variables on the market reaction to the dividend news. The results of both 
univariate and regression analyses are consistent. Negative relation is reported between the abnormal 
returns and the family ownership. It affirms that the stock market gives lesser importance to the 
dividend announcement of family firms than the announcements of non-family firms. This might be 
because of lower level of agency problems in the family firms as suggested by the Jensen and Meck-
ling’s (1976) agency hypothesis. Further, this study discovered a negative association between the size 
of the firm and the dividend news effect. This negative relation is explained by the information asym-
metry theory of John and Williams (1985), Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985). This 
finding is in line with the finding of other empirical studies such as Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Andres 
et al. (2011), Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Amihud and Li (2006). Next, a negative association is found 
between the abnormal returns and the leverage. This negative association is in line with Jensen’s (1986) 
agency theory. Further, a positive relation is found between the dividend yield and the dividend abnor-
mal returns. Among the control variables, this study found that investment opportunities measured by 
MV/BV have no effect on the share price reaction to the dividend announcement while P/E ratio has 
significant negative effect on abnormal returns. These findings show that the reaction of the stock 
market to the dividend announcement is heterogeneous. Firms with significant agency problems and 
information asymmetry problems experience positive abnormal stock returns when they announce 
dividends. 
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